Mostrando postagens com marcador libia. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador libia. Mostrar todas as postagens

domingo, 26 de julho de 2020

Reality check on Lybia, and Palestine


Lybia's capital Tripoli has been quieter than in the last few years following Gaddafi's overthrowing and killing. The reason is that the army of General Khalifa Haftar—who controls large parts of eastern Libya—has withdrawn from the southern part of the capital and is now holding fast in the city of Sirte and at the airbase of Jufra. Most of Libya’s population lives along the coastline of the Mediterranean Sea, which is where the cities of Tripoli, Sirte, Benghazi, and Tobruk are located.
Haftar, who was once an intimate of the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), is now prosecuting a seemingly endless and brutal war against the United Nation’s recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) based in Tripoli and led by President Fayez al-Sarraj. To make matters more confusing, Haftar takes his "legitimacy" from another government, which is based in Tobruk, and is formed out of the House of Representatives (HOR).
However, the quiet in Tripoli is often deceitful. Militias continue to patrol the streets along the Salah al-Din Road near where he lives; the rattle of gunfire is anticipated.
On July 8, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres made a statement that could have been delivered at any point over the last decade. “Time is not on our side in Libya,” he announced. He laid out a range of problems facing the country, including the military conflict, the political stalemate between the GNA and the HOR, the numbers of internally-displaced people (400,000 out of 7 million), the continued attempts of migrants to cross the Mediterranean Sea, the threat from COVID-19, and the “unprecedented levels” of “foreign interference.”
The UN Human Rights Council passed a resolution to send a Fact-Finding Mission to Libya to investigate human rights violations in this war, including the mass graves found in Tarhouna. The credibility of the Council is in doubt. An earlier Commission of Inquiry on Libya set up in 2012 to study war crimes in 2011-2012 was shut down largely because the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) refused to cooperate with the investigation. A second inquiry, set up in March 2015, closed its work in January 2016 with the political deal that created the Government of National Accord.
António Guterres did not mention the NATO war in 2011. It seems that he wants to appoint a joint Special Representative with the African Union and he would like a full review of the UN mission. All that is well and good; but it is short of what is necessary: an honest look at the NATO war that broke the country, fomenting a conflict that seems without end.
Statements about Libya drip with evasion. These terms—“foreign interference” and “foreign-backed efforts”—are dropped into conversations and official statements without any clarification. But everyone knows what is going on.
Benghazi is under the control of General Haftar. The government in Tripoli is backed by the United Nations, Turkey and others; while Haftar is backed by Egypt, France and others. At the core, this is a dispute between two regional powers (Turkey and Egypt) as well as a contest between the Muslim Brotherhood (Turkey) and its adversaries (Egypt and the United Arab Emirates). Wrapped up in all this are contracts for offshore drilling in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, which additionally involved Cyprus and Greece.
It is not enough that this is a regional conflict. There is accumulating evidence that General Haftar is being supported by armed mercenaries (from Russian Muslim provinces and Sudan) and by arms shipments from France, while the United States seems to have hedged its bets with support to both sides in the conflict in order not to bet on the wrong horse.
Last year, General Haftar’s forces moved swiftly toward Tripoli, but were eventually rebuffed by the intervention of Turkey (which provided the Tripoli government with military aid as well as Syrian and Turkish mercenaries).
In late December, Turkey formally signed a military and security agreement with the Tripoli-based GNA, which enabled Turkey to transfer military hardware. This agreement broke the terms of the UN resolution 2292 (2016), recently reaffirmed in UN resolution 2526 (2020). Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have openly been supplying Haftar.
Now, the forces of the Tripoli government have moved to the central coastline city of Sirte, which has emerged as the key hotspot in this contest.
The Tobruk government, which backs General Haftar, and a pro-Haftar tribes council urged Egypt’s General Abdul Fatah El Sisi to intervene with the full force of the Egyptian armed forces if Sirte falls to the Turkish-backed government. Egypt’s military drill—called Hasm 2020—came alongside the Turkish navy’s announcement of maneuvers off the Libyan coast—called Navtex.
This is a most dangerous situation, a war of words escalating between Turkey and Egypt; Egypt has now moved military hardware to its border with Libya.
Of course, oil is a major part of the equation. Libya has at least 46 billion barrels of sweet crude oil; this oil is highly valued for Europe because of the low costs to extract and transport it. Countries like the UAE, which are pushing the embargo of Libyan oil, benefit from the withdrawal of Libya, Iranian, and Venezuelan oil from already suppressed world oil markets. Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) has stopped oil exports since January; from about 1.10 million barrels per day, Libyan oil production fell to nearly 70,000 barrels per day.
Neither Haftar nor the Government of National Accord in Tripoli can agree on the export of oil from the country. Oil has not left the country for the better part of the past six months, with a loss—according to the NOC—of about US$6.74 billion. General Haftar controls major oil ports in the east, including Es Sider, and several key oil fields, including Sharara.
Neither side wants the other to profit from oil sales. The United Nations has intervened to try and resolve the differences, but so far there has been limited progress. The entire conflict rests on the belief that either side has that it could win a military victory and therefore take the entire spoils; no one is willing to compromise, since any such agreement would mean a de jure partition of the country into its eastern and western halves with the oil crescent divided between the two.
UN Secretary-General Guterres has surrendered to reality. In his recent statement on Libya, he listed a series of “de-escalation efforts, including the creation of a possible demilitarized zone”; this “demilitarization zone” would likely be drawn somewhere near Sirte. It would effectively divide Libya into two parts.
I don't know any Lybian who would like their country to be partitioned, its oil then siphoned off to Europe, and its wealth stolen by oligarchs on either side. They had misgivings about Muammar Qaddafi’s government in early 2011; but now all Lybians I know and hear of (outside the warlords cycle) regret the war that has ripped their country to shreds.

