No Oriente Médio, maio, o mês das noivas brasileiras, começou no dia 1°. Com uma operação militar israelense em Gaza.
A IDF matou doze gazauís, derrubou casas, feriu vários.
Mas não agiu só lá. Visou um militante do Hamas e o explodiu perto de Nablus, na Cisjordânia.
Para Ariel Sharon, esta operação não passava de uma continuação da campanha de assassinatos inaugurada por Ehud Barak em 2000.
Para o Hamas era mais uma agressão, mais uma provocação e um morto a mais a ser chorado junto com os doze há pouco enterrados.
Achavam que tinham de dar o troco e não se deixar intimidar.
No olho por olho, o troco foi dado por etapas entre os dias 17 e 19.
Cinco bombas-suicidas explodiram em Afula, Hebron, Jerusalém e na Faixa de Gaza. Causaram, nos cinco atentados, além de si mesmos, doze mortos. O mesmo número da operação da IDF, mas um a menos do que os corpos velados nos primeiros dias de maio.
No dia 21, bastou o rumor de uma visita de George W. Bush ao Oriente Médio para os tanques "cruéis" da IDF forçarem Mahmoud Abbas, então Primeiro Ministro da Palestina, a encurtar visita à Faixa de Gaza.
O "incidente" confirmou as suspeitas dos palestinos que Yasser Arafat fora forçado a nomear Abu Mazem para Israel dispor de um homem mais maleável.
Irritado, o Hamas quis mostrar quem mandava na Faixa e uma bomba estourou perto de um ônibus que servia colonos israelenses. Quatro passageiros foram feridos. A IDF nem se deu ao trabalho de retaliar com uma operação militar específica. Apenas continuou suas atividades repressivas corriqueiras na Faixa. Perseguições diárias e derrubadas de residências.
No dia 25, Ariel Sharon "concordou" com o princípio do Road Map. Entretanto, emitiu "14 reservas" a serem apresentadas na reunião de cúpula patrocinada pelos Estados Unidos na Jordânia.
Nesta perspectiva, Mahmoud Abbas, pressionado pelo Quarteto (Estados Unidos, União Europeia, Rússia, ONU), pediu para o Hamas suspender os ataques a Israel pelo menos na semana das negociações tripartite.
A reunião de cúpula para o lançamento do Road Map reuniu George W. Bush, Ariel Sharon e Mahmoud Abbas no dia 04 de junho em Aqaba, na Jordânia.
Yasser Arafat ficara em casa. Ostracizado na Mukata'a em Ramallah.
O povo palestino não se conformava com o afastamento compulsório do líder, os grupos de resistência do Fatah engoliam bem que mal o sapo, mas o Hamas não estava disposto a engolir o que julgava um acinte.
No dia 05, enquanto os três homens trocavam amabilidades forçadas em Aqaba, o presidente da Autoridade palestina abriu a boca em Ramallah para dizer a verdade que incomodava.
"Os israelenses não oferecem nada tangível".
O Road Map parecia a Arafat inaceitável. Recortava a Cisjordânia de tal forma que, caso fosse implementado, a soberania, em terras contínuas, seria para sempre descartada.
No dia seguinte o Hamas declarou que cortava naquele dia as discussões com o primeiro ministro Mahmoud Abbas "por não defender os interesses palestinos e em vez disso obtemperar". E por causa da falta de confiança, revogava a promessa de interrupção das ações militares contra Israel.
O primeiro ministro Mahmoud Abbas desesperou, incorporou de novo sua identidade Abu Mazem, de militante do Fatah, de companheiro de Arafat na OLP - enfim, de tudo do qual se afastava para caber na nova casaca de promessas ilusórias - para explicar que não estava cedendo e sim ponderando para conseguir a paz.
"Não ao preço da liberdade, autonomia e um Estado", disseram as vozes dissidentes inconformadas com a Nação retalhada.
O Hamas quebrou o cessar-fogo no dia 09, em palavras.
Em atos, foi o Shin Bet e a IDF que o quebraram de fato. No dia 10. Quando Israel atacou Gaza com a intenção declarada de assassinar Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi, líder e co-fundador do Hamas.
Um Apache lançou mísseis no carro que transportava Rantissi causando grande estrago.
Ele sobreviveu com ferimentos leves, um de seus guarda-costas e uma passante morreram no ato.
Seu filho foi ferido junto com 25 pessoas que estavam nas imediações sofreram ferimentos mais ou menos graves.
O Embaixador (Observador) palestino na ONU, entregou ao Secretário Geral uma carta (anexada abaixo), mas ela foi arquivada sem a mídia divulgá-la.
Todavia, a operação da IDF surtiu o efeito de provocar a reação esperada.
