Inside Story: Pré-conferência de Annapolis
Enquanto isso, na Cisjordânia, Mahmoud Abbas mendigava aqui e acolá que as promessas feitas fossem pagas, já que embora tivesse sido derrotado pelo Hamas lutara com unhas e dentes para corresponder às expectativas do Quarteto e de Israel, que queriam ver o Hamas de joelhos e desacreditado.
Foi assim que a conferência de Annapolis foi organizada. E foi por isso que os gazauís responderam com passeatas.
No Comment: Os gazauís no dia 12/11 protestando contra Annapolis
Em Belém, os cisjordanianos também protestavam
George W. Bush talvez não fosse capaz de entender esta nuância política primária, mas sua Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice entendia, e mesmo assim, levou à frente a conferência bilateral que excluía o partido palestino majoritário sem o qual nenhum acordo poderia ser implementado.
Acontece que o mandato de Bush, como o de Bill Clinton oito anos antes, no início da Intifada, estava acabando e ele queria deixar pelo menos uma marca positiva em sua História presidendial. E como todos os presidentes dos Estados Unidos, queria resolver a questão Israel vs Palestina, de preferência, favorizando Israel e deixando os palestinos acreditarem que estavam tendo um lucrinho de fachada.
E este era o cerne do problema. Todos os presidentes estadunidenses querem "resolver o conflito" pelo lado errado. Sem recorrer à solução fácil de acabar com a ocupação e permitir que os palestinos tenham um Estado.
E seria a mesma coisa com W. Bush em Annapolis.
Paralelo à Conferência, no dia 26, Al Jazeea mostrava assim Cisjordânia
Os refugiados palestinos abandonados por Annapolis
O propósito do encontro de cúpula era ressucitar o processo de paz implementando o "Roadmap for peace". E o objetivo declarado era estabelecer um estatuto final para um Estado da Palestina.
O circo foi montado pela Casa Branca e as cartas foram marcadas em Washington e Tel Aviv de maneira tão descarada que antes das discussões, como por milagre, o jornal israelense Haaretz publicou o "joint understanding" que já estava pronto (e nas mão da mídia) para Mahmoud Abbas assinar antes de ele chegar aos EUA e sem poder argumentar.
O documento não passava de uma carta de intenções a mais. Grosso modo, o teor era o seguinte: Parar com o derramamento de sangue, sofrimento e décadas de conflito entre nossos povos; entrar em uma nova era de paz, baseada na liberdade, segurança, justiça, dignidade e respeito e reconhecimento mútuo; propagar a cultura de paz e não-violência; confrontar o terrorismo e sua incitação, que seja cometido por isralenses ou palestinos. A fim de implementar o objetivo de Dois Estados, Israel e Palestina, convivendo lado a lado em paz e segurança, as partes concordavam em começar negociações bilaterais imediatas a fim de concluir um tratado de paz que resolvesse todas as questões suspensas, inclusive as de fundo especificadas em acordos prévios.
Comprometiam-se a engajar negociações bilaterais vigorosas e contínuas e fazerem o máximo para concluir um acordo antes do fim de 2008. Para este fim formariam um comitê liderado conjuntamente pelos chefes de delegações que se encontrariam continuamente como combinado. Este comitê deveria desenvolver um plano de trabalho conjunto, estabelecer e supervisionar o trabalho das equipes de negociação para garantir que todas as questões fossem analisadas.
A primeira sessão do comitê foi marcada para o dia 12 de dezembro de 2007.
Ficou também definido que o Primeiro Ministro de Israel e o Presidente da Autoridade Nacional Palestina continuariam a encontrar-se de quinze em quinze dias a fim de "contribuirem ao avanço das negociações caso fosse preciso".
Ehud Olmert e Mahmoud Abbas também se comprometeram a cumprir com seus respectivos compromissos no Road Map proposto pelo Quarteto no dia 30 de abril de 2003 com o objetivo da solução de dois Estados.
As duas partes concordaram também em formar um mecanismo tripartite - EUA, Israel, ANP - liderado pelos Estados Unidos, que seguiria de perto a implementação do Road map.
