domingo, 6 de abril de 2014

Israel vs Palestina: História de um conflito LIII (01/2006)



A Palestina começou o ano de 2006 em campanha eleitoral entusiasmada. Lembrava o entusiasmo da minha geração quando votou pela primeira vez após um longo e tenebroso regime militar.
A diferença é que na Palestina o ogro continuava a postos, vigilante e pronto para dar o bote.
Infringindo mais uma vez as leis internacionais, o general Ariel Sharon usou a IDF, Forças militares israelenses de ocupação, para aumentar as restrições de movimento dos civis palestinos na Cisjordânia e assim complicar o processo eleitoral em todos os níveis.
(Na Faixa de Gaza após o desmantelamento das invasões judias, a presença dos soldados no solo era menor, e a IDF temia. Deixava os drones espiões dominarem os ares, os drones armados atuarem com bombas esporádicas, mas embaixo não se via uniformes.)
Na Cisjordânia era outra história. Os batalhões de ocupação ilharam o norte. Separaram as cidades e dificultaram ainda mais o trânsito dos cidadãos adultos e dos estudantes. Passar de um município a outro e muitas vezes até dentro deles era dificílimo e em certos dias, impossível.
Desde agosto de 2005 que o checkpoint de Qalandya, entre Ramallah e Jerusalém, fora reforçado com "currais" mais estreitos e com mais grades.
No mesmo período, o checkpoint Za'tara no sul de Nablus, fora transformado em crossing point, ou seja, em uma travessia gradeada no modelo de Qalandya.
Com estas medidas, o General Primeiro Ministro israelense recortaria ainda mais a Cisjordânia (na surdina, mas de maneira bem visível) em três zonas separadas, cuja continuidade a IDF controlava nos mínimos detalhes. Detia mercadorias, ambulâncias e passantes por hora ou horas, dependendo  das ordens ou do estado de ânimo dos soldados. 
O objetivo da manobra militar era dissuadir o trânsito, diminuir ainda mais a comunicação entre familias e amigos a fim de derrubar o moral; prejudicar ainda mais a economia obstaculando o acesso ao trabalho e o tráfego de mercadorias; prejudicar ainda mais o ensino impedindo que os meninos e os jovens  acedessem às escolas e às universidades; perturbar o atendimento médico; evitar a interação entre a população e portanto dificultar a campanha eleitoral; e também, provocar, provocar, provocar, apertar o garrote ao máximo a fim de que os palestinos não aguentassem mais.
Em janeiro de 2006, a IDF controlava totalmente as três zonas cercadas.
Impediam diariamente residentes de Tulkarm e Jenin de atravessar o checkpoint de Za'tara. E além disso, só autorizavam, aleatoriamente, a passagem a "casos humanitários".
Ariel Sharon queria penalizar os palestinos por terem conseguido, após anos de espera, apoio da ONU para a realização de um sufrágio democrático. E conseguiu. Estas medidas penalizaram diretamente no mínimo 800 mil palestinos que moravam na região e dezenas de milhares de comerciantes, trabalhadores, camponeses, estudantes, do centro e do sul da Cisjordânia que precisavam de acesso semanal ou diário ao Norte.
Era uma violação flagrante dos direitos civis, políticos, econômicos, sociais e culturais dos palestinos. Porém, Mahmoud Abbas, que estava tentando por todos os meios conciliar, não denunciou a pena draconiamana que Israel causava a sues compatriotas, e a ONU, uma vez mais, não reagiu como devia.
Além destas infrações, a IDF fechou um monte de estradas que ligavam comunidades.
A estrada entre Jenin e Nablus foi bloqueada por portão e grade de ferro instalados perto da colônia-invasão judia Shavi Shoron, instalada no norte de Nablus.

A estrada que liga Nablus a Tulkarm também foi bloqueada com o mesmo tipo de portão montado perto do vilarejo de Anabta.
Tulkarm e Qalqylia foram separadas pelo checkpoint al-Kafriyat, no sul de Tulkarm; e Qalqylia e Nablus, idem - o checkpoint foi erguido no leste de Qalqylia.
Os palestinos foram obrigados a andar horas à busca de passagens alternativas para ir trabalhar, estudar, consultar um médico, entregar produtos aos mercados. O custo financeiro e o desgaste físico-mental-emocional foram enormes.
Em janeiro, na véspera das eleições, havia mais de 400 blitz e checkpoints na Cisjordânia. Vale lembrar que o território tem apenas 5.879 quilômetros quadrados. Virou mesmo uma colcha de retalhos ainda menores.