No dia seguinte, no dia 11, um bomba-suicida explodiu na Jerusalém Ocidental ocupada levando consigo 16 pessoas.
Aí o Hamas foi acusado de quebrar o cessar-fogo. O ataque da IDF que Gaza sofreu na véspera não foi relevado.
Mais uma vez a mídia engoliu os comunicados de imprensa de Tel Aviv e a "má-vontade" foi posta nas costas dos resistentes.
Enquanto a IDF batia e escondia o braço o Hamas, no dia 12, assumiu o atentado. E a Organização aconselhou os estrangeiros a deixarem Israel se quisessem estar a salvo. Pois os atentados continuariam até que fossem propostas negociações aceitáveis e que Israel parasse de demolir suas residências e bombardeá-los, disse um dos dirigentes.
No dia 13, o governo de Israel prometeu uma "war to the bitter end" contra o Hamas.
Porém, uma pesquisa de opinião demonstrou que a maioria dos israelenses condenava as operações de assassinato dos militantes palestinos, inclusive do Hamas.
No dia 16, declararam a meia-voz que concordavam.
Porém, após toda a dificuldade de alcançarem um denominador comum entre as facções extremistas e moderadas, um dos israelenses que participavam das negociações tripartite jogou-lhes um balde de água gelada.
Era um general da IDF. Declarou-se contrário a qualquer trégua temporária com o Hamas, pois "iria contra os esforços do Road Map para a paz" patrocinado pelos EUA.
Passando ao ato e desconsiderando o esforço de trégua que os resistentes palestinos faziam, no dia 25 a IDF assassinou dois militantes do Hamas na Faixa de Gaza. Justamente quando Mahmoud Abbas se esforçava para incrementar um plano de paz.
Apesar disso, Yasser Arafat, nos bastidores, tentava acalmar o Hamas e até declarou, no dia 26, a manutenção da hudna. Trégua precária e unilateral.
No dia seguinte a IDF assassinou mais três militantes do Hamas e um rapaz que passava por lá. "Efeito colateral".
Na de bater e soprar, Israel permitiu que os palestinos recuperassem o controle da estrada principal da Faixa de Gaza. Fazia 30 meses que durava o bloqueio.
A possibilidade de usar a estrada por mais de dois anos interditada aos nativos devolveu um sorriso esperançoso aos lábios dos gazauís. Mas o Hamas queria também que os assassinatos parassem. Se eles não tivessem sossego, os israelenses também viveriam em sobressalto. Era o que transpirava.
Apesar das provocações não pararem, Yasser Arafat conseguiria, do seu lado, manter a hudna durante sete semanas.
No dia dois de julho, dando seguimento à mão estendida, a IDF retirou suas tropas de Belém, na Cisjordânia, a fim de facilitar as negociações.
No dia 04, os palestinos insistiram na libertação das centenas de prisioneiros políticos detidos em Israel, argumentando que este passo era vital para o sucesso de um plano de paz.
No dia 29, o chefe da IDF declarou que temia que a trégua palestina não durasse e conseguiu semear dúvida ca cabeça dos estrangeiros.
Sentindo o perigo da estratégia de cutucar o Hamas com vara curta, Yasser Arafat pressionou Mahmoud Abbas para que instasse os Estados Unidos a convencer Tel Aviv a implementarum plano de paz de verdade, em vez de pôr lenha na fogueira.
Estava cada vez mais difícil para Yasser Arafat acalmar os ânimos dos mais exaltados que desconfiavam das intenções de Ariel Sharon. E sobretudo dos que viam o Road Map para a paz como uma tentativa disfarçada de ocupação permanente legalizada.
O traçado do Plano do quarteto parecia aos palestinos e a observadores das ONGs humanitárias longe do plano bem intencionado de proporcionar aos palestinos a emancipação que almejavam desde a Naqba.
Desde a planta que as estradas do Road Map pareciam intrincadas e esburacadas.
At the same time, on 5 June, the Palestinian people somberly marked the thirty-sixth anniversary of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip in June of 1967. For 36 years the Palestinian people have been living under this brutal and bloody military occupation of their land, suffering innumerable hardships and violations of their human rights at the hands of the occupying Power. Throughout these nearly four decades, Israel, the occupying Power, has committed countless violations of international humanitarian law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, inflicting mounting losses upon the Palestinian people, inter alia, killing and wounding them, imprisoning, detaining and torturing them, confiscating and colonizing their land, destroying their homes and properties, exploiting their natural resources, devastating their livelihoods and subjecting them to constant restrictions on their movement and harassment and humiliation.