Para finalizar, as partes concordaram com o monitoramento dos EUA durante a efetivação do Road Map. E caso palestinos e israelenses chegassem a um Acordo, este seria implementado sob as diretivas dos Estados Unidos.
Portanto, no final das contas, tudo continuava nas mãos dos Estados Unidos.
No Comment: Enquanto Annapolis acontecia, Gaza protestava
B'Tselem: A Cisjordânia, idem.
.PNG) |
| Origem das delegações, codificadas por cor segundo afiliação e/ou papel |
We express our determination to bring an end to bloodshed, suffering and decades of conflict between our peoples; to usher in a new era of peace, based on freedom, security, justice, dignity, respect and mutual recognition; to propagate a culture of peace and nonviolence; to confront terrorism and incitement, whether committed by Palestinians or Israelis. In furtherance of the goal of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security, we agree to immediately launch good-faith bilateral negotiations in order to conclude a peace treaty, resolving all outstanding issues, including all core issues without exception, as specified in previous agreements.
We agree to engage in vigorous, ongoing and continuous negotiations, and shall make every effort to conclude an agreement before the end of 2008. For this purpose, a steering committee, led jointly by the head of the delegation of each party, will meet continuously, as agreed. The steering committee will develop a joint work plan and establish and oversee the work of negotiations teams to address all issues, to be headed by one lead representative from each party. The first session of the steering committee will be held on 12 December 2007.
President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert will continue to meet on a bi-weekly basis to follow up the negotiations in order to offer all necessary assistance for their advancement.
The parties also commit to immediately implement their respective obligations under the performance-based road map to a permanent two-state solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict, issued by the Quartet on 30 April 2003 -- this is called the road map -- and agree to form an American, Palestinian and Israeli mechanism, led by the United States, to follow up on the implementation of the road map.
The parties further commit to continue the implementation of the ongoing obligations of the road map until they reach a peace treaty. The United States will monitor and judge the fulfillment of the commitment of both sides of the road map. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, implementation of the future peace treaty will be subject to the implementation of the road map, as judged by the United States".
Uma punhalada a mais nas costas de Mahmoud Abbas e o Fatah, que sentiram ter vendido a alma para o diabo para nada. Só receberam em troca escárnio e migalhas. No final das contas Khaled Meshaal, o líder do Hamas, estava certo. No final da conferência, Mahmoud Abbas submeteu-se a uma declaração conjunta, sorriu para as câmeras, engoliu o sapo e voltou para casa esperando que os invasores cumprissem pelo menos parte das promessas lavradas.Esperaria sentado.
Bush gagueja conversa fiada no fim da palhaçada
"The Annapolis conference is a joke. Though not in the least funny.
Like quite a lot of political initiatives, this one too, according to all the indications, started more or less by accident. George Bush was due to make a speech. He was looking for a theme that would give it some substance. Something that would divert attention away from his fiascos in Iraq and Afghanistan. Something simple, optimistic, easy to swallow.
Somehow, the idea of a "meeting" of leaders to promote the Israeli-Palestinian "process" came up. An international meeting is always nice - it looks good on television, it provides plenty of photo-opportunities, it radiates optimism. We meet, ergo we exist.
So Bush voiced the idea: a "meeting" for the promotion of peace between Israel and the Palestinians.
Without any preceding strategic planning, any careful preparations, anything much at all.
That's why Bush did not go into any details: no clear aim, no agenda, no location, no date, no list of invitees. Just an ethereal meeting. This fact by itself testifies to the lack of seriousness of the entire enterprise.
This may shock people who have never seen close up how politics are actually conducted. It is hard to accept the intolerable lightness with which decisions are often made, the irresponsibility of leaders and the arbitrary way important processes are set in motion.
From the moment this idea was launched, it could not be called back. The President has spoken, the initiative starts on its way. As the saying goes: One fool throws a stone into the water, a dozen wise men cannot retrieve it.
. Once the "meeting" had been announced, it became an important enterprise. The experts of all parties started to work frantically on the undefined event, each trying to steer it in the direction which would benefit them the most.
. Bush and Condoleezza Rice want an impressive event, to prove that the United States is vigorously promoting peace and democracy, and that they can succeed where the great Henry Kissinger failed. Jimmy Carter failed to turn the Israeli-Egyptian peace into an Israeli-Palestinian peace. Bill Clinton failed at Camp David. If Bush succeeds where all his illustrious predecessors have failed, won't that show who is the greatest of them all?