PALESTINA
In a recent TV discussion, a respected pro-Palestine journalist declared that if any positive change or transformation ever occurs in the tragic Palestinian saga, it would not happen now, but that it would take a whole new generation to bring about such a paradigm shift.
As innocuous as the declaration may have seemed, it troubled me greatly.
I have heard this line over and over again, often reiterated by well-intentioned intellectuals, whose experiences in researching and writing on the so-called ‘Palestinian-Israeli conflict’ may have driven some of them to pessimism, if not despair.
The ‘hopelessness discourse’ is, perhaps, understandable if one is to examine the off-putting, tangible reality on the ground: the ever-entrenched Israeli occupation, the planned annexation of occupied Palestinian land in the West Bank, the shameful Arab normalization with Israel, the deafening silence of the international community and the futility of the quisling Palestinian leadership.
Subscribing to this logic is not only self-defeating, but ahistorical as well. Throughout history, every great achievement that brought about freedom and a measure of justice to any nation was realized despite seemingly insurmountable odds.
Indeed, who would have thought that the Algerian people were capable of defeating French colonialism when their tools of liberation were so rudimentary as compared with the awesome powers of the French military and its allies?
The same notion applies to many other modern historic experiences, from Vietnam to South Africa and from India to Cuba.
Palestine is not the exception.
However, the ‘hopelessness discourse’ is not as innocent as it may seem. It is propelled by the persisting failure to appreciate the centrality of the Palestinian people – or any other people, for that matter – in their own history. Additionally, it assumes that the Palestinian people are, frankly, ineffectual.
Interestingly, when many nations were still grappling with the concept of national identity, the Palestinian people had already developed a refined sense of modern collective identity and national consciousness. General mass strikes and civil disobedience challenging British imperialism and Zionist settlements in Palestine began nearly a century ago, culminating in the six-month-long general strike of 1936.
Since then, popular resistance, which is linked to a defined sense of national identity, has been a staple in Palestinian history. It was a prominent feature of the First Intifada, the popular uprising of 1987.
The fact that the Palestinian homeland was lost, despite the heightened consciousness of the Palestinian masses at the time, is hardly indicative of the Palestinian people’s ability to affect political outcomes.
Time and again, Palestinians have rebelled and, with each rebellion, they forced all parties, including Israel and the United States, to reconsider and overhaul their strategies altogether.
A case in point was the First Intifada.
When, on December 8, 1987, thousands took to the streets of the Jabaliya Refugee Camp, the Gaza Strip’s most crowded and poorest camp, the timing and the location of their uprising was most fitting, rational and necessary. Earlier that day, an Israeli truck had run over a convoy of cars carrying Palestinian laborers, killing four young men. For Jabaliya, as with the rest of Palestine, it was the last straw.
Responding to the chants and pleas of the Jabaliya mourners, Gaza was, within days, the breeding ground for a real revolution that was self-propelled and unwavering. The chants of Palestinians in the Strip were answered in the West Bank, and echoed just as loudly in Palestinian towns, including those located in Israel.
The contagious energy was emblematic of children and young adults wanting to reclaim the identities of their ancestors, which had been horribly disfigured and divided among regions, countries and refugee camps.
The Intifada – literally meaning the “shake off” – sent a powerful message to Israel that the Palestinian people are alive, and are still capable of upsetting all of Israel’s colonial endeavors. The Intifada also confronted the failure of the Palestinian and Arab leaderships, as they persisted in their factional and self-seeking politics.
In fact, the Madrid Talks in 1991 between Palestinians and Israelis were meant as an Israeli- American political compromise, aimed at ending the Intifada in exchange for acknowledging the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as a representative of the Palestinian people.
The Oslo Accords, signed by Yasser Arafat and Israel in 1993, squandered the gains of the Intifada and, ultimately, replaced the more democratically representative PLO with the corrupt Palestinian Authority.
