domingo, 16 de dezembro de 2012

Israel vs Palestina: História de um conflito XXV (04 2002 - ODS em Jenin)




Como os generais da IDF consideraram a cobertura mediática da campanha militar em Ramallah prejudicial à sua imagem, o alto comando decidiu proibir a presença da imprensa na operação Defensive Shield - ODS em Jenin e Nablus logo de saída.
Ambas foram consideradas "zonas militares fechadas" e postas em regime de permanente toque de recolher antes e durante a investida das tropas motorizadas.
Estas "zonas militares" permaneceram lacradas até o fim da invasão dez dias mais tarde - repetiriam a façanha na Faixa de Gaza em 2008-09 com os mesmos estragos.
A população foi privada de água e eletricidade durante todo o sítio.
Todas as etapas da ODS de Ariel Sharon foram bárbaros. Mas o que ficaria nos anais como a mais selvagem, desde a Naqba, Sabra e Shatila (até o repeteco duplo na Faixa de Gaza), seria o de Jenin.  O assalto foi vedado à imprensa do início ao fim. Portanto, vou começar com o relato do que se viu a posteriori.     
O que os primeiros estrangeiros testemunharam ao entrar no campo de refugiados.
A "paisagem" era apocalíptica.
Desafiava qualquer possibilidade de descrição apropriada.
Não havia tantos cadáveres espalhados pelo caminho como em Sabra e Shatila. Apenas alguns jaziam no caminho. Todavia, o sangue nas ruas indicava um número elevado de vítimas, já carregadas pelos sobreviventes para onde conseguissem abrigo. Socorro era impossível, pois a assistência médica foi vedada durante o sítio.
A maioria dos mortos não estava à vista. Estavam soterrados, enterrados vivos quando os caterpillars armados destruiram residências ainda ocupadas por algum membro da família.
Parecia que um furacão passara deixando atrás de si desolação e desamparo.
Casas total ou parcialmente demolidas, postes caídos, fios elétricos enroscados, concreto despedaçado, ferro fundido na marra, carros pulverizados. Tudo isto misturado, dava a impressão de uma imensa sucata fétida no ar da qual pairava o cheiro inconfundível de cadáver. 
A cidade-campo de refugiados estava abaixo. Nenhuma infra-estrutura fora poupada.
Uma calamidade.

