Just imagine what would happen if a leading American general – or two, since Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis was a leading pro-Iranian figure in Iraq – was blown up on a tour of the Middle East. There would be airstrikes, attacks on Iran’s nuclear centres, threats by Washington to close down all traffic between Iran and the outside world.
The death of an American in Baghdad on Friday and the riots outside the US embassy, while sad, scarcely justify American attacks on this scale.
The assassination of Iranian general Qassem Soleimani has ushered in another turbulent decade for the Middle East. US President Donald Trump's decision to greenlight the assassination of the head of the Quds Force, the special forces of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, is for all practical purposes a "declaration of war" with far-reaching implications for the region, especially Iraq.
US attempts to portray Soleimani as a master terrorist leader, like say, ISIL's (ISIS's) Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is wrong and misses the big picture. Soleimani may have been controversial, even a bloody "shadow commander", but he served at the pleasure of Iran's supreme leader, Ali Hosseini Khamenei, to protect and expand the regime's interests in the Middle East. The killing of Soleimani is an attack on the Iranian state. Just as the killing of General Charles de Gaulle would have been for France.
So why did the US resort to his assassination, why now and what is its endgame?
Several people in Trump's close circle like former national security advisors, Michael Flynn and John Bolton, and "unofficial advisors" like Israel's Binyamin Netanyahu and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman - MBS, have all incessantly urged him to act militarily against Iran and push for regime change.
But for three years, Trump chose to ignore their advice, insisting that the US does not seek war with Iran. Instead, he slapped Tehran with tough sanctions aimed at crippling its economy, containing its regional ambitions and forcing it back to the negotiations table to sign another deal - a "Trump deal".
So, what changed?
Well, basically, the Trump administration realised its "maximum pressure" policy has failed. It has hurt Iran but it did not isolate or deter the Iranian determination.
Iran's proxy attack on the US embassy in Baghdad earlier this week was a rude reminder of the humiliating 1979 takeover of the US embassy in Tehran that demoralised the Carter administration and the 2012 attack on the US diplomatic compound in Benghazi that bruised the Obama administration.
The Trump administration, which feared a repeat of this scenario in Baghdad, claims its response was meant to safeguard American lives from future attacks, not start war with Iran. Or, it looks more like it was meant to safeguard the Trump presidency by deflecting attention from the impeachment during an election year. The same for Netanyahu.
Either way, the assassination is a clear departure from the policy of sanctions, showing Trump's readiness to use US military might as much as its economic blackmail power.
Actions speak louder than words.
Trump calculus
Tehran expanded its proxy attacks on US assets and allies in the area, including recent attacks on tankers in the Gulf and Saudi oil installations, leading up to this week's attack on US positions in Iraq.
Tehran has also cultivated new strategic alliances with Russia and China, joining the two for war games in the Gulf of Oman in late December.
The assassination is not going to change any of these policies; in fact, it will merely accelerate them.
If history is any guide, Iran will absorb the attack at first and avoid an all-out war with far superior US military forces. Trump may have challenged Khamenei for a duel, but the supreme leader prefers fighting in the shadows. The Ayatollah is clever and wise, despite American & Israeli propaganda that spreads the contrary.
So, respond, he did. His options were pletiful and he chose to target the military base from which Soleimani was assassinated. His timetable is open-ended. This includes assassinations, covert operations, low-intensity warfare and oil and maritime disruptions in the Gulf region.
In other words, more of the same - much more.
This will especially be the case in Iraq, where Iran has long exploited US failure and retrenchment in order to shore up its allies and clients and increase its strategic leverage against the US.
And it may well do that again.
Contrary to conventional wisdom and apocalyptical scenarios of World War III starting, the assassination of Soleimani may well prove to be Trump's ticket out of Iraq, just as the assassination of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was his ticket out of the Syrian conflict - although keeping an eye and a hand on the oil.
This fits in perfectly with his desire for strategic redeployment in the Middle East to extract US troops and civilians from the local hotspots and provide the Pentagon with greater freedom to act against its enemies. This means more drone attacks, special forces operations and guided missile strikes with minimum risk for US personnel.
It is nothing new for the US, which redeployed out of Lebanon following the 1983 bombing of the US Marine barracks, and pulled out of Somalia after the 1993 attack on US troops. Similarly, it is planning a withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Of course, Iraq is different. It is a far bigger deal for the US after it invested billions of dollars and lost thousands of lives trying to keep hold of the country over the past 16 years, from its huge embassy complex in Bagdah.
But as a businessman-cum-statesman, Donald Trump is guided by a golden business rule that says: do not throw good money after bad, regardless of pride, oil or partners.
The question is: Will Iran exploit this US tendency for retrenchment, or encourage its propensity for war?
Either way, Iraq and the rest of the divided Arab world will continue to suffer as a result, in accordance with the old Swahili proverb: When elephants fight and when they play, it is the grass that gets crushed.
Iraqi militias, explained (1'40)
People keep asking me who was General Qassem Soleimani.
He was the head of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC's) Quds Force (Holy Force) before he was assassinated early on Friday alongside several others following a US air raid at Baghdad's international airport.