. Ehud Olmert urgently needs a resounding political achievement in order to blur the memory of his dismal failure in the Second Lebanon War and to extricate himself from the dozen or so criminal investigations for corruption that are pursuing him. His ambition knows no bounds: he wants to be photographed shaking the hand of the King of Saudi Arabia. A feat no Israeli prime minister before him has achieved.
. Mahmoud Abbas wants to show Hamas and the rebellious factions in his own Fatah movement that he can succeed where the great Yasser Arafat failed - to be accepted among the world's leaders as an equal partner.
This could, therefore, become a great, almost historic conference, if …
If all these hopes were something more than pipedreams. None of them has any substance. For one simple reason: no one of the three partners has any capital at his disposal.
. Bush is bankrupt. In order to succeed at Annapolis, he would have to exert intense pressure on Israel, to compel it to take the necessary steps: agree to the establishment of a real Palestinian state, give up East Jerusalem, restore the Green Line border (with some small swaps of territory), find an agreed-upon compromise formula for the refugee issue.
But Bush is quite unable to exert the slightest pressure on Israel, even if he wanted to. In the US, the election season has already begun, and the two big parties are bulwarks standing in the way of any pressure on Israel. The Jewish and Evangelistic lobbies, together with the neo-cons, will not allow one critical word about Israel to be uttered unpunished.
. Olmert is in an even weaker position. His coalition still survives only because there is no alternative in the present Knesset. It includes elements that in any other country would be called fascist (For historical reasons, Israelis don't like to use this term). He is prevented by his partners from making any compromise, however tiny - even if he wanted to reach an agreement.
This week, the Knesset adopted a bill that requires a two-thirds majority for any change of the borders of Greater Jerusalem. This means that Olmert cannot even give up one of the outlying Palestinian villages that were annexed to Jerusalem in 1967. He is also prevented from even approaching the 'core issues" of the conflict.
. Mahmoud Abbas cannot move away from the conditions laid down by Yasser Arafat (the 3rd anniversary of whose death was commemorated this week). If he strays from the straight and narrow, he will fall. He has already lost the Gaza Strip, and can lose the West Bank, too. On the other side, if he threatens violence, he will lose all he has got: the favor of Bush and the cooperation of the Israeli security forces.
The three poker players are going to sit down together, pretending to start the game, while none of them has a cent to put on the table.
The majestic mountain seems to be getting smaller and smaller by the minute. It's against the laws of nature: the closer we get to it, the smaller it seems. What looked to many like a veritable Mt. Everest first turned into an ordinary mountain, then into a hill, and now it hardly looks like an anthill. And even that is shrinking, too.
First the participants were to deal with the "core issues". Then it was announced that a weighty declaration of intentions was to be adopted. Then a mere collection of empty phrases was proposed. Now even that is in doubt.
Not one of the three leaders is still dreaming of an achievement. All they hope for now is to minimize the damage - but how to get out of a situation like this?
As usual, our side is the most creative at this task. After all, we are experts in building roadblocks, walls and fences. This week, an obstacle larger then the Great Wall of China appeared.
Ehud Olmert demanded that, before any negotiations, the Palestinians "recognize Israel as a Jewish state". He was followed by his coalition partner, the ultra-right Avigdor Liberman, who proposed staying away from Annapolis altogether if the Palestinians do not fulfill this demand in advance.
Let's examine this condition for a moment: The Palestinians are not required to recognize the state of Israel. After all, they have already done so in the Oslo agreement - in spite of the fact that Israel has yet to recognize the right of the Palestinians to a state of their own based on the Green Line borders.
No, the government of Israel demands much more: the Palestinians must now recognize Israel as a "Jewish state".
Does the USA demand to be recognized as a "Christian" or "Anglo-Saxon state"? Did Stalin demand that the US recognize the Soviet Union as a "Communist state"? Does Poland demand to be recognized as a "Catholic state", or Pakistan as an "Islamic state"? Is there any precedent at all for a state to demand the recognition of its domestic regime?