Ramallah durante a campanha
Este retalhamento militar "coincidiu" com o início da campanha eleitoral parlamentar.
A IDF não se limitou a coagir os cidadãos comuns que iriam às urnas escolher seus parlamentares e Primeiro Ministro. Impôs também severas restrições de movimento aos candidatos e seus comitês eleitorais em todos os lugares. Inclusive a comunidades palestinas isoladas atrás do muro - chamado Annexation Wall.
Candidatos do PFLP em campanha em Belém
Sem contar que os candidatos foram proibidos de circular entre a Cisjordânia e a Faixa de Gaza, o que inviabilizou a campanha do Fatah na Faixa. Isto é, os candidatos locais foram privados da ajuda dos líderes do partido radicados nas principais cidades da Cisjordânia.
Os palestinos perceberam esta coerção como uma punição coletiva da população civil. Punição que infringia mais uma lei inernacional, neste caso, o Artigo 33 da Quarta Convenção de Genebra, relativo à proteção dos civis em tempos de guerra. Este artigo proibe explicitamente “collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism” contra pessoas e propriedades.
O PCHR, Palestinian Center for Human Rights, reclamou, pediu à comunidade internacional proteção para os civis, insistiu, insistiu, contudo, a União Europeia se contentou em mandar observadores para vigiar o bom andamento eleitoral. Ou seja, garantir que não houvesse fraude. O que estava longe de ser a preocupação dos participantes do pleito e a população nem pensava nesta possibilidade.
Os palestinos, acostumados com as intempéries militaro-políticas, fizeram campanha assim mesmo, apesar de revoltados. 
Enquanto isso, no dia 05 de janeiro, do lado israelense da Linha Verde, o general Ariel Sharon encontrava-se hospitalizado em estado crítico, após ter sofrido um infarto dos bravos.

O país, até então controlado a mãos de ferro pelo General primeiro ministro, ficou acéfalo, porém, com o governo seguindo à risca sua política ocupacionista. O processo de paz, que já ia de mal a pior por causa do General Bulldozer, entrou em um vácuo politico que deixava margem à recuperação da extrema direita sionista que em Tel Aviv ganhava cada vez mais espaço. Sem contar o fato de a arena eleitoral estando livre, ser óbvio que seu substituto provisório usaria os mesmos métodos de seus predecessores a fim de ser eleito para o cargo vago - atacar os palestinos.   
Enquanto isso, na mídia e na cabeça de uns desmemoriados, o General Bulldozer, o Butcher (Açougueiro), apelidos que Sharon havia merecido durante seus anos de carreira militar no Exército e no Governo, passou de algoz a pacifista. Era surreal ouvir os comentários em Tel Aviv e Washington. Era como se ele tivesse sido o arquiteto da paz em vez do da guerra.
No dia seguinte Sharon foi operado e no dia 10 os médicos lutavam para reanimá-lo após um coma induzido. Diminuiram os sedativos para avaliar os danos cerebrais do ataque cardíaco e esperaram.
Seus companheiros do recém-criado partido Kadima começaram sem ele a campanha que elegeria dentro de dois meses o novo Primeiro Ministro, caso ele não acordasse.
Nesse ínterim, os palestinos se preparavam para votar nas condições opressivas em que o General adormecido os colocara; e votaram.
A consequência da situação insuportável era previsível para todos que tinham olhos para ver o estado em que os palestinos estavam. Menos para os europeus e estadunidenses míopes.
Entrevista com Marwan Barghouti uma semana antes das eleições

No dia 25 de janeiro de 2006, a chamada "comunidade internacional" (representada pelos países ocidentais mais ricos do planeta)  que ficara de braços cruzados enquanto Ariel Sharon encostava os palestinos no muro (concretíssimo, neste caso) recebeu uma paulada.
O Hamas venceu as eleições com uma maioria que não deixava dúvidas de qual era a vontade popular. Obteve 74 cadeiras das 132 que o Conselho legislativo da Palestina contava. O Fatah só elegeu 45 deputados. Ahmed Qorei, então primeiro ministro de Mahmoud Abbas, demitiu-se no mesmo dia.
No dia 26, as ruas de Gaza se encheram de militantes do Hamas atirando para o alto e distribuindo balinhas aos meninos naquela quinta-feira festiva em que celebravam a vitória surpreendente desejada.
No dia 27, em um misto de histeria e estado de choque, em vez de aceitar o resultado do pleito democrático que eles mesmos haviam apoiado, testemunhado e portanto legitimado, Israel, Estados Unidos, União Europeia, e outros mais, decidiram o quê? Decidiram cortar toda ajuda aos palestinos por considerarem o Hamas uma organização terrorista e não um partido de direito, além de fato.