Soleimani acquired celebrity status at home and abroad as leader of the Quds Force, the foreign arm of the IRGC, and for his key role in fighting in Syria and Iraq and spreading Iranian influence in the Middle East, which the United States and Tehran's regional foes Saudi Arabia and Israel have struggled to keep in check.
He survived several assassination attempts against him by Western, Israeli and Arab agencies over the past 20 years.
Soleimani's Quds Force, tasked with carrying out operations beyond Iran's borders, shored up support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad when he looked close to defeat in the civil war raging since 2011, and also helped armed groups defeat the ISIL (ISIS) group.
Qassem Soleimani became head of the Quds Force in 1998 and kept a low profile for years while he strengthened Iran's ties with Hezbollah in Lebanon, Syria's al-Assad and Shia militia groups in Iraq.
He stepped into the limelight in recent years, appearing alongside Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other Shia leaders.
Under Soleimani's leadership, the Quds Force vastly expanded its capabilities, becoming a significant influence in intelligence, financial, and political spheres beyond Iran's borders.
Soleimani was not born with a silver spoon in his mouth. He was born pinto a poor family in southeastern Iran's Kerman Province.
He started working as a 13-year-old to help support his family, spending his free time lifting weights and attending sermons by the founder of the Islamic Republic Ayatollah Khomeini.
As a young man during the Iranian revolution in 1979, Soleimani began his ascent through the Iranian military. He saw combat for the first time in Iran's West Azerbaijan province and emerged from the Iran-Iraq war a national hero for the missions he led across Iraq's border.
Following the re-establishment of government in Iraq in 2005, Soleimani's influence extended into Iraqi politics under the leadership of former Prime Ministers Ibrahim al-Jaafari and Nouri al-Maliki.
During that time, the Badr Organisation, a Shia political party and paramilitary force that has been described as "Iran's oldest proxy in Iraq", became an arm of the state after the interior and transport ministries came under the control of the armed group's political wing.
Following the outbreak of civil war in Syria in 2011, Soleimani ordered some of his Iraqi militias into Syria to defend the Assad government.
During Iraq's fight against ISIL, the Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilisation Forces) - Iran-backed Shia paramilitary units, some of which fell under Soleimani's control - fought alongside the Iraqi military to defeat the armed group. His role in helping defeat ISIL-Daesh made him a "national hero" and a "martyr" among the Iranian people and other Middle Eastern countries.
"If it wasn't for people like him, this region would have seen black flags flying across the region."
His good deeds againts terrorism were not enough to protect him from the U.S, Israel and Saoudi Arabia.
Soleimani was rumoured to be dead on several occasions, including in a 2006 aircraft crash that killed other military officials in northwestern Iran and following a 2012 bombing in Damascus that killed top aides of embattled Syrian President al-Assad.
In November 2015, rumours circulated that Soleimani had been killed or seriously wounded leading forces loyal to al-Assad as they fought around Syria's Aleppo.
Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz said in August that his country was working to "uproot" Soleimani. And in October, Tehran said it had foiled a plot by Israeli and Arab agencies to kill Soleimani.
If you study the military record of the late Gen. Qassem Soleimani, you’ll see both why U.S military and political leaders feared him, yet did not wish him dead.
The embodiment of Washington’s stance was President George W. Bush. In January 2008, Bush was informed he had a real-time opportunity to kill Soleimani as he attended a meeting in Syria. Soleimani was known to U.S. intelligence as the commander of Iran’s Al-Quds force, akin to the Pentagon Joint Special Operation Command. He was known to have played a leading role in nurturing the anti-American insurgency that bled U.S. forces in Iraq from 2003 to 2011.
Bush was soft on Israel terrorism but not on Iran policy. He knew that upwards of 600 U.S. soldiers had been killed by Iraqi militias sponsored by Soleimani, in defense of Iraq independency. But the 43rd president also had bruising experience with geopolitical reality: the fiasco of his Iraq invasion. He knew better than anyone that, just as eliminating Saddam Hussein unleashed a whirlwind of chaos and terrorism that the United States could not control, so “taking out” Soleimani might have unforeseen bloody consequences for U.S. interests. Bush had actually learned a hard lesson by the end of his failed presidency that Trump may yet absorb: violently removing an enemy can create far larger problems than it solves. Twelve years ago, Bush prudently passed on killing Soleimani.
Last week, Trump did not. The president chose to do what the Israel’s Mossad and its sophisticated assassination apparatus, had considered and rejected on multiple occasions. With little deliberation, in order to avoid confrontation and the growth of terrorist groups that Soleimani restrained. CarelessTrump pulled the trigger.
Was Soleimani assassinated for arbitrary political reasons or was he the victim of a “targeted killing”?
The Defense Department said he was “actively developing plans” to attack Americans. However, an anonymous source, probably a senior CIA official, told the New York Times the evidence for that claim was “razor-thin.” Which in CIA jargon means inexistant.
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told NBC’s Chuck Todd that Soleimani was planning an “imminent” attack on American targets when he was killed. When CNN’s Jake Tapper pressed him on how imminent, Pompeo said “this is not something that’s relevant.”