The demand is ridiculous per se. But this can easily be shown by analysis ad absurdum.
What is a "Jewish state"? That has never been spelled out. Is it a state with a majority of Jewish citizens? Is it "the state of the Jewish people" - meaning the Jews from Brooklyn, Paris and Moscow? Is it "a state belonging to the Jewish religion" - and if so, does it belong to secular Jews as well? Or perhaps it belongs only to Jews under the Law of Return - i.e. those with a Jewish mother who have not converted to another religion?
These questions have not been decided. Are the Palestinians required to recognize something that is the subject of debate in Israel itself?
According to the official doctrine, Israel is a "Jewish and democratic state". What should the Palestinians do if, according to democratic principles, some day my opinion prevails and Israel becomes an "Israeli state" that belongs to all its citizens - and to them alone? (After all, the US belongs to all its citizens, including Hispanic-Americans, African-Americans, not to mention "Native-Americans".)
The sting is, of course, that this formula is quite unacceptable to Palestinians because it would hurt the million and a half Palestinians who are Israeli citizens. The definition "Jewish state" turns them automatically into - at best - second class citizens. If Mahmoud Abbas and his colleagues were to accede to this demand, they would be sticking a knife in the backs of their own relatives.
Olmert and Co. know this, of course. They are not posing this demand in order to get it accepted. They pose it in order that it not be accepted. By this ploy they hope to avoid any obligation to start meaningful negotiations.
Moreover, according to the deceased Road Map, which all parties pretend to accept, Israel must dismantle all settlements set up after March, 2000, and freeze all the others. Olmert is quite unable to do that. At the same time, Mahmoud Abbas must destroy the "terror infrastructure". Abbas can't do that either - as long as there is no independent Palestinian state with an elected government.
I imagine Bush tossing and turning in his bed at night, cursing the speechwriter who put this miserable sentence into his mouth. On their way to heaven, his curses must be mingling with those of Olmert and Abbas.
When the leaders of the Jewish community in Palestine were about to sign the Declaration of independence on May 14, 1948, the document was not ready. Sitting in front of the cameras and history, they had to sign on an empty page. I am afraid that something like that will happen in Annapolis.
And then all of them will head back to their respective homes, heaving a heartfelt sigh of relief".
Uri Avnery 17/11/2007
Mesmo assim, estavam dispostos a continuar negociando. Mas era um diálogo de surdos, embora Olmert estivesse convencido que a única solução de paz viável era a dos dois Estados.
Por um lado, a delegação palestina apresentou um mapa que oferecia a Israel 1,9% de terras na Cisjordânia em troca do mesmo tanto de terra em Israel.
Pelo outro, Ehud Olmert declarou que sua própria "oferta" era a "mais generosa que os palestinos já haviam recebido", embora não cedesse nenhuma autonomia concreta aos palestinos. Vangloriava-se de "oferecer" supervisão internacional dos sítios sagrados, o retorno simbólico de alguns milhares de refugiados vítimas da diáspora que a Naqba causara, e a retirada israelense de 93,7% da Cisjordânia (conservando as terras mais férteis e estratégicas, a fim de recortar a Cisjordânia), mais o equivalente de 5,8% - em volta da Faixa de Gaza - de Israel em uma troca de terras (significa que de qualquer jeito os palestinos perderiam 0,95% de terreno, que em um território tão pequeno - 1/3 do israelense - conta bastante).
Mas quaisquer que fossem as propostas, uma condição sine qua non provava que Israel jamais tencionara chegar a um acordo: Exigia que todos os palestinos rechecessem Israel como Estado Judeu. O que era e é impossível, considerando que 20 por cento da população de Israel é de palestinos cristãos e muçulmanos que sobreviveram à Naqba. Era a prova que o Primeiro Ministro de Israel em nenhum momento pensou em resolver nenhum problema e sim forçar a barra para garantir um segundo mandato.
Inside Story: Pós-Conferência
This summed up the whole event. The final statement announced that the United States will supervise the negotiations, act as a referee of the implementation and as a judge throughout. Everything depends on her. If she wants it - much will happen. If she does not want it - nothing will happen.