But even then, the Palestinian people kept coming back, reclaiming, in their own way, their importance and centrality in the struggle. Gaza’s Great March of Return is but one of many such people-driven initiatives.
Palestine’s biggest challenge in the movement is not the failure of the people to register as a factor in the liberation of their own land, but their quisling leadership’s inability to appreciate the immense potential of harnessing the energies of Palestinians everywhere to stage a focused and strategic, anti-colonial, liberation campaign.
This lack of vision dates back to the late 1970s, when the Palestinian leadership labored to engage politically with Washington and other Western capitals, culminating in the pervading sense that, without US political validation, Palestinians would always remain marginal and irrelevant.
The Palestinian leadership’s calculations at the time proved disastrous. After decades of catering to Washington’s expectations and diktats, the Palestinian leadership, ultimately, returned empty-handed, as the current Donald Trump administration’s (Deal of the Century)has finally proven.
I have recently spoken with two young Palestinian female activists: one is based in besieged Gaza and the other in the city of Seattle. Their forward-thinking discourse is, itself, a testament that the pessimism of some intellectuals does not define the thinking of this young Palestinian generation, and there would be no need to dismiss the collective efforts of this budding generation in anticipation of the rise of a ‘better’ one.
Malak, a Seattle-based law student, does not convey a message of despair, but that of action. “It’s really important for every Palestinian and every human rights activist to champion the Palestinian cause regardless of where they are, and it is important especially now, ” she told me.
“There are currently waves of social movements here in the United States, around civil rights for Black people and other issues that are (becoming) pressing topics – equality and justice – in the mainstream. As Palestinians, it’s important that we (take the Palestinian cause) to the mainstream as well, There is a lot of work happening among Palestinian activists here in the United States, on the ground, at a social, economic, and political level, to make sure that the link between Black Lives Matter and Palestine happens.” 
On her part, Wafaa in Gaza spoke about her organization’s – 16th October Group – relentless efforts to engage communities all over the world, to play their part in exposing Israeli war crimes in Gaza and ending the protracted siege on the impoverished Strip.
“Palestinians and pro-Palestinian activists outside are important because they make our voices heard outside Palestine, as mainstream media does not report (the truth of) what is taking place here. For these efforts to succeed, we all need to be united,” she asserted, referring to the Palestinian people at home and in the diaspora, and the entire pro-Palestinian solidarity movement everywhere, as well.
The words of Malak and Wafaa are validated by the growing solidarity with Palestine in the BLM movement, as well as with numerous other justice movements the world over.
On June 28, the UK chapter of the BLM tweeted that it “proudly” stands in solidarity with Palestinians and rejects Israel’s plans to annex large areas of the West Bank.
BLM went further, criticizing British politics for being “gagged of the right to critique Zionism and Israel’s settler-colonial pursuits”.
Repeating the claim that a whole new generation needs to replace the current one for any change to occur in Palestine is an insult – although, at times, unintended – to generations of Palestinians, whose struggle and sacrifices are present in every aspect of Palestinian lives.
Simply because the odds stacked against Palestinian freedom seem too great at the moment, does not justify the discounting of an entire nation, which has lived through many wars, protracted sieges and untold hardship. Moreover, the next generation is but a mere evolution of the consciousness of the current one. They cannot be delinked or analyzed separately.
In his “Prison Notebooks”, anti-fascist intellectual, Antonio Gramsci, coined the term “pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will.”
While logical analysis of a situation may lead the intellect to despair, the potential for social and political revolutions and transformations must keep all Palestinians and their supporters motivated to keep the struggle going, no matter the odds.