Washington chatter aside, Soleimani was a guest of the Iraqi government, which is a military ally of the U.S. government. In other words, he was not unwelcome. Iraqi government documents leaked by an anonymous source to The Intercept show that Soleimani wielded wide influence in Iraqi affairs, often with top officials who were also on good terms with the United States.
Prime minister Adel Abdul Mahdi told Iraqi parliament on Sunday that Soleimani came to Iraq last week to respond to a diplomatic note from Saudi Arabia. While bitter enemies, the Saudi monarchy and the Islamic Republic, were privately negotiating steps to pacify the region, which has been roiled by anti-Iranian and anti-American demonstrations.
“I was supposed to meet Soleimani in the morning the day he was killed,” Mahdi said. "He came to deliver me a message from Iran responding to the message we delivered from Saudi to Iran.”
The Iraqi parliament proceeded to unanimously disinvite the 5,000 U.S. troops now stationed in the country. The parliament did not set a deadline for their departure, and scores of non-Shia parliamentarians did not vote.
Soleimani was not feared by U.S. (and Israeli and Saudi) policymakers because he was a terrorist (though he sometimes used terror tactics on a much smaller scale than Israel practices daily against the Palestinians and elsewhere) but because he was successful in his job. According to journalist Yossi Mellman, Israeli intelligence assessed him as “adaring and talented commander, despite the considerable number of mistakes in his assessments and failed operations in the course of his career.”
Whether you think Soleimani was “a deadly puppet master” or an “Islamic martyr,” there’s no disputing he helped his country to achieve three significant goals.
First, Soleimani played a key role in driving U.S. occupation forces out of Iraq in order to garantee the country's sovereignity. As Al-Quds commander he presided over the creation of anti-American militias in 2003 that mounted deadly attacks on the U.S. forces seeking to establish a pro-American government. One Iraqi militia leader, Qais al-Khazali, who debriefed U.S. intelligence officers in 2008, said he had “a few meetings” with Soleimani and other Iranian officials of similar rank.
According to Khazali, Soleimani did not take part in the operational activities–providing weapons, training or cash. He left those tasks to deputies or intermediaries. Under Iranian tutelage, these militias specialized in using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to kill upwards of 600 soldiers in the U.S. occupation forces, according to general David Petraeus.
Soleimani’s attacks–along with the manifest failure of U.S. goals to reduce terrorism and spread democracy–contributed to President Obama’s politically popular decision to withdraw of most U.S. troops in 2011. Forcing the U.S. out of Iraq was a priority for the government in Tehran, and Soleimani helped achieve it.
Second, Soleimani played a key role in driving ISIS out of Iraq–a victory in which the United States ironically helped boost his reputation.
In this battle, Soleimani took advantage of U.S. vulnerability, not hubris. When ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi proclaimed an Islamic State in western Iraq six years ago, Tehran was just as alarmed as Washington. The Sunni fundamentalists of ISIS regard the Shia Muslims of Iran and Iraq as infidels, almost as contemptible as Americans and Israelis.
After the regular Iraqi armed forces collapsed, Iraqi Ayotollah Ali Sistani blessed the creation of Shia militias to save the country. Sistani’s fatwa empowered Iran to mobilize and expanded Soleimani’s militia network. The Iranian-sponsored fighters, along with the Kurdish pesh merga, proceeded to do most of the bloody street fighting that drove ISIS out of Mosul, Kirkuk and other Iraqi cities.
As Soleimani moved about openly in Iraq, U.S. commanders did not attack him because he did not attack them. Sometimes, pro-American and pro-Iranian soldiers even foughtside by side. Thanks to this tacit U.S.-Iranian cooperation that neither country cared to publicly acknowledge, ISIS was expelled from Iraq into Syria by 2017.
In Iran, Soleimani emerged as a hero in the fight against the deadliest religious fanatics on the planet, especially after ISIS had carried out a terror attack in Tehran on June 2017 that killed 12 people.
In Iraq, the rout of ISIS enhanced the prestige of Soleimani and the Iranian-backed militias. Some of their leaders entered politics and business, drawing complaints about–and demonstrations against—heavy-handed Iranian influence. Many Iraqis grew unhappy about Iran’s new influence, but success made Soleimani an indispensable security partner for the embattled government in Baghdad. That’s why he visited Iraq last week
Third, Soleimani helped defeat ISIS and Al-Qaeda in Syria’s civil war. In 2015, President Bashar al-Assad’s armed forces were losing ground to Sunni fundamentalist forces funded by the CIA and the Persian Gulf oil monarchies. The CIA wanted to overthrow Assad. Iran feared losing its ally in Damascus to a hostile anti-Shia regime controlled by al-Qaeda. Obama feared another Iraq and refused to commit U.S. forces.
Soleimani brought in Iranian advisers and fighters from Hezbollah, the Shia militia of Lebanon which Iran has supported since the 1980s. With help from merciless Russian bombing and Syrian chemical attacks, the Iranian-trained ground forces helped Syria turn the tide on the jihadists. The CIA, under directors Leon Panetta, John Brennan and Mike Pompeo, spent$1 billion dollars to overthrow Assad. They had less influence on the outcome than Soleimani.