Over the years, any and all efforts to address the situation and bring an end to the Israeli occupation have been undermined by Israel’s intransigence and relentless pursuit of illegal policies and practices against the Palestinian people. Israeli actions during the past week since the Summit at Aqaba have been no exception. Indeed, in the days leading up to the Summit and thereafter, Israeli occupying forces continued to kill, abduct and detain Palestinians and to destroy properties and demolish homes. Moreover, the illegal Israeli settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, have continued to harass the Palestinian people, commit acts of violence against them and steal Palestinian land. In fact, while the Israeli occupying forces began dismantling some of the “unauthorized settlement outposts” this week, as called for by the road map, Israeli settlers began rebuilding an outpost that had been dismantled and settler leaders declared their intentions to “do everything we can to torpedo, obstruct and to prolong” this process.
The international community must condemn and reject any such Israeli actions aimed at undermining or sabotaging the peace process. Israel, the occupying Power, must adhere to international law, including international humanitarian law, and must take serious measures to implement the relevant provisions of the road map towards creating a qualitative change in the situation on the ground and the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and promoting an environment conducive to the success of the current peace initiative.
This letter is in follow-up to our previous 165 letters to you regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, since 28 September 2000. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 16 May 2003 (A/ES-10/226-S/2003/548), constitute a basic record of the crimes committed by the Israeli occupying forces against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, State terrorism and systematic human rights violations committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the Perpetrators must be brought to justice.
Accordingly, in follow-up to the above-mentioned letters, it is my deep regret to inform you that, since my last letter, at least 41 Palestinians, including children, have been killed by the Israeli occupying forces, raising the total number of martyrs to 2,440 Palestinians. (The names of the martyrs that have been identified thus far are contained in the annex to the present letter.)
I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council."
Nasser Al-Kidwa, Embaixador da Palestina na ONU.
Carta enviada no dia 10 de junho de 2003 ao Secretário Geral das Nações Unidas.
Lista das vítimas:
Saturday, 17 May 2003: 1. Khaled Ibrahim Suleiman Alzaq, 2. Taher Mahmoud Abdo;
Sunday, 18 May 2003: 1. Ali Mohammed Abu Namoos (18 years old), 2. Khaled Ziad Nasr (13 years old), 3. Mustafa Said Nizal;
Wednesday, 21 May 2003: 1. Ramez Ayed Khalil Arar (17 years old), 2. Rasmiya Hamadallah Arar (38-year-old mother of 8 children);
Saturday, 24 May 2003: 1. Ghasan Mohammed Abu Sharkh, 2. Hamdi Attiyeh Abu Khooseh;
Monday, 26 May 2003: 1. Rafik Joma’an Al-Bansh, 2. Tamer Nizar Fathi Arar (11 years old);
Tuesday, 27 May 2003: 1. Mohammed Nasim Amin Awad (16 years old), 2. Kamal Amjad Nawahdeh (14 years old);
Wednesday, 28 May 2003: 1. Mohammed Shaher Kayed Tameezi, 2. Mohammed Fathi Hassan Ziad;
Thursday, 29 May 2003: 1. Mohammed Jihad Al-Qudrah, 2. Saned Mohammed Fahmawi (18 years old), 3. Mohammed Abed Bu Sibitan (16 years old);
Friday, 30 May 2003: 1. Ahmed Khaled Jad Al-Haq;
Saturday, 31 May 2003 1. Sami Adel Abu Ali (died from wounds sustained on 25 May), 2. Mohammed Abdelkarim Hamamreh, 3. Hisham Ibrahim Tafesh (17 years old) (died from wounds sustained on 29 May);
Monday, 2 June 2003: 1. Mahmoud Ahmed Abu Omreh;
Tuesday, 3 June 2003: 1. Amir Khalil Abdellatif (17 years old) (died from wounds sustained on 22 May), 2. Salem Suleiman Abdelmasdr (died from wounds sustained on 6 April), 3. Nasser Abdelqader Bakr;
Thursday, 5 June 2003: 1. Ibrahim Abdelfatah Abu Wahid (15 years old), 2. Adel Mohammed Hadaiydeh, 3. Hani Ahmed Kharyoush, 4. Mohammed Mohammed Hassan Haniyeh;
Saturday, 7 June 2003: 1. Ala’a Abdelmuneim Al-Fakhouri, 2. Waleed Hijazi Abeedo;
Tuesday, 10 June 2003: 1. Imad Rasheed Al-Sheikh Ibrahim, 2. Mohammed Muin Al-Askafi, 3. Tarik Adel Al-Masri, 4. Khadra Yussef Abu Hamada, 5. Mustafa Abdelrihim Saleh, 6. Jasser Jabr Hassanein, 7. Hamouda Faraj Abed Rabbo, 8. Mohammed Fayez Ahmed Abed Rabbo, 9. Mariam Rajab Ibrahim Abed Rabbo (6 years old).