Palestinian villages hidden under Israeli planted forrest to bury the massacres and History itself

Jonathan Cook: "The Jewish National Fund, established more than 100 years ago, is perhaps the most venerable of the international Zionist organisations. Its recent honorary patrons have included prime ministers, and it advises UN forums on forestry and conservation issues.
It is also recognised as a charity in dozens of western states. Generations of Jewish families, and others, have contributed to its fundraising programmes, learning as children to drop saved pennies into its trademark blue boxes to help plant a tree.
And yet its work over many decades has been driven by one main goal: to evict Palestinians from their homeland.
The JNF is a thriving relic of Europe’s colonial past, even if today it wears the garb of an environmental charity. As recent events show, ethnic cleansing is still what it excels at.
The organisation’s mission began before the state of Israel was even born. Under British protection, the JNF bought up tracts of fertile land in what was then historic Palestine. It typically used force to dispossess Palestinian sharecroppers whose families had worked the land for centuries.
But the JNF’s expulsion activities did not end in 1948, when Israel was established through a bloody war on the ruins of the Palestinians’ homeland – an event Palestinians call the Nakba, or catastrophe.
Israel hurriedly demolished more than 500 cleansed Palestinian villages, and the JNF was entrusted with the job of preventing some 750,000 refugees from returning. It did so by planting forests over both the ruined homes, making it impossible to rebuild them, and village lands to stop them being farmed.
These plantations were how the JNF earned its international reputation. Its forestry operations were lauded for stopping soil erosion, reclaiming land and now tackling the climate crisis.
But even this expertise – gained through enforcing war crimes – was undeserved. Environmentalists say the dark canopies of trees it has planted in arid regions such as the Negev, in Israel’s south, absorb heat unlike the unforested, light-coloured soil. Short of water, the slow-growing trees capture little carbon. Native species of brush and animals, meanwhile, have been harmed.
These pine forests – the JNF has planted some 250 million trees – have also turned into a major fire hazard. Most years hundreds of fires break out after summer droughts exacerbated by climate change.
Early on, the vulnerability of the JNF’s saplings was used as a pretext to outlaw the herding of native black goats. Recently the goats, which clear undergrowth, had to be reintroduced to prevent the fires. But the goats’ slaughter had already served its purpose, forcing Bedouin Palestinians to abandon their pastoral way of life.
Despite surviving the Nakba, thousands of Bedouin in the Negev were covertly expelled to Egypt or the West Bank in Israel’s early years.
It would be wrong, however, to imagine that the JNF’s troubling role in these evictions was of only historical interest. The charity, Israel’s largest private land owner, is actively expelling Palestinians to this day.
In recent weeks, solidarity activists have been desperately trying to prevent the eviction of a Palestinian family, the Sumarins, from their home in occupied East Jerusalem to make way for Jewish settlers.
Last month the Sumarins lost a 30-year legal battle waged by the JNF, which was secretly sold their home in the late 1980s by the Israeli state.
The family’s property was seized – in violation of international law – under a draconian 1950 piece of legislation declaring Palestinian refugees of the Nakba “absent”, so that they could not reclaim their land inside the new state of Israel.
The Israeli courts have decreed that the Absentee Property Law can be applied outside Israel’s recognised territory too, in occupied Jerusalem. In the Sumarins’ case, it appears not to matter that the family was never actually “absent”. The JNF is permitted to evict the 18 family members next month. To add insult to injury, they will have to pay damages to the JNF.
A former US board member, Seth Morrison, resigned in protest in 2011 at the JNF’s role in such evictions, accusing it of working with extreme settler groups. Last year the JNF ousted a family in similar circumstances near Bethlehem. Days later settlers moved on to the land.
Ir Amim, an Israeli human rights group focusing on Jerusalem, warned that these cases create a dangerous legal precedent if Israel carries out its promise to annex West Bank territory. It could rapidly expand the number of Palestinians classified as “absentees”.
But the JNF never lost its love of the humble tree as the most effective – and veiled – tool of ethnic cleansing. And it is once again using forests as a weapon against the fifth of Israel’s population who are Palestinian, survivors of the Nakba.
Earlier this year it unveiled its “Relocation Israel 2040” project. The plan is intended to “bring about an in-depth demographic change of an entire country” – what was once sinisterly called “Judaisation”. The aim is to attract 1.5 million Jews to Israel, especially to the Negev, over the next 20 years.
As in Israel’s first years, forests will be vital to success. The JNF is preparing to plant trees on an area of 40 sq km belonging to Bedouin communities that survived earlier expulsions. Under the cover of environmentalism, many thousands of Bedouin could be deemed “trespassers”.
The Bedouin have been in legal dispute with the Israeli state for decades over ownership of their lands. This month in an interview with the Jerusalem Post newspaper, Daniel Atar, the JNF’s global head, urged Jews once again to drop money into its boxes. He warned that Jews could be dissuaded from coming to the Negev by its reputation for “agricultural crimes” – coded reference to Bedouin who have tried to hold on to their pastoral way of life.
Trees promise both to turn the semi-arid region greener and to clear “unsightly” Bedouin off their ancestral lands. Using the JNF’s original colonial language of “making the desert bloom”, Atar said his organisation would make “the wilderness flourish”.
The Bedouin understand the fate likely to befall them. In a protest last month they carried banners: “No expulsions, no displacement.”
After all, Palestinians have suffered forced displacement at the JNF’s hands for more than a century, while watching it win plaudits from around the world for its work in improving the “environment”." Published in the National, Abhu Dhabi