The net effect of Soleimani’s three victories—abetted by U.S. crimes and blunders—was, for better or worse, to bolster Iranian influence across the region. From Afghanistan in the east to the Mediterranean in the West, Iran gained political ground, thanks to Soleimani. He perfected the art of asymmetric warfare, using local proxies, political alliances, deniable attacks, and selective terrorism to achieve the government’s political goals.
(Soleimani, it is worth noting, had no record of attacking non-uniformed Americans. While Pompeo said that Soleimani “had inflicted so much suffering on Americans,” it is a fact thatnot a single American civilian was killed in an Iranian-backed terror attack between 2001 to 2019.)
Iran’s cumulative successes provoked dismay Washington (and Tel Aviv and Riyadh). In the course of the 21st century, Iran overcome international isolation and to actually gain, not lose, advantage to its regional rivals. He also became a media personality in the regime using selfies from the battlefield to promote an image of an accessible general who liked to rub shoulders with his men.
Along the way, Iran maintained a terrible record on human rights at home, persecuting journalists, bloggers, and women who spurn the hijab. Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security didn’t kill Americans but it did take a number of hostages, including Washington Post reporter Jason Rezaian. Across the region, Iran’s ambitions stirred up widespread opposition from secular, feminist, and nationalist movements that reject the theory and practice of Iranian theocracy.
These non-violent movements, however, never advocated that the United States attack their country. They are not welcoming Soleimani’s death, and they are unlikely to support the U.S. (or Israeli) attacks in the coming conflict. Quite the contrary. The anti-Iranian demonstrations in Iran and Iraq are over for the foreseeable future. Iranians and Iraqis who publicly supported the United States and opposed the mullahs, have been silenced. In death as in life, Soleimani had diminished the U.S. influence in the Middle East.
Last October Yossi Cohen, head of Israel’s Mossad, spoke openly about assassinating Iranian general Qassem Soleimani, the head of the elite Quds Force in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
“He knows very well that his assassination is not impossible,” Cohen said in an interview. Soleimani had boasted that the Israel’s tried to assassinate him in 2006 and failed.
“With all due respect to his bluster,” Cohen said, “he hasn’t necessarily committed the mistake yet that would place him on the prestigious list of Mossad’s assassination targets.”
Soleimani was the most capable foe of the United States and Israel in the region. As chief of the Al-Quds force, Soleimani was a master of Iran’s asymmetric warfare strategy, using proxy forces to bleed Iran’s enemies, while preserving the government’s ability to plausibly deny involvement.
After the U.S. invasions of Iraq, he funded and trained anti-American militias that launched low-level attacks on U.S. occupation forces, killing upward of 600 U.S. servicemen and generating pressure for U.S. withdrawal.
In recent years, Soleimani led two successful Iranian military operations: the campaign to drive ISIS out of western Iraq in 2015 and the campaign to crush the jihadist forces opposed to Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. The United States and Israel denounced Iran’s role in both operations but could not prevent Iran from claiming victory.
Soleimani had assumed a leading role in Iraqi politics in the past year. The anti-ISIS campaign relied on Iraqi militias, which the Iranians supported with money, weapons, and training. After ISIS was defeated, these militia maintained a prominent role in Iraq that many resented, leading to demonstrations and rioting. Soleimani was seeking to stabilize the government and channel the protests against the United States when he was killed.
In the same period, Israel pursued its program of targeted assassination. In the past decade Mossad assassinated at least five Iranian nuclear scientists, according to Israeli journalist Ronen Bergman, in an effort to thwart Iran’s nuclear program. Yossi Melman, another Israeli journalist, says that Mossad has assassinated 60-70 enemies outside of its borders since its founding in 1947, though none as prominent as Soleimani.
Israel also began striking at the Iranian-backed militias in Iraq last year. The United States did the same on December 29, killing 19 fighters and prompting anti-American demonstrations as big as the anti-Iranian demonstrations of a month ago.
Now the killing of Soleimani promises more unrest, if not open war. The idea that it will deter Iranian attacks is foolish.
“This doesn’t mean war,” wrote former Defense Department official Andrew Exum, “It will not lead to war, and it doesn’t risk war. None of that. It is war.“
The Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Jarida reported a year ago that Washington had given Israel the green light to assassinate Soleimani. Al-Jarida, which in recent years has broken exclusive stories from Israel, quoted a source in Jerusalem as saying that “there is an American-Israeli agreement” that Soleimani is a “threat to the two countries’ interests in the region.” It is generally assumed in the Arab world that the paper is used as an Israeli platform for conveying messages to other countries in the Middle East.
Trump has now fulfilled the wishes of Mossad. After proclaiming his intention to end America’s “stupid endless wars,” the president has effectively declared war on the largest country in the region in solidarity with Israel, the most unpopular country in the Middle East.
Inside Story: Could Iran and US go to war?
By killing top Iranian military commander, Qasem Soleimani, American and Israeli leaders demonstrated the idiom ‘out of the frying pan into the fire.’
US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are both politically and legally embattled – the former has just been impeached and the latter is dogged by an Attorney General indictment and investigation into major corruption cases.
