Israel vs Palestina: Operações Militares X (Líbano 1992-96)

1992

No dia 16 de fevereiro de 1992 um Apache, helicóptero de combate que os EUA oferece à IDF, bombardeou o carro de Abbas Musawi, líder do Hizbollah. Junto com Abbas, Israel executou sua esposa, seu filho de cinco anos, mais quatro pessoas que se encontravam no veículo, e feriu outras tantas.
Tel Aviv alegou que era punição pela captura e morte de um soldado israelense em 1986 e sequestro de um soldado estadunidense em 1988.
Porém, o que o atentado terrorista visava era, por um lado, minar os esforços de paz entre Líbano & Síria que na mesma hora divulgavam de Damasco intenção conjunta de ir a Washington 'dar uma chance à paz'.  Por outro lado, visava provocar reação dos libaneses para 'justificar' uma nova operação sanguinária.
Vazou na época que o primeiro ministro Shamir não queria matar e sim sequestrar Abbas Musawi para trocá-lo por soldados israelenses presos no Líbano. No entanto, seu então chefe de gabinete, o general Ehud Barak, conceguiu convencê-lo  a ordenar o assassinato da família inteira e de quem quer que estivesse no perímetro do atentado terrorista.
Até o NYTimes, porta-voz de Israel em Nova York, foi obrigado a admitir o óbvio, embora tenha carregado na tinta ao se referir à vítima para transformá-lo em culpado: "The dramatic afternoon raid on a motorcade carrying the Shiite Muslim leader, Sheik Abbas Musawi, outside Jibchit in southern Lebanon kept this part of the Middle East locked in a new cycle of violence that was likely to cast a pall on United States-brokered peace talks scheduled to resume in Washington next week." 
Em seguida, a resistência palestina atacou um batalhão da IDF causando baixas e esta 'retaliou' contra dois campos de refugiados. 
Em Tunis, Ahmed Abderrahman, porta-voz da OLP, justificou que ao atacar os soldados israelenses os três palestinos haviam exercido "their legitimate right to resist against the Israeli army of occupation. It was a resistance act, like the French resistance against Nazi occupation." 
Os resistentes palestinos mataram soldados. A IDF bombardeou civis em campos de refugiados. Em Ramallah, a porta-voz da delegação palestina nas negociações de paz e deputada do Fatah, Hanan Ashrawi, deplorou o bombardeio de civis: "To use the air force and state policy to kill women and children, that's not terrorism?" Na época, Rachelle Marshall relatou bem os fatos no artigo Israel Derails the Peace Train Again. 
Mal a notícia da morte de Abbas al-Musawi foi divulgada, Hassan Nasrallah foi empossado na Secretaria Geral do Hizbollah. Nasrallah não perdeu tempo, inaugurou seu mandato anunciando uma política de retribuição, "If Israel hits Lebanese civilian targets, then Hizbollah will retaliate with attacks on Israeli territory."
Nesse ínterim, o Hizbollah continuaria a atacar as forças israelenses de ocupação no território libanês em retaliação a uma série de mini-operações israelenses contra palestinos e libaneses. Operações corriqueiras cujos nomes caíram no esquecimento.
Um dia chegou a notícia de uma com nome, que foi de fato um grande fora, uma operação frustrada no Iraque. Repertoria-la-ei porque é quase anedótica, se não tivesse tido consequências dramáticas mais tarde, quando os EUA interviriam no país diretamente e deixariam atrás de si o caos.

Operation Bramble Bush: Plano de assassinato do presidente do Iraque Saddam Hussein, cujo 'ensaio' aconteceu no dia 05 de novembro de 1992 no deserto do Negev.
Ao sair a notícia da doença terminal do tio de Saddam, Khairallah Taifah, Israel planejou um atentado durante o funeral. Soldados das forças especiais Sayeret Matkal deveriam infiltrar-se no Iraque através da Jordânia até Tikrit, de onde lançariam mísseis Midras teleguiados que atingissem Saddam e quem estivesse no diâmetro da explosão. A operação foi aprovada e o general Ehud Barak, então comandante da IDF, supervisionou de perto os ensaios. O segredo foi quebrado devido a um "training accident" na presença de Uri Saguy, chefe de Inteligência militar, e o episódio acabou sendo relatado como uma tentativa de assassinato de Hassan Nasrallah, em vez de Saddam Hussein, e os censores militares reclamaram da imprensa ter "violated censorship laws". Esquecendo que tais leis vigoram em Israel e não na imprensa dos países estrangeiros democráticos.
(Sete anos mais tarde, Israel recidivaria com a Operation Bramble Bush II, também contra Saddam Hussein. Agentes do Mossad foram enviados ao Iraque como olheiros para armar uma armadilha contra o presidente, porém, o assassinato foi de novo abortado. Desta vez por causa da operação conjunta EUA & Inglaterra Desert Fox, executada do dia 16 a 19 de dezembro de 1998 - os dois aliados bombardearam o Iraque durante quatro dias seguidos, em um ensaio para a invasão em 2003 com os resultados que se conhece: falência da economia, das instituições público-governamentais, sectarismo religioso, e a emergência do Estado Islâmico.)