That bodes ill. There is no indication that George Bush will really intervene to achieve anything, apart from nice photos. Some people believe that the whole show was put on to make poor Condoleezza Rice feel good, after all her efforts as Secretary of State have come to nought.
Even if Bush wanted to, could he do anything? Is he capable of putting pressure on Israel, in the face of vigorous opposition from the pro-Israel lobby, and especially from the Christian-Evangelist public, to which he himself belongs?
A friend told me that during the conference he watched the televised proceedings with the sound turned off, just observing the body language of the principal actors. That way he noticed an interesting detail: Bush and Olmert touched each other many times, but there was almost no physical contact between Bush and Mahmoud Abbas. More than that: during all the joint events, the distance between Bush and Olmert was smaller than the distance between Bush and Abbas. Several times Bush and Olmert walked ahead together, with Abbas trailing behind.
That's the whole story.
Sherlock Holmes said in one of his cases that the solution could be found in "the curious incident of the dog in the night-time." When it was pointed out to him that the dog did nothing, he explained: "That was the curious incident."
Anyone who wants to understand what has (or has not) happened at Annapolis will find the answer in this fact: the dog did not bark. The settlers and their friends were keeping quiet, did not panic, did not get excited, did not distribute posters of Olmert in SS uniform (as they had done with Rabin after Oslo). All in all, they contented themselves with the obligatory prayer at the Western Wall and a smallish demonstration near the Prime Minister's residence.
This means that they were not worried. They knew that nothing would come out of it, that there would be no agreement on the dismantling of even one measly settlement outpost. And on the forecast of the settlers' leaders one can rely in such matters. If there had been the slightest danger that peace would result from this conference, they would have mobilized their followers en masse.
The Hamas movement, on the other hand, did organize mass demonstrations in Gaza and the West Bank towns. The Hamas leaders were very worried indeed.
Not because they were afraid that peace would be concluded at the meeting. They were apprehensive of another danger: that the only real aim of the meeting was to prepare the ground for an Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip.
Ami Ayalon, a former admiral who once posed as a man of peace, and who is now a Labor member of the cabinet, appeared during the conference on Israeli TV to say so quite openly: he was in favor of the conference because it legitimizes this operation.
The line of thought goes like this: In order to fulfill his obligation under the Road Map, Abbas must "destroy the terrorist infrastructure" in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. "Terrorism" means Hamas. Since Abbas is unable to conquer the Gaza Strip himself, the Israeli army will do it for him...
...It may be that in retrospect, the main (if not the only) outcome of Annapolis will be this: the conquest of the Gaza Strip in order to "strengthen Abbas".
Hamas, in any case, is worried. And not without reason.
In preparation for such a confrontation, the Hamas leaders have become even more shrill in their opposition to the meeting, to which they were not invited. They denounced Abbas as a collaborator and a traitor, reiterating that Hamas would never recognize Israel nor accept a peace agreement with it....
...If I were invited to moderate this conference, I would start like this: Gentlemen (Ladies will not be present, of course), let us begin by summing up the points on which there is agreement, and only afterwards deal with the points in dispute.
So: all of you agree that the land between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River will become one state (general agreement). You, Palestinian gentlemen, agree that the Jews will enjoy full equality (agreement on the Palestinian side of the table). And you, Israeli gentlemen, agree that Arabs will enjoy full equality (agreement on the Israeli side of the table). And, of course, you do agree that there will be full freedom of religion for all (general agreement).
If this is the situation, gentlemen, then the only remaining disagreement concerns the name - whether to call the state Palestine or Israel. Is it worthwhile to quarrel and spill blood about that? Let's agree on a neutral name, something like Isrestine or Palael.
Back to the White House: if the three leaders agreed there in secret deliberations that the Israeli army will invade the Gaza Strip, that is very bad news.
It would have been better to get Hamas involved - if not directly, then indirectly. The absence of Hamas left a yawning gap at the conference. What is the sense in convening 40 representatives from all over the world, and leaving more than half the Palestinian people without representation?
The more so since the boycott of Hamas has pushed the organization further into a corner, causing it to oppose the meeting even more vociferously and incite the Palestinian street against it.