No dia 30, o Hamas fez apelos aos doadores estrangeiros para que não cortassem a ajuda financeira da qual precisaria para governar, mas rejeitou o juramento de renunciar unilateralmente à violência contra o ocupante voraz.
Declaração, embora nociva, de certa maneira, louvável. Pois podiam fazer como Israel fizera desde 1948; ou seja, prometer uma coisa e fazer outra. Entretanto, os dirigentes do Hamas preferiram ser claros.
Reunciar ao direito de defesa e resistência à ocupação civil e militar de sua nação despojada de cidadania e de perspectiva, jamais. Era seu aviso. Enquanto a Palestina não fosse um Estado autônomo e soberano sem invasores civis nem militares, a resistência continuava. Foi a mensagem formal que passaram.
No último dia de janeiro o governo de Israel declarou que suspenderia o repassamento à Autoridade Palestina dos impostos que recolhiam (segundo os famigerados Acordos de Oslo) dos palestinos.
Assim, Tel Aviv privou os palestinos não apenas da ajuda financeira externa como também da renda interna gerada pelos impostos que os cidadãos pagavam.
A medida pareceu chocar apeans alguns gatos pingados. Os demais só estavam focados na contra-propaganda israelo-estadunidense do "perigo" do Hamas.
(Na época publiquei um artigo na revista brasileira Caros Amigos, chamando atenção para o absurdo da situação. Foi publicado no site. Se a minha melhora não falha, no número seguinte, ou em seguida, alguém me contradisse em outro artigo defendendo o indefensável. Infelizmente, o Brasil não é e não está impermeável à iniquidade e à desinformação favorável aos poderosos.)
A situação na Palestina e sobretudo na Faixa de Gaza pioraria ainda mais nos dias, semanas e meses seguintes. Em uma infração gravíssima da Convenção de Genebra. O Artigo 33 foi pisoteado por Israel e seria pisoteado, por passividade ou cumplicidade, pelos próprios ocidentais que firmaram o documento e gostam tanto de dar lição de moral.
Em suma, um papelão do mundo dito civilizado.  









Robert Fisk 01/28/06 "The Independent" :
The Great War for Civilisation - Dust Jacket - Robert Fisk.jpg
Oh no, not more democracy again! Didn't we award this to those Algerians in 1990? And didn't they reward us with that nice gift of an Islamist government - and then they so benevolently cancelled the second round of elections? Thank goodness for that!
True, the Afghans elected a round of representatives, albeit that they included some warlords and murderers. But then the Iraqis last year elected the Dawa party to power in Baghdad, which was responsible - let us not speak this in Washington - for most of the kidnappings of Westerners in Beirut in the 1980s, the car bombing of the (late) Emir and the US and French embassies in Kuwait.
And now, horror of horrors, the Palestinians have elected the wrong party to power. They were supposed to have given their support to the friendly, pro-Western, corrupt, absolutely pro-American Fatah, which had promised to "control" them, rather than to Hamas, which said they would represent them. And, bingo, they have chosen the wrong party again.
Result: 76 out of 132 seats. That just about does it. God damn that democracy. What are we to do with people who don't vote the way they should?
Way back in the 1930s, the British would lock up the Egyptians who turned against the government of King Farouk. Thus they began to set the structure of anti-democratic governance that was to follow. The French imprisoned the Lebanese government which demanded the same. Then the French left Lebanon. But we have always expected the Arab governments to do what they were told.
So today, we are expecting the Syrians to behave, the Iranians to kowtow to our nuclear desires (though they have done nothing illegal), and the North Koreans to surrender their weapons (though they actually do have them, and therefore cannot be attacked).
Now let the burdens of power lie heavy on the shoulders of the party. Now let the responsibilities of people lie upon them. We British would never talk to the IRA, or to Eoka, or to the Mao Mao. But in due course, Gerry Adams, Archbishop Makarios and Jomo Kenyatta came to take tea with the Queen. The Americans would never speak to their enemies in North Vietnam. But they did. In Paris.
No, al-Qa'ida will not do that. But the Iraqi leaders of the insurgency in Mesopotamia will. They talked to the British in 1920, and they will talk to the Americans in 2006.
Back in 1983, Hamas talked to the Israelis. They spoke directly to them about the spread of mosques and religious teaching. The Israeli army boasted about this on the front page of the Jerusalem Post. At that time, it looked like the PLO was not going to abide by the Oslo resolutions. There seemed nothing wrong, therefore, with continuing talks with Hamas. So how come talks with Hamas now seem so impossible?
Not long after the Hamas leadership had been hurled into southern Lebanon, a leading member of its organisation heard me say that I was en route to Israel.
"You'd better call Shimon Peres," he told me. "Here's his home number."
The phone number was correct. Here was proof that members of the hierarchy of the most extremist movements among the Palestinians were talking to senior Israeli politicians.
The Israelis know well the Hamas leadership. And the Hamas leadership know well the Israelis. There is no point in journalists like us suggesting otherwise. Our enemies invariably turn out to be our greatest friends, and our friends turn out, sadly, to be our enemies.
A terrible equation - except that we must understand our fathers' history. My father, who was a soldier in the First World War, bequeathed to me a map in which the British and French ruled the Middle East. The Americans have tried, vainly, to rule that map since the Second World War. They have all failed. And it remains our curse to rule it since.
How terrible it is to speak with those who have killed our sons. How unspeakable it is to converse with those who have our brothers' blood on their hands. No doubt that is how Americans who believed in independence felt about the Englishmen who fired upon them.
It will be for the Iraqis to deal with al-Qa'ida. This is their burden. Not ours. Yet throughout history, we have ended up talking to our enemies. We talked to the representatives of the Emperor of Japan. In the end, we had to accept the surrender of the German Reich from the successor to Adolf Hitler. And today, we trade happily with the Japanese, the Germans and the Italians.
The Middle East was never a successor to Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy, despite the rubbish talked by Messrs Bush and Blair. How long will it be before we can throw away the burden of this most titanic of wars and see our future, not as our past, but as a reality?
Surely, in an age when our governments no longer contain men or women who have experienced war, we must now lead a people with the understanding of what war means. Not Hollywood. Not documentary films. Democracy means real freedom, not just for the people we choose to have voted into power.
And that is the problem in the Middle East.