OCHA  



BRASIL
AOS FATOS:Todas as declarações de Bolsonaro, checadas


domingo, 19 de janeiro de 2020

Reality Check on Lybia's War Puzzle


Turkish President Recept Tayyp Erdogan has warned Europe it could face new threats from "terrorist" groups if Libya's United Nations-recognised government in Tripoli were to fall, in an article published in Politico.
In the article released on Saturday, the eve of a Libya peace conference in Berlin, Erdogan said the European Union's failure to adequately support the Government of National Accord (GNA) would be "a betrayal of its own core values, including democracy and human rights. Terrorist organisations such as ISIS [ISIL] and al-Qaeda, which suffered a military defeat in Syria and Iraq, will find a fertile ground to get back on their feet. Keeping in mind that Europe is less interested in providing military support to Libya, the obvious choice is to work with Turkey, which has already promised military assistance. We will train Libya's security forces and help them combat terrorism, human trafficking and other serious threats against international security. 
Renegade military commander Khalifa Haftar's eastern-based forces have been engaged in an offensive on Tripoli for more than nine months targeting the GNA led by Fayez al-Sarraj. The fighting has killed more than 2,000 people, including some 280 civilians, and displaced tens of thousands of others.
In a joint initiative, Turkey and Russia have brokered a ceasefire but Haftar walked away from talks in Moscow this week aimed at finalising the truce agreement.

Inside Story: What role will Turkey play in Lybia?

Actually, since the outbreak of the Libyan revolution in 2011, which saw the intervention of NATO countries, under the pressure of warmongers Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, and the toppling of Muammar Gaddafi's regime, international involvement in Libya has gradually escalated. Although some Western states took a step back in recent years, there has been growing intervention by other countries such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), France, Turkey, Russia and Egypt, which have all been looking to secure their own interests in the post-Gaddafi era.
The Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA), which was formed in 2015 through a UN-brokered agreement approved by the Security Council, has struggled to establish control over the country. Although it is the only governing body which has been recognised by the United Nations, it has been undermined by foreign intervention. Formally, the GNA has been supported by the United States and the European Union, but its main backers in recent years have been Italy, Turkey and Qatar.
The UAE, Egypt and to a certain extent France and Russia have all been supporting renegade military commander Khalifa Haftarwho since 2014 has been trying to take power in Libya through military force. The military operation he launched in April 2019 to take over the capital Tripoli, has further complicated the situation.
The conflict has been dragging on for nine months and the dynamics of international involvement has been shifting rapidly with significant external factors coming into play.
Although Haftar pledged to take the Libyan capital quickly, he failed to do so and was forced to seek additional support from his allies. After a visit to Moscow last year, a few hundred Russian mercenaries, mostly from the private military company Wagner Group, were sent to aid his war effort. Over the past few months, their number increased to 1,500.
Earlier this month, Russian President Vladimir Putin admitted there are Russian fighters in Libya, but claimed they do not represent the state and are not paid by the Russian government.
In the face of another offensive on Tripoli, the GNA requested help from its backers and Turkey responded. In November, the two signed mémorandums of understanding, allowing for maritime and military cooperation between both countries. In January, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced the deployment of troops to Libya "to support the legitimate government and avoid a humanitarian tragedy".
The Trump administration seems to be content with Turkey playing a leading role, which may be why the US has become less involved. Washington has had limited diplomatic engagements through the US ambassador to Libya as well as the deputy national security adviser for the Middle East and North Africa, Victoria Coates, who has held several meetings with both camps in the past three months.
The Turkish military entrance into the conflict is not likely to be met by an escalation of involvement from Egypt, although this would exacerbate the conflict if it were to happen. Some Egyptian analysts, while condemning the Turkish intervention in Libya, have indicated that it is unlikely for Egypt to face off with Turkey militarily.
Libya's neighbour Algeria, which has just had a new president elected, has also become more vocal about getting involved in resolving the conflict, reiterating that the GNA is the legitimate government and that Tripoli is a red line. Algiers opposes Haftar's campaign and is perceived as balancing off the Egyptian involvement.
The main European players, namely Italy and France, have had to take a backseat in the past year. Italy lost much of its credibility and influence in Libya after its recent failure to host talks between Haftar and the head of the GNA, Fayez al-Sarraj. On January 7, Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte tried to organise a surprise meeting between Haftar and al-Sarraj in Rome, but the latter refused to attend.
Currently, Turkey and Russia seem to be trying to work together to resolve the conflict, as they have become the two key international players in Libya. The two managed to broker a ceasefire between the GNA and Haftar's forces which came into effect on January 12.
The following day, al-Sarraj and Haftar met in Moscow to sign an official open-ended ceasefire agreement. The latter, however, decided to pull out of the talks.
Amid this uncertainty and persisting tensions, on January 19, a conference will be held in Berlin to attempt to move the peace process in Libya forward. It will be attended by the two warring sides, as well as representatives of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council as well as Italy, Turkey, Algeria, Egypt, the UAE and the Republic of Congo, which chairs the African Union's special commission on Libya.
Whether Italy and France can use the Berlin conference to seize back the initiative in the Libyan conflict from Turkey and Russia remains to be seen. For now, the shift in dynamics on the ground has established Ankara and Moscow as the main powerbrokers.
The Turkish military presence in Libya will mean that the GNA is in a much stronger position to survive the onslaught by Haftar. This is likely to cause Egypt and the UAE to review their strategy on Libya and they may abandon their hopes of imposing a military solution through Haftar.
The deal struck between Erdogan and Putin ultimately means that both sides in Libya will need to compromise and realise that there is no way for either side to achieve a victory through military means. This should hopefully hasten the end of the current conflict and pave the way for political dialogue to negotiate a long-term political solution in Libya.