Despairing, out of options and united by a common cause, both leaders were on the lookout for a major disruption – that would situate them in a positive light within their countries’ respective media – and they found it.
The assassination of the Iranian major general in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and commander of its Quds Force, Soleimani, on January 3, along with several Iranian military leaders by a US drone was a testament to the degree of that US and Israeli desperation.
Although there has been no official confirmation or denial of the Israeli role in the US operation, it is only logical to assume indirect or even direct Israeli involvement in the assassination.
Over the last few months, the possibility of a war against Iran has once more gained momentum, topping the agenda of Israel’s foreign policy makers. Politically beleaguered Netanyahu has repeatedly and tirelessly asked his friends in Washington to increase pressure on Teheran.
“Iran is increasing its aggression as we speak,” Netanyahu claimed on December 4, during a meeting with US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo. “We are actively engaging in countering that aggression.”
One can only assume what “active engagement” from the overtly militant Israeli point of view can possibly mean in this context.
Moreover, the fingerprints of the Israeli intelligence, the Mossad, are unmistakably present in the assassination. It is plausible that the attack at Soleimani’s convoy near the Baghdad International airport was a joint CIA-Mossad operation.
It is well-known that Israel has more experience in targeted assassinations in the region than all Middle Eastern countries combined. It has killed hundreds of Palestinian and Arab activists this way. The assassination of Hezbollah’s top military leader – the movement’s second in command – Imad Mughniyah in February 2008, in Syria, was only one of numerous such killings.
It is no secret that Israel is itching for a war against Iran. Yet all of Tel Aviv’s efforts have failed to bring about US-led war similar to the Iraq invasion in 2003. The most that Netanyahu could achieve in terms of US support in that regard was a decision by the Trump administration to renege on the US commitment to the international community by withdrawing from the Iran Nuclear Treaty in May 2018.
That coveted Israeli war seemed assured when Iran, after various provocations and the slapping by Washington of yet more sanctions, shot down a US unmanned aerial vehicle that, as Iran maintained, violated the country’s airspace, on June 20, 2019.
Even then, the US response fell short of achieving the all-out war that Netanyahu has been so frantically seeking.
But much has happened since then, including a repeat of Netanyahu’s failure to win a decisive election, thus securing another term in office, compounding the Israeli Prime Minister’s fully justified fear that he could eventually find himself behind bars for operating a massive racket of bribes and misuse of power.
Trump, too, has his own political woes, thus his own reasons to act erratically and irresponsibly. His official impeachment by the US House of Representatives on December 18 was the last of such bad news. He too needed to up the political ante.
If there is one thing that many Democratic and Republican lawmakers have in common is their desire for more Middle East military interventions and to maintain a stronger military presence in the oil and gas-rich region. This was reflected in the near-celebratory tone that US officials, generals, and media commentators have used following the assassination of the Iranian commander in Baghdad.
Israeli officials too were visibly excited. Immediately following the killing of General Soleimani, Israeli leaders and officials issued statements and tweets in support of the US action.
For his part, Netanyahu declared that “Israel has the right to defend itself. The US has the same right exactly.” “Soleimani,” he added, “is responsible for the deaths of innocent US citizens and many others. He was planning further attacks.”
The last statement in particular, “he was planning further attacks,” points to the obvious joint intelligence and information sharing between Washington and Tel Aviv.
Benny Gantz, mistakenly celebrated for being a “centrist”, was no less militant in his views. When it comes to matters of national security, “there is no coalition and opposition,” he stated.
“The killing of Soleimani is a message to all the head of global terror: on your own heads be it,” the Israeli general, responsible for the death of thousands of innocent Palestinians in Gaza and elsewhere, also added.
Teheran is convinced that Israel has played a major role in the operation. The pressing questions are more about the nature and the timing of the Iranian response: How far will Iran go to send even a stronger message back to Washington and Tel Aviv? and could Teheran communicate a decisive message without granting Netanyahu his wish of an all-out war between Iran and the United States?
Recent events in Iraq – the mass protests and attempt by unarmed protesters to storm the US embassy in Baghdad on December 31 – were, to some extent, a game changer. Initially, they were understood as an angry response to US airstrikes on an Iranian-backed militia group on Sunday, but the protests had unintended consequences as well, particularly dangerous from a US military and strategic perspective. For the first time since the phony US ‘withdrawal’ from Iraq under the previous administration of Barack Obama in 2012, a new collective understanding began maturing among ordinary Iraqis and their representatives that the US must leave the country for good.
Acting quickly, the US, with palpable Israeli giddiness, assassinated Soleimani to send a clear message to Iraq and Iran that demanding or expecting an American withdrawal is a red line that cannot be crossed – and to the whole Middle East that the evident US retreat from the region will not be duplicated in Iraq.
Soleimani’s assassination was followed by yet more US airstrikes on Iran’s allies in Iraq, as to also emphasize the level of US seriousness and willingness to seek violent confrontation as a matter of course.
While Iran weighed in its responses, it was aware of the geostrategic consequences of its decisions. An Iranian move against US-Israeli interests had to be convincing from the point of view of Iran and its allies, yet, again, without engaging in an all-out war.