No meio da área urbana sucateada durante os dez dias de assalto, jazia um terreno "vago" meio retangular. Contando os "espaços abertos" pelos caterpillars armados, em que estas escavadoras transformaram fileiras de casas em estrada, o vácuo era bem maior do que a área do explodido World Trade Center após o ataque do Al-Qaeda.
O núcleo residencial aplainado era o bairro Hauachine que dias antes contava mais de  300 casas.
Cento e cinquenta residências foram reduzidas a poeira, a nada. Outras tantas foram gravemente danificadas pelos caterpillars armados que deixaram 435 famílias totalmente desabrigadas.
No fim das contas, duas mil pessoas ficaram ao Deus dará.
O cálculo imediato foi de 52 mortos palestinos e 23 soldados israelenses. Estes últimos, mortos por fogo amigo e pela resistência, unida e ferrenha.
Em Nablus, a IDF destruiria o patrimônio histórico, deixara a maioria das casas depredadas, paredes derrubadas ou esburacadas, mas ainda com possibilidade da família "acampar" de maneira precária.
Em Jenin, não.
Dir-se-ia que a ordem era de não deixar pedra sobre pedra e atropelar tudo o que movesse, visível ou imaginário.
Os caterpillars D9 demoliram o bairro inteiro antes de rodar sobre o terreno onde mulheres, velhos, crianças, adolescentes, vagavam como almas penadas. Todos em busca dos familiares perdidos nos escombros dos lares que dias antes ali estavam.
Estas almas baqueadas penavam.
Alguns cavavam os destroços com as poucas pás disponíveis e outros, a mãos nuas. Esperavam escavar das ruínas filhos, irmãos, pai, mãe, avós enterrados vivos.
Três jovens que cavam onde fora até há pouco sua casa conseguem arrancar dos detritos o cadáver do pai desfigurado. Mais na frente uma mulher em prantos interpela  Deus "Alah, vingue-nos contra Sharon!", escarafunchando os entulhos do que fora sua casa, à procura de parentes soterrados.
Crianças vagueiam com as feições cobertas de horror e incompreensão e uma jovem diz com voz apagada: "Sharon, com sua louca operação criminosa, fez de todos estes meninos e meninas bombas-suicidas potenciais. É ele, este monstro, que nos empurra a replicar, por todos os meios possíveis de expulsar seu exército e seus colonos de nossa terra".
Sua família conseguira salvar-se escapando de Jenin para Rumaneh no início do assalto. Muitos moradores tiveram a mesma sorte, mas grande parte foi presa na engrenagem do cerco ardiloso, perdeu todos os pertences e pelo menos um parente.
Este foi o resultado da Operação Defensive Shield em Jenin.
Antes de contar o desenrolar da operação, vou abrir parêntese para falar em um rapaz de Jenin que perdeu dois amigos de infância no dia 10 de abril fatídico. Além disso, estava para encabeçar a lista negra da IDF e do Shin Bet, como o "terrorista" local mais procurado.
Ele se chama Zakaria Muhammad 'Abdelrahman Zubeidi.
Em Jenin, Zakaria basta. Na Cisjordânia e na Faixa de Gaza, Zakaria Zubeidi.
Viraria, e é ainda, lenda-viva no Fatah e em toda a Palestina.
Quando as tropas da IDF invadiram Jenin, foi a voz de Zakaria Zubeidi que os soldados israelenses ouviram no megafone. Fluente em hebraico, o resistente palestino avisou os invasores que se não recuassem, a luta seria árdua, pois os moradores não entregariam sua cidade de resistência ferrenha.
Enquanto as tropas israelenses punham Jenin abaixo, a voz extinta do megafone ainda ressoava em suas cabeças. O medo reinava. Os soldados, em uma mistura de super-poder e temor incubado, passavam de casa em casa semeando o caos enquanto Zakaria, e outro amigo de infância então líder local das Brigadas al-Aqsa, escapava de cômodo em cômodo como gato.
Acabou não sendo capturado.
Ele ainda não era o líder das Brigadas al-Aqsa, dissensão armada do Fatah desde o massacre que originou o nome desta célula militar, mas aos 26 anos, seu nome já era conhecido na Cisjordânia inteira, e na IDF. E no Shin Bet. E no Mossad.
Ele subiria na hierarquia das Brigadas em Jenin com os assassinatos sucessivos dos chefes, inclusive do seu melhor amigo, Ala'a. E passaria a ser a maior autoridade - clandestina - local.
Em 2002, a sua cara de menino grande, de sorriso aberto, ainda não estava marcada pela explosão acidental de uma das bombas que fabricava.
Mesmo sem as marcas escuras registradas em todos os dossiês de Inteligência israelense como suas, já era respeitado como um general da guerrilha urbana contra o que os palestinos chamam de  IOF - Israeli Occupation forces - em vez de IDF - Israeli Defensive Forces que acham pouco adequada à função que realmente exercem.
Aos 13 anos, no jogo de pedras contra soldados israelenses, Zakaria foi baleado - como são dezenas de crianças palestinas durante o ano. A bala que lhe foi dirigida o atingiu na perna. Teve de ser operado quatro vezes. No fim da hospitalização (tardia) de seis meses, voltou para casa com uma deficiência física. A perna ferida ficou mais curta. Ficou manco para toda vida.
Foi detido aos 15 anos durante seis meses e durante este período virou porta-voz dos prisioneiros menores junto ao diretor do presídio.
Foi para trás das grades como um menino a mais que a prisão israelense traumatizaria e saiu de lá como líder. 
Voltou a ser preso por mais tempo, aprendeu hebraico e aderiu ao Fatah.
Foi libertado em 1993 na leva dos Acordos de Oslo. Tinha 17 anos e entrou nas Forças de Segurança da Autoridade Palestina durante um ano. Depois largou por insatisfação com o sistema de favoritismo e viveu de bicos mais ou menos legais até a Intifada al-Aqsa. Ou seja, esta Segunda Intifada.
Zakaria conta que só aderiu à resistência armada no fim de 2001 ao perder um amigo.
Mas o fator determinante no passo em direção da resistência armada pode ter sido a impotência. Frente ao assassinato da mãe no dia 03 de março de 2002 e do irmão Taha.
Quando a IDF entrou em Jenin um mês depois, Zakaria já estava na Brigada dos Mártires da al-Aqsa.
Prosseguiria na luta armada sem jamais ser capturado e sem jamais separar-se do revórver que carregava pra todo lado.