Debate between Norman Finkelstein and former Israeli foreign minister Shlomo Ben Ami


http://www.sinopsedolivro.net/capas-livros/outro-israel-reflexoes-de-uri-avnery.jpgUri Avnery, 28/01/2006. Gush Shalom.
If Ariel Sharon had not been in a deep coma, he would have jumped out of his bed for joy.
The Hamas victory fulfils his most ardent hopes.
For a whole year now, he did everything possible to undermine Mahmoud Abbas. His logic was quite obvious: The Americans wanted him to negotiate with Abbas. Such negotiations would inevitably have lead to a situation that would have compelled him to give up almost all of the West Bank. Sharon had no intention of doing so. He wanted to annex about half of the territory. So he had to get rid of Abbas and his moderate image.
During the last year, the situation of the Palestinians got worse from day to day. The actions of the occupation made normal life and commerce impossible. The West Bank settlements were continuously enlarging. The Wall which cuts off about 10% of the West Bank was nearing completion. No important prisoners were released. The aim was to impress on the Palestinians that Abbas is weak ("a chicken without feathers", as Sharon put it), that he cannot achieve anything, that offering peace and observing a cease-fire leads nowhere.
The message to the Palestinians was clear: "Israel understands only the language of force."
Now the Palestinians have put in power a party that speaks this language.
Why did Hamas win?
Palestinian elections, like German ones, consist of two parts. Half the members of parliament are elected on straight party lists (like in Israel), the other half are elected individually in their districts. This gave Hamas a huge advantage.
In the party lists elections, Hamas won with only a slight majority. This would suggest that as far as the general political line is concerned, the majority is not far from Fatah - two states, peace with Israel.
Many of the votes given to Hamas had nothing to do with peace, religion and fundamentalism, but with protest. The Palestinian administration, run almost exclusively by Fatah, is tainted with corruption. The "man in the street" felt that the people on top don't care about him. Fatah was also blamed for the terrible situation created by the occupation.
Also, the glory of the martyrs and the indomitable fight against the immensely superior Israeli army added to the popularity of Hamas.
In the personal-regional elections, the situation of Hamas was even better. Hamas had more creditable candidates, untainted by corruption. Its party machine was far superior, its members far more disciplined. In every district, there were several Fatah candidates competing with each other. After the death of Yasser Arafat, there is no strong leader capable of imposing unity. Marwan Barghouti, who could perhaps have done the job, is held in an Israeli prison - another big Israeli gift for Hamas.
People who believe in conspiracy theories can assert that it is all part of a devious Israeli plan.
Some people even believe that Hamas was an Israeli invention right from the beginning. That is, of course, a wild exaggeration. But it is indeed the case that in the years before the first intifada, the Islamic organization was the only Palestinian group that had practically a free run in the occupied territories.
The logic went like this: Our enemy is the PLO. The Islamists hate the secular PLO and Yasser Arafat. So we can use them against the PLO.
Moreover, while all political institutions were banned, and even Palestinians who worked for peace were arrested for carrying out illegal political activity, no one could control what was happening in the mosques. "As long as they are praying, they are not shooting," was the innocent opinion in the Israeli military government.
When the first intifada broke out at the end of 1987, this was proved wrong. Hamas was formed, partly in order to compete with the Islamic Jihad fighters. Within a short time, Hamas became the core of the armed uprising. But for almost a year, the Israeli Security Service did not act against them. Then policy changed and Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader, was arrested.
All this happened more through stupidity than design. Now the Israeli government is faced with a Hamas leadership that was democratically elected by the people.
What now? Well, a strong feeling of déjà vu.
In the 70s and 80s, the Israeli government declared that it would never ever negotiate with the PLO. They are terrorists. They have a charter that calls for the destruction of Israel. Arafat is a monster, a second Hitler. So, never, never, never ---
In the end, after much bloodshed, Israel and the PLO recognized each other and the Oslo agreement was signed.
Now we are hearing the same tune again. Terrorists. Murderers. The Hamas charter calls for the destruction of Israel. We shall never never never negotiate with them.
All this is very welcome to Sharon's Kadima party, which openly calls for the unilateral annexation of territory ("Fixing the borders of Israel unilaterally"). It will help the Likud and the Labor party hawks whose mantra is "We have no partner for peace", meaning - to hell with peace.
Gradually, the tone will change. Both sides, and the Americans, too, will climb down from the tall tree. Hamas will state that it is ready for negotiations and find some religious basis for this. The Israeli government (probably headed by Ehud Olmert) will bow to reality and American pressure. Europe will forget its  ridiculous slogans.
In the end, everybody will agree that a peace, in which Hamas is a partner, is better than a peace with Fatah alone.
Let's pray that not too much blood is spilled before that  point is reached.