The total number of Palestinian killed by Israeli occupying forces
since 28 September 2000 is 2,440.
15 de maio - 65 anos de NAQBA:
http://mariangelaberquo.blogspot.fr/2011/05/naqba-catastrofe.html
Reservista da IDF, Forças israelenses de ocupação, Breaking the Silence
What is a leader?
These are kids. Everyone participating is a kid. No older than 16. At most, 18. Usually when we come in, they don’t go to school. We’re the attraction and they come out to 'play'. I even remember once we put on music for them through some cellular phone.
We also got used to this. We were relatively sane, took things fairly in proportion.
We’d get… cement blocks and crazy things thrown at our vehicle and you… at first you use some rubber ammo and then realize, it’s silly. Once... there’s this PA system we have (a sound system for addressing a large public), so we put on music from a cell phone and everyone started dancing.
The kids?
Yes, it was huge. We put on music and suddenly they all stopped throwing stones and began to dance. It was eastern music so they were dancing with their hands.
Then the song ended and they went on throwing stones. It was really serious. You realize who you’re dealing with here. These are kids. Chances are I’d do exactly as they do if I were in their shoes. There was a case of a unit commander who decided to shoot a guy in the leg because he runs the show, and it happened.
Live ammunition?
These are kids. Everyone participating is a kid. No older than 16. At most, 18. Usually when we come in, they don’t go to school. We’re the attraction and they come out to 'play'. I even remember once we put on music for them through some cellular phone.
We also got used to this. We were relatively sane, took things fairly in proportion.
We’d get… cement blocks and crazy things thrown at our vehicle and you… at first you use some rubber ammo and then realize, it’s silly. Once... there’s this PA system we have (a sound system for addressing a large public), so we put on music from a cell phone and everyone started dancing.
The kids?
Yes, it was huge. We put on music and suddenly they all stopped throwing stones and began to dance. It was eastern music so they were dancing with their hands.
Then the song ended and they went on throwing stones. It was really serious. You realize who you’re dealing with here. These are kids. Chances are I’d do exactly as they do if I were in their shoes. There was a case of a unit commander who decided to shoot a guy in the leg because he runs the show, and it happened.
Live ammunition?
Yes. Live, not rubber. You know, from the point of view of the commander, they would have stopped throwing anyway.
When you begin getting hit with stones, you get out of the jeep?
No.
You shoot the rubber ammo from inside the jeep?
You shoot through the loophole.
Where do you aim? Do you choose some kid at random?
Yes. Choose someone, aim at his body.
Body?
Center of mass.
10 meters' range at the center of mass?
No.
You shoot the rubber ammo from inside the jeep?
You shoot through the loophole.
Where do you aim? Do you choose some kid at random?
Yes. Choose someone, aim at his body.
Body?
Center of mass.
10 meters' range at the center of mass?
I remember one time we put a kid down. We didn’t kill him but someone hit the kid in the chest and he fell and probably lost consciousness, or at least, it was pretty close. About 10 meters'.
Were you instructed as to how to use rubber ammo?
No. It’s like… There are rules. They tell you to shoot four. There’s this cluster of rubber bullets, pieces with four parts, packed in a kind of nylon. You can break it in two, so it’s stronger and flies further. As soon as it’s four it’s less strong and flies less far. We’d usually break it in half.
Is this something you were told to do? That if you want to achieve a longer range you break it in half?
Were you instructed as to how to use rubber ammo?
No. It’s like… There are rules. They tell you to shoot four. There’s this cluster of rubber bullets, pieces with four parts, packed in a kind of nylon. You can break it in two, so it’s stronger and flies further. As soon as it’s four it’s less strong and flies less far. We’d usually break it in half.
Is this something you were told to do? That if you want to achieve a longer range you break it in half?
No, we figured it out ourselves. It’s something that’s common knowledge in the army. People know about this. It’s not… When you use a weapon, you get to know it pretty well, I guess.
Just so you know, as soon as this pack is broken in half, it becomes lethal.
Really? Well, that’s what we did.
We did, too. As soon as the 'tampons' are separated, they’re lethal. The nylon must not be removed.
Not removed?!
No. We barely fired a whole cluster, I mean four. It’s like you want to save ammo, too."
Unidade militar: Paratroopers Brigade. First Sergeant. Nablus 2006-2007
Just so you know, as soon as this pack is broken in half, it becomes lethal.
Really? Well, that’s what we did.
We did, too. As soon as the 'tampons' are separated, they’re lethal. The nylon must not be removed.
Not removed?!
No. We barely fired a whole cluster, I mean four. It’s like you want to save ammo, too."
Unidade militar: Paratroopers Brigade. First Sergeant. Nablus 2006-2007
Reservista da IDF Breaking the Silence - 2
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