Voltando à ODS e a Jenin propriamente dita, ela é a terceira maior cidade palestina.     Sua fonte de renda e subsistência é predominantemente agrícola. Até a Intifada, Jenin era a cidade palestina com maiores ligações culturais e comerciais com Israel.  
Devido à proximidade da Linha Verde (apenas 12 quilômetros), muitos israelenses iam a Jenin fazer compras de legumes e frutas; de boa qualidade e mais baratos do que os do seu lado.
O campo de refugiados foi criado em 1953 junto da cidade a fim de abrigar as vítimas da Naqba originárias das regiões de Carmel e Haifa.  Sua população é de 16.000 habitantes, dentre os quais 40% têm menos de 14 anos.
Não sei se já disse, mas os campos de refugiados palestinos não são constituídos de tendas como os demais campos de refugiados que a ONU monta.
Onde quer que se se refugiem, os palestinos constroem casas e se organizam como um bairro com administração autônoma. Nos países vizinhos em que se refugiaram, instalam-se como um município precário da cidade à qual são agregados. No Líbano, por exemplo, são cidadãos apátridas excluídos da sociedade local. Abordaremos este tema doloroso e crucial para os palestinos em outra oportunidade. 

Em Jenin, as repetidas incursões militares da IDF, que resultavam em detenções aleatórias, execuções sumárias e destruição de propriedades, fizeram deste campo um dos núcleos mais fortes da resistência.
Ariel Sharon sabia do "monstro" que a Naqba e a ocupação fabricara. Por isto ao invadir Jenin na Operação Defensive Shield, acionou as forças de artilharia mais pesadas e sofisticadas para dominar logo de chegada.
O general contava com oposição ao seu intento, mas não tanta quanto a que o esperava. Subestimara a determinação de seus oponentes de defender suas famílias e seu terreno até o último homem, se necessário.
Os resistentes das diversas brigadas armadas do Fatah - Tanzim, Al-Aqsa - receberam os tanques e as escavadoras a balas, a coquetéis molotov, e os meninos, a pedradas e estilingadas.
Muitos chamam esta incursão da IDF em Jenin de guerra. Por causa da resistência militar dos palestinos, que perseveram, defenderam sua cidade contra os "cruéis" e os Apaches com revólveres e algumas Kalachnikov.
A determinação da resistência era grande, mas a disparidade numérica e de recursos bélicos era maior ainda. E esta disparidade de meios somadas à privação de víveres e água, faz lembrar a Batalha de Stalingrado durante a Segunda Guerra.
Em Stalingrado, os russos não baixaram os braços diante da investida das tropas alemãs e resistiram ao sítio do exército de Hitler durante meses. Acabaram exangues, famintos, a cidade em ruínas, mas vitoriosos, graças ao rigor do inverno que forçou os soldados alemães à retirada.
No caso dos resistentes de Jenin, embora também estivessem se defendendo de invasão bárbara, não dispunham da cumplicidade da neve e além disso, os recursos da IDF - alimentados pelos EUA - ao contrário dos da Wehrmacht, eram inesgotáveis.
E foram usados com abundância e sem a piedade mínima que surge, às vezes, de maneira acanhada, quando se lida com seres racionais da mesma espécie.
Não. Os soldados israelenses aprendem desde pequenos que os palestinos são animais, objetos, sem direitos e bárbaros. A piedade não cabe.
Os resistentes passavam de casa em casa evacuada deixando armadilhas atrás de si para os soldados da IDF. Retrocediam lutando e perdendo sangue. 
Sharon só ganhou a partida sangrenta porque, ao perder 23 soldados até o dia 09 de abril, os tanques "cruéis" recuaram e abriram alas para os caterpillars armados. Estes agiram à vontade derrubando todas as casas com apoio aéreo para "que o inimigo ficasse descoberto".
Diante da visão macabra de seus compatriotas indefesos - esposas, mães, filhos, pais - sendo soterrados no processo de a IDF ganhar a batalha, os resistentes depuseram as armas.
Esperavam ainda conseguir, com o gesto de renúncia, salvar os parentes e amigos soterrados.
Gesto vão. Para a maioria, o socorro chegaria tarde.
Militarmente, a IDF venceu, como sempre.
Capturou 34 membros da resistência.
Mas a vitória devastadora custaria caro.
A perda de familiares, o desabrigo forçado pelos caterpillars, o ressentimento, enfim, todos os sentimentos decorrentes da ocupação desmedida, iam facilitar o recrutamento, entre os sobreviventes, de bombas-suicidas prontos a vingar a crueldade.