Inside Story: Is Haftar aggressor or leader in Lybia?

Since renegade military commander Khalifa Haftar launched an offensive on Libya's capital Tripoli in April, the conflict in the North African country has ground to a standstill.
After months of fighting, forces aligned with the United Nations-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA), based in Tripoli, have largely prevented Haftar, who is affiliated with a rival administration in the east, from seizing the city
Following a recent escalation in fighting, the UN on Wednesday welcomed calls by Turkey and Russia - who support opposing sides in the conflict - for a ceasefire amid warnings that Libya faced becoming a "second Syria".
As more foreign actors jostle for influence in Lybia, let's take a look at the powers looking to shape events in the war-wracked country and who they are siding with.

Inside Story: Who is fueling war in Lybia?

United Arab Emirates:The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is seen by many experts as one of Haftar's main supporters, having supplied him with advanced weapon systems in violation of a 2011 UN arms embargo imposed at the beginning of an uprising that toppled longtime leader Muammar Gaddafi.
Haftar's self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) has relied heavily on UAE air support, which includes the suspected deployment of Chinese-made Wing Loong II drones during its months-long offensive against the GNA. 
A UN report released in November said the UAE also supplied Haftar with the Russian-made Pantsir S-1 advanced air defence system that was installed at the al-Jufra base near the town of Gharyan. 
"The complexity and costs of the system make it very unlikely that the United Arab Emirates has supplied it to any other entity who could have subsequently transferred it to Libya," the report said. 
A separate UN report in 2017 said the Gulf country built an airbase at Al Khadim in eastern Libya and provided Haftar with aircraft as well as military vehicles. 
The UAE considers Haftar a trusted partner capable of curbing the spread of political Islam, most notably the Muslim Brotherhood.
"Abu Dhabi has no tolerance for political Islam, including its most moderate manifestations,"said  a Libya expert. "The only way for them to sleep easy at night and be sure proponents of political Islam do not wield any power in Libya is to prop up strict autocracy instead. The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood happens to be very weak politically in Libya is not going to reassure or appease the Emiratis. The latter prefer erring on the safe side, by combating any form of democratic opening, whether legitimate, corrupt or dysfunctional."
Egypt : Like Abu Dhabi, Cairo's aversion to the Muslim Brotherhood has meant that it found in Haftar a natural ally. 
President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi took power after a 2013 military coup that toppled the elected president Mohamed Morsi, Egypt's first democratically elected head of state and a member of the Brotherhood. The group was outlawed that same year and declared a "terrorist" organisation by Egyptian authorities. 
For Cairo, the GNA's makeup, one that accepts the participation of groups such as the Brotherhood - already an important component of the UN-recognised government - in the political decision-making process, constitutes a major red line. 
Haftar's endorsement by wealthy Gulf states, his military background and ability to rein in armed groups in eastern Libya's sparsely populated desert region have also earned him the support of el-Sisi.
Egypt has used its vast border with Libya to funnel weapons and provide logistical support to Haftar, according to Libyan officials and Egyptian foreign ministry. 
During a recent trip to Cairo, Haftar - who received part of his military training in Egypt - said he would take over Tripoli "within hours" if Egypt were to send troops to assist his forces.
France : French President Emmanuel Macron, who sees himself as Napoleon, has officially backed efforts for a peaceful solution to the conflict in Libya.
That stance, however, is counterweighed by France's diplomatic support for Haftar, which includes the blocking of a European Union statement calling on the renegade military commander to halt his assault on the capital, prompting GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj in April to accuse the Macron administration of backing a "dictator". 
There are also concerns that France is providing Haftar with military support. 
Tunisia's border guard in April denied entry to 13 French nationals attempting to cross into its territory after the group failed to disclose weapons it had in its possession. 
Quoting a "well-placed source" at Tunisia's presidential palace, Radio France International reported the men were not diplomats as claimed but intelligence agents.
In June, US-made Javelin missiles belonging to France were found at a base used by Haftar's troops in the town of Gharyan, located some 80km (50 miles) south of Tripoli.
In 2016, a French helicopter crashed near Benghazi, killing three soldiers, during what then-President François Hollande described as a "dangerous intelligence operation". The GNA said the incident was a "violation" of its sovereignty.