Soleimani’s assassination could also be understood as a clear message to both Russia and China as well, that the US is prepared to set the whole region on fire, if necessary, in order to maintain its strategic presence and to serve its economic interests – which mostly lie in Iraqi and Arab oil and gas.
This comes at the heel of a joint Russian, Chinese and Iranian naval drill in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Oman, starting on December 27. The news of the military exercises must have been particularly alarming to the Pentagon, as Iran, which was meant to be isolated and browbeaten, is increasingly becoming a regional access point to the emergent and resurfacing Chinese and Russian military powers respectively.
Soleimani was an Iranian commander, but his massive network and military alliances in the region and beyond made his assassination a powerful message sent by Washington and Tel Aviv that they are ready and unafraid to up their game.
The ball is now in the court of Iran and its allies.
Judging by past experiences, it is likely that Washington will regret assassinating the Iranian general for many years to come.
Inside Story: Is Trump taking US to a new Golf War?
Trump is way out of his depht. He was not counting on Iranian pride and means. Out of arrogance, he miscalculated his move, thanks to the influence of his pal who rules over Israel and who is carrying the ethnic cleansin of Palestine.
Since taking office in January 2017, Trump's dramatic positions and pronouncements on the Middle East and beyond have shocked and dismayed much of the US foreign policy establishment, especially on three main challenges facing the US in the region: security, diplomacy and democracy and human rights.
For the past three years, Trum has been re-coupling US and Israeli strategies, especially towards Palestine and Iran and the global "war on terror" which Obama spent eight years decoupling.
This is not to say, Obama was not a staunch supporter of Israel and defender of its "security" or was not trigger happy with the US drone assassination programme. He certainly was. He just did not like Netanyahu and did not appreciate his deceit.
By contrast, Trump loves Israeli Prime Minister because they are so much alike. The American President embraced all things Netanyahu as soon as he stepped into the White House. It helped that the two men have far more in common than meets the eye.
Both men are thrice married with a history of adultery, are facing charges for misusing their office for personal gain, and have a problematic relationship with the truth.
And yet, both Netanyahu and Trump remain all too popular with their right-wing base.
Even religious fanatics, both in Israel and the US, consider these two secular, undevout, and morally challenged leaders as God's vessels on earth.
Both are able showmen, who have pursued, and mastered, populist, theatrical and divisive policies that have rallied their rightist constituencies around their populist personas.
But most importantly in this context, Trump has pursued the same ultra-nationalist securitarian, some say racist, agendas that Netanyahu has long championed in Israel and the Middle East.
This is especially important today, as both commanders-in-chief are exploiting foreign policy to deflect attention from their domestic troubles with the law.
Trump's knowledge of the Middle East was dismal prior to taking office. He was an empty page ready to be filled, but only with the ideas which helped guide and propel his presidential campaign towards victory, such as infringements on rights of immigrants and minorities, a ban on Muslims travelling to the US, and all things anti-Obama.
A number of Middle Eastern despots like those of Egypt and the UAE did try to fill in some of the blanks. But no one had the ability, style, record, and diligence of Netanyahu, who also enjoyed unfiltered access to the president-elect through his three ultra-Zionist lieutenants, Jared Kushner, Jason Greenblatt and David Friedman.
First among these ideas, was the radical departure from a quarter of a century of US policy towards Israel and Palestine, namely moving the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, accepting the legitimacy of the illegal Jewish settlements in the occupied Palestinian lands, abandoning the two-state solution, and recognising Israel's sovereignty over the occupied Syrian Golan Heights.
It is Netanyahu's dream come true.
Trump also embraced Netanyahu's view on the Arab world in support of friendly despots and dictators and against democracy and human rights. He aligned US policy toward the Gulf and Arab affairs with the interests of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt and embraced Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman-MbS despite his reckless policies domestically and regionally - all in the hope of paving the way for Arab normalisation of relations with "colonial" Israel.
Another Netanyahu dream come true.
Nowhere was Netanyahu's influence on Trump more pronounced than on Iran
The Trump administration abandoned the Iran nuclear deal against the advice and urging of its NATO allies, Russia and China.
It then pursued a punitive policy of containment through tough economic sanctions, an option unavailable to Israel, in order to strong-arm Iran into a humiliating new deal that not only bans all its nuclear activity, but also curtails its military and regional outreach.
When maximum pressure did not produce the desired results, as Iran continued its bellicose regional policies, Trump adopted both Netanyahu's means and endgame, starting with the assassination of Soleimani, widely seen as a "declaration of war" with untold consequences for the region.
Israel has been carrying out targeted killings and preemptive strikes against Iranian targets in Syria; in 2013, it was accused of being behind the killing of another Revolutionary Guard general, Hassan Shateri.
To be clear, Trump did not order the assassination to avenge the killings of countless Syrians and Iraqis; he did so to deter Iran from escalating its attacks on US interests and allies.
Although Netanyahu tried to distance himself from the targeted assassination of the Iranian general in Iraq, make no mistake, this is a third Netanyahu dream come true, in a span of three years. He is said to have been the only world leader with prior knowledge of the planned assassination.