"I have been in urban environments where house to house fighting has happened: Rwanda, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Colombia, and a city struck by a massive earthquake: Mexico city.
The devastation seen in Jenin camp had the worst elements of both situations.
Houses not just bulldozed or dynamited but reduced almost to dust by the repeated and deliberate coming and goings of bulldozers and tanks.
Houses pierced from wall to wall by tank or helicopter gun ships. Houses cut down the middle as if by giant scissors. Inside, an eerie vision of dining or bedrooms almost intact. No signs whatsoever that that bedroom or dining room or indeed the house had been used by fighters.
Gratuitous, wanton, unnecessary destruction. Children’s prams, toys, beds everywhere.
Where were those children?
I do not know, but I do know where the survivors will be in the future."
Javier Zuniga, diretor regional da Anistia Internacional quando entrou em Jenin no dia 17 de abril de 2002

Relatório da Anistia Internacional:
Between 11 April when the last group of Palestinian fighters had surrendered and 15 April when, after the High Court hearing, the IDF allowed ambulances to enter under strict IDF supervision, about a tenth of the area of Jenin refugee camp was destroyed. According to Palestinian combatants and the IDF some of the fiercest fighting had taken place in this part of the refugee camp and it was in Hawashin that 13 Israeli soldiers were killed in an ambush. But the evidence strongly suggests that the fighting had already stopped when most of the demolition of houses took place.
Given the density of population in the one square kilometre refugee camp, which had a population of around 14,000 before the events of 3 April 2002, the complete destruction of the Hawashin quarter and the partial destruction of two additional quarters of the camp, have left more than 800 families, totalling some 4000 persons, homeless, living in tents or with relatives. About 169 houses with 374 apartment units have been completely destroyed with additional units partially destroyed.(16) Additionally, widespread IDF vandalism and property damage to the interior of homes was visible in a number of areas of the camp, especially in the al-Damaj quarter.
Under the Fourth Geneva Convention destruction of property can be justified only if there is an absolute military necessity. Amnesty International delegates who entered Jenin refugee camp on 17 April, the day the IDF withdrew, saw that the IDF had used bulldozers not just to destroy the houses but to drive backwards and forwards over them, impacting the rubble and rendering it very difficult for residents to dig in search of their possessions, valuables, or missing family members.
The IDF told Amnesty International delegates that fighting had continued after 11 April 2002 and Palestinian snipers remained in buildings. They also argued that the destruction of property, in the wake of hostilities, was necessary because of the proliferation of booby trap bombs and unexploded ordinance.(17) However, today the work of clearing Israeli unexploded bombs and Palestinian booby traps under the crushed rubble is continuing; military specialists have stressed to Amnesty International that buried ordnance under crushed rubble is far harder to clear than if left in undemolished houses.
Palestinian and foreign eyewitnesses inside and outside Jenin refugee camp state that fighting had essentially ceased after 10 April. The aerial photos of the destruction of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated 11 and 13 April, show that the bulk of destruction took place then. In the opinion of an Amnesty International delegate, Major David Holley:
"There were events post 11 April that were neither militarily justifiable nor had any military necessity: the IDF levelled the final battlefield completely after the cessation of hostilities." He added: "It is surmised that the complete destruction of the ruins of battle, therefore, is punishment for its inhabitants."
Jenin city was also extensively damaged during Operation Defensive Shield. According to official records over 1200 residential properties have been damaged. Forty homes have been completely demolished. Other homes were either partially damaged, burned, had interior damage or damage to exterior walls or water tanks. Nine schools in the Jenin city area were damaged as was the Department of Education.(18) In Jenin’s old city and the market district of al-Sibat, a number of homes and businesses were destroyed or partially damaged including the Jenin Municipality Public Library.
Destruction of property and civil infrastructure
This was the sight that greeted Amnesty International delegates who entered Jenin refugee camp when the IDF lifted their blockade on 17 April 2002.
The IDF demolished Palestinian homes in Jenin refugee camp from the beginning of their offensive though, as testimonies and aerial photos show, the razing of the Hawashin quarter took place mostly after 11 April. But the IDF demolition of homes in the Jenin refugee camp was already the subject of a petition to the High Court filed on 8 April 2002. The petitioners argued that by failing to provide adequate warnings to allow the residents to be heard and to give adequate time to escape before demolishing houses, the State was failing in both its own domestic obligations under Israeli Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, as well as international humanitarian law under the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Access to essential supplies
Residents of Jenin town and refugee camp reported to Amnesty International delegates their increasing fear as stocks of food and water diminished. The delegates in the town between 15 and 17 April witnessed the trauma of families who had spent the previous two weeks confined to their houses, with water and electricity cut off for most of the period.
The electricity supply was cut in the city on 3 April 2002; in most places service was restored within four to 10 days but, according to UNRWA, it was not until 25 April that even a partial electricity supply was restored to the lower part of the refugee camp. In an interview with Amnesty International, the head of electricity services for the Jenin City Municipality provided a detailed log of service interruptions as well as a report of damage assessment by engineers. Several of the main feeders had been, in his view, targeted and repair crews had been subjected to IDF gunfire when they attempted to repair damaged cables.
Water supplies were also cut by the IDF and, in addition, many of the water storage tanks on the tops of houses were damaged by IDF fire; in some places the water supply was not restored for 20 days. The Director of the Water Sector for Jenin city told Amnesty International delegates that in one pumping station supplying Jenin city and the western villages the pumps were inoperable; damage to the network was extensive and "mainlines from the reservoirs or pumping stations were cut intentionally by bulldozers or indirectly through heavy tank traffic. Seven of 11 booster pumps [which help water reach high areas] were hit or destroyed by heavy machine gun fire or tanks. Damage to the network inside the refugee camp was beyond repair." On 5 April the IDF occupied one pumping station and dismissed the operator for four days. Camp residents and those living in the upper areas of the town remained without water for up to three weeks; UNRWA reports that water points to the camp were not restored until 28 April.