Hamas is not only the armed body that now dominates the Gaza Strip. It is first of all the political movement that won the majority of the votes of the Palestinian people in democratic elections - not only in the Gaza Strip, but in the West Bank, too. That will not change if Israel conquers the Strip tomorrow. On the contrary: such a move may stigmatize Abbas as a collaborator in a war against his own people, and actually strengthen the roots of Hamas in the Palestinian public.
Olmert said that first of all the "terrorist infrastructure" must be eliminated, and only then can there be progress towards peace. This totally misrepresents the nature of a "terrorist infrastructure" - regrettable from a person whose father (like Tzipi Livni's father) was a senior Irgun "terrorist". It also shows that peace does not head the list of his aspirations - because that statement constitutes a deadly land-mine on the way to an agreement. It is putting the cart before the horse.
The logical sequence is the other way round: First of all we have to reach a peace agreement that is acceptable to the majority of the Palestinians. That means (a) to lay the foundations for a State of Palestine whose border will run along the green Line (with limited swaps of territory) and whose capital will be East Jerusalem, (b) to call upon the Palestinian people to ratify this agreement in a referendum, and (c) to call upon the military wing of Hamas to lay down their arms or to be absorbed into the regular forces of the new state, similarly to what happened in Israel, and join the political system in the new state.
If there were an assurance that this is the way things will go ahead, there is still a reasonable chance of convincing Hamas not to obstruct the process and to allow Abbas to manage it - as Hamas has agreed in the past.
Why? Because Hamas, like any other serious political movement, is dependent on popular support. At this point, with the occupation getting worse from day to day and all the routes to peace seemingly blocked, the Palestinian masses are convinced that the method of armed resistance, as practiced by Hamas, is the only one that offers them any hope. If the masses become convinced that the political path of Abbas is bearing fruit and is leading to the end of the occupation, Hamas, too, will be compelled to change course.
Unfortunately, the Annapolis conference did nothing to encourage such hopes. The Palestinian public, like the Israeli one, treated it with a mixture of distrust and disdain. It looks like an empty show run by a lame duck American president, whose only remaining pleasure is to be photographed as the leader of the world. And if Bush gets the UN resolution he wants to hide behind - another resolution that nobody will take seriously - it will not change anything.
Especially if it is true, as reported in the Israeli press, that the Israeli government is planning a huge expansion of the settlements, and if the army chiefs start another bloody war, this time in Gaza.
Then did this spectacle have no positive side at all? Will it be forgotten tomorrow, as dozens of other meetings in the past have been forgotten, so only people with an exceptional memory are aware they ever happened?
I am not sure that this is so.
True, it was only a waterfall of words. But in the lives of nations, words, too, have their value.
Almost the whole of humanity was represented at this conference. China. India. Russia. Europe. Almost all Arab governments lent their support. And in this company, it was solemnly resolved that peace must be established between Israel and an independent and viable State of Palestine. True, the terms were not spelled out, but they were hovering over the conference. All the participants knew what they were.
The representatives of the Israeli mainstream joined - at least pro forma - this consensus. Perhaps they did so tongue in cheek, perhaps only as a ploy, perhaps as an act of deceit. But as our sages said ages ago: he who accepts the Torah not because of itself will in the end accept it for itself. Meaning: if somebody accepts an idea from tactical calculation he will be compelled to defend it, and in the end he will convince himself. Even Olmert has already declared on his way home: "Without the Two-State Solution, the State of Israel is finished."
In connection with this, a competition between cabinet members is already developing, and that is a good sign. Tzipi Livni has set up more than a dozen committees of experts, each one charged with dealing with a particular aspect of peace, from the division of water to the allocation of television channels. (For those with a good memory: this is happening 50 years after I proposed the setting up of exactly such an apparatus, which I called the "White General Staff", as opposed to the "Khaki General Staff").
True, the Annapolis conference was no more than a small step, taken under duress. But it was a tiny step in the right direction.
The consciousness of a large body of people changes only in a long and slow process, at an almost geological pace. This cannot be detected with the naked eye. But, as Galileo Galilei murmured to himself: "And yet it does move!"