Russia: Much like France, Russia has publicly supported the UN's mediation efforts led by Special Envoy Ghassan Salame. Moscow, however, in April blocked a UN Security Council statement that would have called on the Libyan commander to halt his advance on Tripoli.
Russian mercenaries from the private Wagner group have also reportedly joined the battle alongside Haftar's forces. If true, it is hard to believe that it could have happened without the Kremlin's greenlight and suggests a push by Russia to establish itself as a new power broker in the region.
While Russia may lack the political capital to launch an Astana-like process in Libya, its gamble on the inaction of its counterparts may still position it as a power broker. 
Moscow denies sending troops to back Haftar.
United States: The US was among the states that supported the efforts that led to the GNA's creation in late 2015. But soon after taking office in January 2017, US President Donald Trump said he did not see a "role" in Libya.
"I think the United States has right now enough roles. We are in a role everywhere," Trump said in April, 2017. But Washington began to send mixed signals shortly after Haftar launched his offensive on Tripoli.
In an April 19 phone conversation with Haftar, who is also a US citizen, Trump recognised "Field Marshall Haftar's significant role in fighting terrorism and securing Libya's oil resources".
Washington in July blocked a UNSC statement ciondemning and air raid on a migrant detention centre that killed more than 40 people, which the GNA blamed on the US ally UAE. 
Saudi Arabia: The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported in April that Saudi Arabia offered tens of millions of dollars to help fund Haftar's Tripoli offensive. According to the US publication, the offer came during a visit by Haftar to the Saudi capital, Riyadh, in late March 2019, days before the launch of his assault on Tripoli. 
Citing senior advisers to the Saudi government, the WSJ said the offer of funds, which Haftar accepted, was intended to buy the loyalty of tribal leaders, recruit and pay fighters and other such military purposes. 
However, Riyadh, which views the Muslim Brotherhood with the same level of apprehension as the neighbouring UAE, has been bogged down by a conflict of its own in Yemen. 
Sudan/Jordan : A report by the UNSC Libya sanctions committee in November accused Sudan and the head of Sudan's Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, widely known as Hemeti, of violating UN sanctions by deploying 1,000 troops to Libya.
Citing Sudanese military commanders in Libya, The Guardian said in December that as many as 3,000 Sudanese soldiers were participating in Haftar's military campaign. They included fighters from the impoverished Darfur region. 
Jordan is another country that is mentioned in the report. 
Turkey: Turkey has been one of the GNA's foremost supporters since its inception in 2015. 
Ankara has stepped up its military support for the GNA in the face of Haftar's military campaign.
In addition to armoured vehicles, the GNA was reported to have bought 20 Bayraktar TB2 drones from Turkey last summer. It is currently stepping up, as I explained above.
The maritime border delineation deal is a way for Ankara to affirm its position as a leading power in the region, according to analysts, who are quick to point out that drilling rights in the contested seabed only tell part of the story.
Turkey is going to Libya to make sure that any discussion in the Mediterranean includes Ankara because neighbouring countries are trying to exclude it. If Libya falls under Haftar, who is an ally of the UAE, which in turn is antagonistic to Turkey, that essentially puts all of Turkish maritime interests in the Mediterranean at the mercy of the UAE, Egypt and Greece," said an expert.
Qatar: Qatar's dispute with its Gulf neighbours is reflected in the Libyan theatre where Doha supports a Tripoli government that is more tolerant of Islamist elements - such as the Muslim Brotherhood - than the Haftar-affiliated House of Representatives (HoR), which in turn enjoys the support of the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
Doha had played a key financial and military role in the 2011 overthrow of Gaddafi but has since taken a backseat with its support for GNA tempered and limited to diplomatic backing.
Italy: Lybia is a former Italian colony and Rome has maintained strict neutrality throughout the conflict raging across the Mediterranean.
Though supportive of the internationally-recognised GNA, Italy advocates for a comprehensive peace process that would incorporate all segments of Libyan society, which it knows well as the country's former occupying power.
In April, Italy's then-Interior Minister Matteo Salvini warned France against supporting any of the warring factions for "economic or commercial reasons" after Paris blocked the EU's call for restraint.
Rumour has it that Italy is concerned France is trying to usurp Italian oil giant ENI's privileged position in the North African country.

Inside Story: How is outside intervention shaping Lybia's future
Inside Story: Are the chances of finding peace in Lybia getting worse?