The IDF Head of Plans and Policy Directorate told Amnesty International delegates that there was no policy to cut either electricity or water and said that Palestinians used water pipes to make bombs. However, between March and May 2002 Amnesty International’s delegates inspected damaged electric feeders and water pipes in many Palestinian towns and refugee camps. They concluded that damage to electricity cables and water pipes was deliberate and widespread.
The prolonged curfew made it impossible for those in Jenin city or the refugee camp to obtain alternative water supplies, except during the period in which curfews were lifted. Humanitarian relief services were unable to provide water, medical or food supplies until 17 April 2002. Most houses had reserves of food; residents had suffered previous incursions and periods of curfew and laid in supplies of rice, lentils, beans, as well as storing water in bottles or buckets within their homes. Fresh milk and water and fresh food were unavailable. Hospitals reported six cases within Jenin refugee camp of children with complications resulting from drinking wastewater. Hospitals had their own generators but services were affected by water and food shortages; for days Jenin City Hospital patients and staff lived mainly on biscuits.
Blocking medical and humanitarian relief
Medical relief services were denied access to Jenin refugee camp for nearly 11 days, from 12 noon on 4 April until 15 April 2002. In addition the IDF shot at ambulances(10) or fired warning shots around them. Ambulance drivers were harassed or arrested. Meanwhile the dead in Jenin refugee camp remained in the street or in houses for days. The wounded lay for hours untended or were treated at home. In several cases people are reported to have died in circumstances where lack of access medical care may have caused or hastened their death. Many testimonies show families desperately telephoning for help in vain and compelled to stay alone with dying or dead relatives. Many cases of Palestinians killed by the IDF show the difficulty or impossibility of obtaining medical care or an ambulance to remove the dead.
On 15 April, during two hours the IDF allowed Palestinian and international medical and humanitarian teams to distribute some food, water and milk into the camp. On 16 April the IDF allowed ICRC and UNRWA personnel to enter the camp; the ICRC reported, in its daily summary: "Part of the camp looks as if it had been hit by an earthquake ... Civilians in the camp are under shock and report urgent need for medicine, water and food.
Compelling Palestinians to participate in military operations and to act as "human shields"
The IDF systematically compelled Palestinians to take part in military operations. Several Palestinians interviewed by Amnesty International in relation to other subjects said that they had been compelled to take part in military operations and as "human shields". These practices violate international humanitarian law. Although the IDF announced through the State Attorney on 24 May 2002 that it would not use civilians in military operations, Amnesty International has continued to receive reports of cases in which Palestinians were used by members of the IDF during military operations, including as "human shields" (see, for example, the description of the case resulting in the killing of Fares al-Sa’adi above).
The large number of cases of Palestinians used as "human shields" in IDF military operations reveal a clear pattern. Typically the IDF would compel an adult male(6) in their military operation to search property in each area of the refugee camp. A Palestinian would be held by the IDF for a certain period, sometimes for days. These Palestinians were placed at serious risk, in some cases resulting in injury, as the following case illustrates.
Depoimento de um soldado à ONG B'Tselem: "Before searching a house, we go to a neighbor, take him out of his house, and tell him to call for the person we want. If it works, great. If not, we blow down the door or hammer it open. The neighbor goes in first. If somebody is planning something, he is the one who gets it. Our instructions are to send him inside and have him go up to all the floors and get everyone out of the house. The neighbor can't refuse; he doens't have that option. The neighbor shouts, knocks on the door, says that the army is here. If nobody answers, we tell him that we'll kill him if nobody comes out, and that he should shout that out to the people in the house. The basic procedure was the same no matter who gave the briefing. Maybe the "We'll kill him" came from the platoon, but the rest came from the brigada level or higher."
Torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of detainees:
During their operations in Jenin refugee camp between March and June 2002, the IDF ill-treated and sometimes tortured hundreds of detained men mostly between the ages of 16 and 55.(7) The IDF announced that 685 Palestinians had been arrested in Jenin by 11 April. It appears that the only requirement for detention was gender, nationality, and age.(8) Men were separated from women, children and men over 55. They were stripped to their underwear, blindfolded and their hands were bound with plastic cuffs. Reports of ill-treatment were frequent and some said they were beaten; one detainee died as a result of these beatings.
Those detained were removed from the refugee camp and taken first to Bir Sa’adeh where they were held for between two and five days. During this period they were ill-treated: former detainees interviewed said they were forced to squat, with their heads lowered, for protracted periods of time; their hands were still bound behind their back with plastic cuffs and they were blindfolded. For the first 24 hours no food was reportedly supplied and water distribution was not systematic (some report receiving some water, others none at all). Most said that no blankets were furnished despite the cool temperatures at night and there was limited or no access (or access permitted in difficult or degrading circumstances) to toilet facilities. From Bir Sa’adeh detainees were transferred to Salem detention centre.
At the end of their detention, detainees were interrogated for periods ranging from 15 to 60 minutes.
Detainees were released several kilometres from one of three villages around Salem, usually Rumaneh village. They were made to walk to the town; they were frequently still without clothing and most without shoes. They were told to remain in the village. Amnesty International interviewed several detainees upon their release. They were being housed in temporary accommodation in public buildings (in Rumaneh village, a school was converted into a temporary shelter); families took others in. As the blockade was still continuing most had no idea of what had happened to their families, who had remained in the camp, or their property. They returned to Jenin only after 17 April 2002, following the temporary IDF withdrawal from the refugee camp.
B'TSELEM
As detenções durante a Operação Defensive Shield foram majoritariamente coletivas. A IDF ordenou que todos os homens acima de 14 anos fossem detidos indiscriminadamente por um mínimo de 18 dias.
Durante a ODS, cerca de 7.000 palestinos foram presos simplesmente por serem de sexo masculino. Sem permissão de tomar banho nem trocar de roupa. 5.600 foram soltos após processos de familiares e de ONGs de Direitos Humanos. Foram postos em liberdade longe de casa, sem nenhum "certificado de prisão" e sem carteira de identidade - que é considerado pelas Forças de ocupação um delito que leva à prisão. Isto os deixava à mercê de nova detenção, o que aconteceu em muitos casos também aleatórios.
http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files2/publication/200207_defensive_shield_eng.pdf