Reservistas da IDF, forças israelenses de ocupação,
Shovrim Shtika - Breaking the Silence  

We had a very tough time with this, morally speaking. This whole checkpoint was about Palestinians coming to work for Israelis in the Jordan Valley. It's just loaded with Israeli exploitation of Palestinians. Loaded.
How do you see this at the checkpoint?
There's the date harvest, the Palestinians are paid something like 50 shekels (cerca de US$13).
Do you see this at the checkpoint?
Of course. I know how much they're paid. They come every day at four in the morning or five o'clock, and go back at seven in the evening, exhausted. You see a guy exhausted from having worked hard all day, physically, and they receive 50 shekels a day. Great, I mean for date picking that's what they get. That's what the workers get. Now, I see this. Not only do they get 50 shekels for a day's work, but on top of that I stand on them, they have to wait at my checkpoint and undergo that humiliating procedure of inspection. I mean, this whole checkpoint is in fact an economic checkpoint. You feel you're on checkpoint duty not for the sake of Israeli security but for Israel's bank account.
How is that related to the checkpoint?
Who goes through that checkpoint? Only Palestinians working in the Jordan Valley. They have nothing to look for there, just their livelihood. Nothing else. I mean, because of this livelihood there are families in between the areas, but originally the people from Akraba and the hill villages have nothing to look for in the Jordan Valley. These are two separate populations. Nowadays it's already very connected, because when you work somewhere you get connected, and families come into being and stuff. But I am standing at that checkpoint so that Palestinians without work permits will not come through.
Why should I mind their not having work permits?
Officially, from a security point of view, because they were not cleared.
But what does that mean, not cleared? Do you know what prevents a person from getting a work permit?
Listen carefully: if a relative of the fourth degree, meaning your uncle's grandfather, had once thrown a stone back in 1948, I'm not kidding you now, then you don't get a work permit.
How do you know that?
I know that because we once asked a GSS agent about the criteria. We were told there is a very clear definition. If any family relation – fourth degree down – has ever been charged with an act of violence against Israel, no work permit will be issued. That's one of the criteria. Now show me a person, I mean what's the percentage of the population? Nothing. We're at war with them for over fifty years now, clearly someone somewhere back on the family tree had thrown something sometime, you see? Now everything's documented. So you get a 16-year old boy, all smiles, and the grandfather of the father of his brother is the guy who threw a Molotov cocktail in 1962. Now why would this guy bypass the checkpoint – to go on a terrorist attack? No. To get a day's work done. So I'm his checkpoint for economic interests. Cool. Great. It's shit. Beyond capitalism, socialism, never mind. Why do I as a soldier have to watch out for the bank accounts of the Jordan Valley settlers? No reason in the world. That's corrupting occupation at its worst. Pure economic interests. 


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