Nothing is more satisfying for an Israeli leader than having the US embrace Israel's strategy and fight Israel's wars in the region. And nothing is more dangerous for the rest of the world - we all know how the last conflict Tel Aviv incited ended in disaster in Iraq.
The last thing any Israeli leader wants is for the US to withdraw from the region, leaving Israel to fend for itself in a hostile environment. Same goes for Saudi Arabia.
That is why it is important to underline that while the Trump administration may seek to reposition its forces out of the hotspots of the Middle East, including Iraq (just as Israel redeployed out of Lebanon and Gaza) the US will still maintain formidable projection of forces throughout the region.
The question is, will this strategy enable future US diplomacy, which also served Israel's interests during the so-called "peace process", or lead to the further escalation of violence and war?
Alas, the ongoing bluster about imminent attacks, counter-attacks, and disproportionate responses and bombings of cultural sites do not bode well for diplomacy.
With naval fleets, military bases and some 60,000 troops deployed around Iran and throughout the Middle East, the Trump administration could pursue an Israel-like air-land-sea strategy of drones, fighter jets, guided missiles, cyber and Special Forces attacks and targeted assassinations that exhaust its enemies and destabilises the region as a whole.
That would be another Netanyahu dream and another Middle East nightmare come true.
Iran's foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said the United States had declined to issue him a visa to attend a UN Security Council meeting scheduled in New York later this week, as tensions escalate between the two countries after the US assassinated Iran's most prominent military commander.
"They fear that someone comes to the US and reveals realities," Zarif said from Tehran on Tuesday.
His comments come as Iran prepares to burry the remains of general Qassem Soleimani, who was assassinated on Friday in Baghdad, along with Iraqi paramilitary commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.
Under the 1947 UN "headquarters agreement," the US is generally required to allow access to the UN for foreign diplomats. But Washington says it can deny visas for "security, terrorism and foreign policy" reasons.
The US State Department declined to comment immediately.
UN spokesman Stephane Dujarric declined to comment on the apparent visa denial.
Zarif wanted to attend a meeting of the Security Council on Thursday on the topic of upholding the UN Charter. The meeting and Zarif's travel had been planned before the escalation in tensions between Washington and Tehran.
The Security Council meeting would have given Zarif a global spotlight to publicly criticise the US for killing Soleimani.
Iran's ambassador to the UN, Majid Takht Ravanchi, has described the killing of Soleimani as "an obvious example of state terrorism and, as a criminal act, constitutes a gross violation of the fundamental principles of international law, including, in particular ... the Charter of the United Nations."
Zarif last travelled to New York in September for the annual gathering of world leaders at the UN - after the US sanctionned him for implementing "the reckless agenda of Iran's Supreme Leader."
The sanctions block any property or interests Zarif has in the US, but he says he has none.
Zarif also attended UN meetings in April and July. During his July visit, Washington imposed tight travel restrictions on Zarif and diplomats at Iran's mission to the UN, confining them to a small section of New York City.
UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres spoke to US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo earlier on Monday.
State Department spokeswoman Morgan Ortagus said in a statement the pair discussed events in the Middle East and that Pompeo "expressed his appreciation" for Guterres' diplomatic efforts.
Since taking office in January 2017, Trump's dramatic positions and pronouncements on the Middle East and beyond have shocked and dismayed much of the US foreign policy establishment, especially on three main challenges facing the US in the region: security, diplomacy and democracy and human rights.
For the past three years, Trum has been re-coupling US and Israeli strategies, especially towards Palestine and Iran and the global "war on terror" which Obama spent eight years decoupling.
This is not to say, Obama was not a staunch supporter of Israel and defender of its "security" or was not trigger happy with the US drone assassination programme. He certainly was. He just did not like Netanyahu and did not appreciate his deceit.
By contrast, Trump loves Israeli Prime Minister because they are so much alike. The American President embraced all things Netanyahu as soon as he stepped into the White House. It helped that the two men have far more in common than meets the eye.
Both men are thrice married with a history of adultery, are facing charges for misusing their office for personal gain, and have a problematic relationship with the truth.
And yet, both Netanyahu and Trump remain all too popular with their right-wing base.
Even religious fanatics, both in Israel and the US, consider these two secular, undevout, and morally challenged leaders as God's vessels on earth.
Both are able showmen, who have pursued, and mastered, populist, theatrical and divisive policies that have rallied their rightist constituencies around their populist personas.
But most importantly in this context, Trump has pursued the same ultra-nationalist securitarian, some say racist, agendas that Netanyahu has long championed in Israel and the Middle East.
This is especially important today, as both commanders-in-chief are exploiting foreign policy to deflect attention from their domestic troubles with the law.
Trump's knowledge of the Middle East was dismal prior to taking office. He was an empty page ready to be filled, but only with the ideas which helped guide and propel his presidential campaign towards victory, such as infringements on rights of immigrants and minorities, a ban on Muslims travelling to the US, and all things anti-Obama.
A number of Middle Eastern despots like those of Egypt and the UAE did try to fill in some of the blanks. But no one had the ability, style, record, and diligence of Netanyahu, who also enjoyed unfiltered access to the president-elect through his three ultra-Zionist lieutenants, Jared Kushner, Jason Greenblatt and David Friedman.