Documentário Journeyman: Activists who became Human Shields
Depoimento de um resistente palestino:
"It is difficult to assess how many fighters there were because fighters were split into two groups: one to lay bombs, the other to fight with rifles; maybe there were around 400 in all; approximately 60 from the refugee camps. There was good cooperation between the resistance groups; it was decided to use bombs only in the beginning of the attack against the Israeli tanks. Once the tanks had broken into the city and were on the outskirts of the old city, this took the IDF three days, it was decided to resist with small-arms fire.
Once the IDF surrounded the old city there were five days of fighting concentrating in two parts of the old city: the Qasbah and al-Yasmina. The Israeli soldiers had good street maps and aerial photos of the town, they seemed to know where to go and what houses to enter and search. The fighting was very difficult because we did not have good communications and the Israeli snipers were so accurate: movement in the alleys and streets was virtually impossible because of the snipers and attacks from helicopters using missiles.
There was no order from Ramallah to resist, we decided to do it ourselves once we saw pictures of the fighting from Ramallah. Groups were concentrated in their own area of houses each with their own leader but communication between groups was primitive and difficult. During the first three days of the fight there was no shooting from our fighters just the use of bombs against the Israeli tanks. Some fighters tried to supply food and water to those who had run out but these were easy targets for the snipers: I was shocked at their accuracy. I also thought that they would never enter the old city but they did, I don’t think we were prepared for this."