Uri Avnery, 01/12/2007
No dia 28, Al Jazeera comentou assim Annapolis/Israel/Palestina
e deu espaço para o great deceiver Mark Regev destilar seu veneno e mentiras
E Inside Story mostrou outro lado
Nesse ínterim,Noam Chomsky falava em Boston, EUA, na Conferência Apartheid Paradigm
Uri Avnery não tinha razão de ser otimista e Khaled Meshaal estava certíssimo. Em seu tabuleiro de Xadrez, o governo de Israel estava moivimentando o seu Cavalo aos saltos e por todos os lados indiscriminadamente para capturar os Peões, a Torre, o Bispo, a Dama e pôr o Rei adversário em xeque mate.
Nada como o massacre de uns tantos palestinos e a destruição de propriedades dos ocupados para aumentar a popularidade do primeiro ministro junto à maioria dos eleitores e os votos choverem nas urnas do comandante do ato sanguinário.
Dezembro de 2007 seria "tranquilo" em relação ao ano seguinte. Algumas operações relâmpago na surdina e as famigeradas operações de assassinato que continuariam enquanto nós, no Ocidente, estávamos envolvidos com o Natal. Um ensaio da sangrenta operação que começaria no mesmo dia, no ano seguinte.
Documentário Journeyman: Inside Gaza (2007 - 11'')
Reservistas da IDF, forças israelenses de ocupação,
Shovrim Shtika - Breaking the Silence
"One more thing about ‘neighbor procedure’ [human shield]: I remember for sure at least two more cases in my team, one where a child was forced to enter and another time, I think it was an adult, who was made to go into a house, turn on the lights and open the doors, and that information was not passed on to the forces on radio, that someone was entering the house to open everything. I was in the peripheral closing teams, and suddenly I saw a door open and someone peeking out. My instinctive reaction was to raise my gun and almost shoot, because I know the house is empty. There’s no one there, supposedly, everyone’s been removed, and if anyone is still inside, it must be a terrorist who didn’t come out when we called out. Suddenly a door opens and someone comes out. Your first instinct is to raise the gun, the next is to shoot. Luckily I didn’t, because I identified that it was a child. But hey, if it had been a bit darker, if he would have just peeped out, lots of ifs – I would have opened fire, perhaps.
How old was he?
In this specific case, I don’t know. I can estimate, you know, 12. I think it was in Ilar, Salfit, I don’t remember, one of those villages". Sargento da IDF.
In this specific case, I don’t know. I can estimate, you know, 12. I think it was in Ilar, Salfit, I don’t remember, one of those villages". Sargento da IDF.
"There’s some law that it’s forbidden to hit a Palestinian when he’s hand- cuffed, when his hands are tied. When the Shabak guys take people from their homes in the middle of the night, they’d blindfold them and kick them in the stomach while they’re handcuffed. Three in the morning, they open the door, burst into the house. The mother’s hysterical, the whole family’s hysterical . . . the Shabak sends someone in to check, it’s not always a terrorist, but they grab him, they bring him out—you can’t imagine what’s going through the guy’s head—he’s blindfolded, there’s two soldiers holding him from behind, and other soldiers follow. These are standing army, fifteen people in the company who’re a problem, a minority. And they just, here’s this man hand- cuffed, and they kick him in the stomach and the head . . . those guys really liked doing it. Was it reported to the staff? This was an officer! A serious officer, part of the staff! During your regular service, you don’t understand what’s going . . . If this guy wasn’t allowed to do it, he wouldn’t do it! It’s just because that’s how it is. It’s the Wild West and everyone . . . does whatever they want. And most of the soldiers, they just take it as given? . . . The truth is, when I think about it, I should have done something. I really should have stopped it . . . but you don’t think like that . . . You say that’s the reality, it doesn’t have to be that way, they’re shits for doing it . . . but you don’t really know what to do. You don’t feel like there’s anyone to turn to. You go back home. Did you tell your mother and father? Are you kidding? You suppress it. Your parents knew nothing at all? What are you . . . ? You’re part of it. Really, there isn’t much you can do. Especially when they’re officers and you’re in the Tank Corps who they wouldn’t even piss on, so what? You’re going to fight? You’re going to stop it? You can’t start messing with company loyalty or the group like that, you can’t start fighting with people in the middle of it all. It wouldn’t happen now. I wouldn’t let it happen, but that’s not saying much because I’m in the reserves". Sargento da IDF, Nablus.
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