First among these ideas, was the radical departure from a quarter of a century of US policy towards Israel and Palestine, namely moving the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, accepting the legitimacy of the illegal Jewish settlements in the occupied Palestinian lands, abandoning the two-state solution, and recognising Israel's sovereignty over the occupied Syrian Golan Heights.
It is Netanyahu's dream come true.
Trump also embraced Netanyahu's view on the Arab world in support of friendly despots and dictators and against democracy and human rights. He aligned US policy toward the Gulf and Arab affairs with the interests of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt and embraced Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman-MbS despite his reckless policies domestically and regionally - all in the hope of paving the way for Arab normalisation of relations with "colonial" Israel.
Another Netanyahu dream come true.
Nowhere was Netanyahu's influence on Trump more pronounced than on Iran
The Trump administration abandoned the Iran nuclear deal against the advice and urging of its NATO allies, Russia and China.
It then pursued a punitive policy of containment through tough economic sanctions, an option unavailable to Israel, in order to strong-arm Iran into a humiliating new deal that not only bans all its nuclear activity, but also curtails its military and regional outreach.
When maximum pressure did not produce the desired results, as Iran continued its bellicose regional policies, Trump adopted both Netanyahu's means and endgame, starting with the assassination of Soleimani, widely seen as a "declaration of war" with untold consequences for the region.
Israel has been carrying out targeted killings and preemptive strikes against Iranian targets in Syria; in 2013, it was accused of being behind the killing of another Revolutionary Guard general, Hassan Shateri.
To be clear, Trump did not order the assassination to avenge the killings of countless Syrians and Iraqis; he did so to deter Iran from escalating its attacks on US interests and allies.
Although Netanyahu tried to distance himself from the targeted assassination of the Iranian general in Iraq, make no mistake, this is a third Netanyahu dream come true, in a span of three years. He is said to have been the only world leader with prior knowledge of the planned assassination.
Nothing is more satisfying for an Israeli leader than having the US embrace Israel's strategy and fight Israel's wars in the region. And nothing is more dangerous for the rest of the world - we all know how the last conflict Tel Aviv incited ended in disaster in Iraq.
The last thing any Israeli leader wants is for the US to withdraw from the region, leaving Israel to fend for itself in a hostile environment. Same goes for Saudi Arabia.
That is why it is important to underline that while the Trump administration may seek to reposition its forces out of the hotspots of the Middle East, including Iraq (just as Israel redeployed out of Lebanon and Gaza) the US will still maintain formidable projection of forces throughout the region.
The question is, will this strategy enable future US diplomacy, which also served Israel's interests during the so-called "peace process", or lead to the further escalation of violence and war?
Alas, the ongoing bluster about imminent attacks, counter-attacks, and disproportionate responses and bombings of cultural sites do not bode well for diplomacy.
With naval fleets, military bases and some 60,000 troops deployed around Iran and throughout the Middle East, the Trump administration could pursue an Israel-like air-land-sea strategy of drones, fighter jets, guided missiles, cyber and Special Forces attacks and targeted assassinations that exhaust its enemies and destabilises the region as a whole.
That would be another Netanyahu dream and another Middle East nightmare come true.
Inside Story: What would happen if foreign troops were expelled from Iraq?
"They fear that someone comes to the US and reveals realities," Zarif said from Tehran on Tuesday.
His comments come as Iran prepares to burry the remains of general Qassem Soleimani, who was assassinated on Friday in Baghdad, along with Iraqi paramilitary commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.
Under the 1947 UN "headquarters agreement," the US is generally required to allow access to the UN for foreign diplomats. But Washington says it can deny visas for "security, terrorism and foreign policy" reasons.
The US State Department declined to comment immediately.
UN spokesman Stephane Dujarric declined to comment on the apparent visa denial.
Zarif wanted to attend a meeting of the Security Council on Thursday on the topic of upholding the UN Charter. The meeting and Zarif's travel had been planned before the escalation in tensions between Washington and Tehran.
The Security Council meeting would have given Zarif a global spotlight to publicly criticise the US for killing Soleimani.
Iran's ambassador to the UN, Majid Takht Ravanchi, has described the killing of Soleimani as "an obvious example of state terrorism and, as a criminal act, constitutes a gross violation of the fundamental principles of international law, including, in particular ... the Charter of the United Nations."
Zarif last travelled to New York in September for the annual gathering of world leaders at the UN - after the US sanctionned him for implementing "the reckless agenda of Iran's Supreme Leader."
The sanctions block any property or interests Zarif has in the US, but he says he has none.
Zarif also attended UN meetings in April and July. During his July visit, Washington imposed tight travel restrictions on Zarif and diplomats at Iran's mission to the UN, confining them to a small section of New York City.
UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres spoke to US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo earlier on Monday.
State Department spokeswoman Morgan Ortagus said in a statement the pair discussed events in the Middle East and that Pompeo "expressed his appreciation" for Guterres' diplomatic efforts.
Let's have a laugh, over a serious matter, with Trevor Noah
PALESTINA
BRASIL
Nenhum comentário:
Postar um comentário