Documentário de Mohammed Bakri: Jenin Jenin


Documentário de Charles Annenberg Weingarten: No child is born a "terrorist"
Extrato de entrevista com Zakaria Zubeidi em 2004
Is there a difference between terror attacks in the territories and attacks in Israel?
Zakaria: “In the beginning, we decided to carry out attacks only in the West Bank, against settlers and soldiers. But the technology of the times changed everything. The Israeli gets on a helicopter, flies from Tel Aviv to Jenin and fires a rocket. Right? We don’t have any rockets or helicopters or tanks. Right? We have a different technology. A person, like a rocket, comes out of the camp and goes to Israel (to become a suicide-bomber)."
“Israeli technology is more accurate than ours. One time it falls in a bus, another time on the road, another time in a cafe. Why? Because we’re being killed every day and we have to respond. They’re killing us from inside tanks and they’re killing us with Apache helicopters. Do we have the weapons to take down the Apache? Do we have anti-tank weapons? The F-16 is the world’s top fighter jet and the Apache is the best helicopter, and we have nothing. We have M-16s and Kalashnikovs. So we’re defending ourselves with what we have. And we’re not the ones starting it. After they kill us, we kill. There was a cease-fire and you killed Raed Karmi, and there were other cases like that and now you just tried to kill Rantisi. Who’s to blame for the civilians that have been killed in Israel? The Israeli government that kills our civilians every day.”
Do you have any red lines when it comes to killing people?
“I’m not a murderous person and I don’t like killing. But what happened in my house and what I saw in the camp brought me to these things. I was one of the best students in the school and I never thought that I’d want to kill anyone or to be a criminal. But the Israelis dragged me into these things. I have a lot of friends in Israel, very many friends….”
And if they got hurt?
“That’s not my problem and it’s not Hamas’ problem. It’s the Israeli government’s problem.”
  
Reservistas da IDF, Forças israelenses de ocupação,
Shovrim Shtika - Breaking the Silence







Global BdS Movement: http://www.bdsmovement.net/


Nenhum comentário:

Postar um comentário