Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine has brought strong US and European condemnation and sanctions, but as we have already seen here, many nations around the world have chosen not to join this united
front.
Dozens of governments outside the USA, Canada and Europe have been
reluctant to censure Russia, and many more have refrained from joining
multilateral sanctions. China has tacitly supported the Kremlin since its
February affirmation of a Sino-Russian friendship with “no limits.” A few others have backed Russia vocally, among them Belarus, which
has served as a staging
ground for the Russian
invasion.
Meanwhile, other governments have sat on the fence. Brasil said pointedly that would not take sides. Indian leaders have reaffirmed their policy of
nonalignment, implying that their nation
will seek to stay out of the fight. South Africa, Pakistan and numerous other nations are following a similar path.
I believe responses to this current conflict shed light on how
governments throughout what is known as the Global South are apt to behave if
a new Cold War takes shape. Unless governments are threatened directly, many
appear content to espouse nonalignment – a policy of avoiding strong support
for the the USA and Euriope or for its principal rivals in Moscow and Beijing.
Nonalignment may be a sensible strategy for individual countries as a
way to preserve autonomy and avoid costly choices between major powers.
The concept of nonalignment emerged in the 1950s. It implied a refusal to join the rival Cold War blocs led by
Washington and Moscow. The concept was pioneered by a group
of post-World War II leaders including
India’s Jawaharlal Nehru, Indonesia’s Sukarno, Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser,
Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah and Yugoslavia’s Josip Broz Tito.
Despite representing a broad range of political ideologies, they all saw
nonalignment as a way to resist colonial and imperial powers, preserve
independence and stay out of the Soviet-American conflict.
These ideas led to the 1961 establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement, a loosely organized group that soon included most of the world’s countries and
population. Several core principles
guided the movement, including anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, respect for
sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonaggression and noninterference.
Yet the movement faced a dilemma from the start. When a powerful state
violates core principles like sovereignty and territorial integrity, should
members of the Non-Aligned Movement take sides to oppose it?
The movement’s diverse members occasionally took strong unified stands.
For example, they joined in opposing
colonial rule in Rhodesia and
apartheid in Namibia and South Africa. When superpower interests were more
directly in play, however, nonaligned states failed to agree on when to take
sides.
Leftist leaders in states such as Cuba and Vietnam saw USA's powers as neoimperial threats and sided clearly with Moscow despite joining the
Non-Aligned Movement. Conservative states, such as Saudi Arabia and Morocco,
tilted consistently toward Washington. Many sought relative neutrality. But all
these states remained in the movement, which has no agreed standard for what
degree of alignment is acceptable.
The differences among members of the Non-Aligned Movement undermined
their ability to exercise collective clout, even when superpowers rode
roughshod over norms of sovereignty and self-determination.
In 1979, for example, members were deeply divided over the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. Fifty-six voted to condemn
the Soviet invasion at the United Nations, but nine supported Moscow and 26
abstained. Those numbers are remarkably similar to recent votes on Ukraine. Divisions over the Soviet war in Afghanistan weakened the Non-Aligned
Movement and undercut its ability to enforce international norms and influence
Soviet policy.
The movement’s relevance declined after the Cold War, as its diverse members struggled to define its role in a world no
longer shaped by a Soviet-American standoff. Still, the movement has survived,
and its 120 members recently celebrated the group’s
60th anniversary in Belgrade.
The Non-Aligned Movement faces new challenges today, as the war in
Ukraine continues.
For many governments in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America,
nonalignment remains appealing. Most depend heavily on trade, aid and
investment both from the USA and Europe powers and from China (if not also from
Russia). Choosing sides could thus be crippling economically. That danger is
apparent in Belarus, which faces stiff Western
sanctions for aiding the Russian
war effort. Countries opposing Russia also risk debilitating energy cutoffs. Taking sides against China in any future scenario, such as conflict
over Taiwan, would be even more costly.
Relative nonalignment is also attractive from a security standpoint. It
enables governments to obtain weapons from multiple sources and limit
dependence on any single power. This is a major factor for India, which remains heavily reliant on Russian arms, and to a lesser extent
for countries like Vietnam.
Nonalignment helps keep diplomatic doors open as well. This appeals to
governments wary of losing policy autonomy if they rely too much on one
powerful state or bloc for political support.
For all of these reasons, nonalignment is likely to continue to be
common. In fact, its strategic appeal is arguably stronger now than it was
during the Cold War because of greater global integration. Unlike the 1950s,
most countries now have strong economic, political and, in some cases,
military linkages to both East
and West.
Nonalignment may be sensible policy for individual states, but it could
spell trouble for USA's ruling. Russian President Vladimir Putin has
shattered the illusion that territorial conquest and great-power wars were
consigned to the NATO members. Reluctance to take sides in such a
clear case of aggression can weaken USA's international norms and undermine Washington's security rules.
At this stage, most members of the Non-Aligned Movement have condemned Russian attacks. Yet only one, Singapore, has imposed sanctions. Others are passing the buck, making the war in Ukraine the deserved burden for the United States and its core allies to bear.
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