PALESTINA

A seemingly ordinary news story, published in the Israeli newspaper, Haaretz, on January 7, shed light on a long-forgotten, yet crucial, subject: Israel’s so-called “firing zones” in the West Bank.
“Israel has impounded the only vehicle available to a medical team that provides assistance to 1,500 Palestinians living inside an Israeli military firing zone in the West Bank,” according to Haaretz.
The Palestinian community that was denied its only access to medical services is Masafer Yatta, a tiny Palestinian village located in the South Hebron hills.
Masafer Yatta, which exists in complete and utter isolation from the rest of the occupied West Bank, is located in ‘Area C’, which constitutes the larger territorial chunk, about 60%, of the West Bank. This means that the village, along with many Palestinian towns, villages and small, isolated communities, is under total Israeli military control.
Do not let the confusing logic of the Oslo Accords fool you; all Palestinians, in all parts of the occupied West Bank, East Jerusalem and the besieged Gaza Strip, are under Israeli military control as well.
Unfortunately for Masafer Yatta, and those living in ‘Area C’, however, the degree of control is so suffocating that every aspect of Palestinian life – freedom of movement, education, access to clean water, and so on – is controlled by a complex system of Israeli military ordinances that have no regard whatsoever for the well-being of the beleaguered communities.
It is no surprise, then, that Masafer Yatta’s only vehicle, a desperate attempt at fashioning a mobile clinic, was confiscated in the past as well, and was only retrieved after the impoverished residents were forced to pay a fine to Israeli soldiers.
There is no military logic in the world that could rationally justify the barring of medical access to an isolated community, especially when an Occupying Power like Israel is legally obligated under the Fourth Geneva Convention to ensure medical access to civilians living in an Occupied Territory.
It is only natural that Masafer Yatta, like all Palestinians in ‘Area C’ and the larger West Bank, feel neglected – and outright betrayed – by the international community as well as their own quisling leadership.
But there is more that makes Masafer Yatta even more unique, qualifying it for the unfortunate designation of being a Bantustan within a Bantustan, as it subsists in a far more complex system of control, compared to the one imposed on black South Africa during the Apartheid regime era.
Soon after Israel occupied the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza, it devised a long-term stratagem aimed at the permanent control of the newly-occupied territories. While it designated some areas for the future relocation of its own citizens – who now make up the extremist illegal Jewish settler population in the West Bank – it also set aside large swathes of the Occupied Territories as security and buffer zones.
What is far less known is that, throughout the 1970s, the Israeli military declared roughly 18% of the West Bank as “firing zones”.
These “firing zones” were supposedly meant as training grounds for the Israeli occupation army soldiers – although Palestinians trapped in these regions often report that little or no military training takes place within “firing zones”.
According to the Office for the UN Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Palestine, there are around 5,000 Palestinians, divided among 38 communities that still live, under most dire circumstances, within the so-called “firing zones”.
The 1967 occupation led to a massive wave of ethnic cleansing that saw the forced removal of approximately 300,000 Palestinians from the newly-conquered territory. Many of the vulnerable communities that were ethnically cleansed included Palestinian Bedouins, who continue to pay the price for Israel’s colonial designs in the Jordan Valley, the South Hebron Hills and other parts of occupied Palestine.
This vulnerability is compounded by the fact that the Palestinian Authority (PA) acts with little regards to Palestinians living in ‘Area C’, who are left to withstand and resist Israeli pressures alone, often resorting to Israel’s own unfair judicial system, to win back some of their basic rights.
The Oslo Accords, signed in 1993 between the Palestinian leadership and the Israeli government, divided the West Bank into three regions: ‘Area A’, theoretically under autonomous Palestinian control and consisting of 17.7% of the overall size of the West Bank; ‘Area B’, 21%, and under shared Israeli-PA control and ‘Area C’, the remainder of the West Bank, and under total Israeli control.
This arrangement was meant to be temporary, set to conclude in 1999 once the “final status negotiations” were concluded and a comprehensive peace accord was signed. Instead, it became the status quo ante.
As unfortunate as the Palestinians living in ‘Area C’ are, those living in the “firing zone” within ‘Area C’ are enduring the most hardship. According to the United Nations, their hardship includes “the confiscation of property, settler violence, harassment by soldiers, access and movement restrictions and/or water scarcity.”
Expectedly, many illegal Jewish settlements sprang up in these “firing zones” over the years, a clear indication that these areas have no military purpose whatsoever, but were meant to provide an Israeli legal justification to confiscate nearly a fifth of the West Bank for future colonial expansion.
Throughout the years, Israel ethnically cleansed all remaining Palestinians in these “firing zones”, leaving behind merely 5,000, who are likely to suffer the same fate should the Israeli occupation continue on the same violent trajectory.
This makes the story of Masafer Yatta a microcosm of the tragic and larger story of all Palestinians. It is also a reflection of the sinister nature of Israeli colonialism and military occupation, where occupied Palestinians lose their land, their water, their freedom of movement and eventually, even the most basic medical care.
These harsh “conditions contribute to a coercive environment that creates pressure on Palestinian communities to leave these areas,” according to the United Nations. In other words, ethnic cleansing, which has been Israel’s strategic goal all along.

Daily Life Under Occupation




OCHA  



BRASIL


AOS FATOS:Todas as declarações de Bolsonaro, checadas