1993

Julho: Operation Accountability, chamada no Líbano de Seven-Day War.
Esta operação de Israel no Líbano durou do dia 25 ao dia 31 de julho e aconteceu um plena negociação dos Acordos de Oslo.
O general Ytkhak Rabin era primeiro ministro e foi ele que ordenou a operação comandada por Ehud Barak, então chefe da IDF.
Os israelenses registraram a perda de um soldado e três feridos. Cerca de 120 civis libaneses foram mortos e mais de 500 ficaram feridos durante a ofensiva que desalojou 300 mil libaneses e palestinos em cidadezinhas e campos de refugiados no sul do Líbano.
A população civil foi a mais atingida porque o objetivo de Israel era, além de 'punir' o Hizbollah, aterrorizar , provocar o caos no sul do país, e empurrar um grande fluxo de refugiados em direção de Beirute a fim de forçar o governo a tomar medidas ainda mais restritivas às guerrilhas anti-ocupação.
Atingir o primeiro alvo foi fácil. Filas e filas de famílias sulistas enchiam as estradas que levavam à capital. O êxodo foi tamanho  que o Human Righst Watch declarou que Israel "is in grave violation of International humanitarian law".
Atingir o segundo objetivo, o de cutucar Ahmed Jibril, comandante da Frente Popular pela Libertação da Palestina, e Hassan Nasrallah, também não foi difícil. O Hizbollah estava desprevenido e respondeu jogando uma penca de foguetes Katyusha no norte de Israel, indiscriminadamente. Acabaram matando dois civis, ferindo treze, e dando a Tel Aviv mais uma oportunidade de fazer-se de vítima de seus próprios ataques.
No final da semana, os Estados Unidos mediaram um cessar-fogo. Israel prometeu 'frear' seus ataques a civis e o Hizbollah concordou em parar de jogar foguetes no norte de Israel.
O acordo foi celado com um aperto de mãos. O que não evitaria escaramuças pontuais na zona fronteiriça nos meses seguintes e uma chuva de mísseis israelenses em 1994 no Vale Beqaa, onde a IDF matou cerca de trinta membros do Hizbollah.
Noam Chomsky:  Limited War” in Lebanon

1994

Maio. Operação de sequestro de Mustafa Dirani, libanês ligado ao Movimento Amal associado à Síria, no dia 21.
Mustafa foi mantido em detenção administrativa no propósito de servir de barganha em uma eventual negociação de troca de prisioneiros entre Israel, que ocupava o sul do Libano, e o Hizbollah. Mas também por acreditar que ele soubesse do paradeiro de um de seus pilotos, Ron Arad, capturado em outubro de 1986 pelo Amal.
Um batalhão das forças especiais da IDF sequestrou Mustafa, em casa, e ao ser interrogado sob tortura, Mustafa disse que transferira Arad para o Hizbollah, que por sua vez o transferira à Guarda Revolucionária Iraniana, que na época tinha uns oficiais no Libano. Porém, nem o Hizbollah, nem o Irã, forneceram informação sobre o militar israelense. Arad jamais seria encontrado.
Quanto a Mustafa, dez anos mais tarde, em janeiro de 2004, seria trocado (junto com 22 militantes libaneses e 12 prisioneiros políticos palestinos) pelos corpos de três soldados israelenses e pelo "shady" coronel-'empresário' de tráficos ilícitos Elchanan Tannenbaum.
Outubro. Operação de resgate do soldado da IDF Nachshon Wachsman, capturado pelo Hamas seis dias antes. Às 20 horas da sexta-feira, dia 04 de outubro, dia do anúncio do Prêmio Nobel da Paz para Yasser Arafat, Yitzhak Rabin e Shimon Peres, a tropa de elite da IDF, Sayeret Matkal, invadiu o vilarejo palestino Bir Nabala, começou o procedimento de resgate de seu camarada na casa em que estava preso e deparou-se com uma sólida porta de aço, em vez da de ferro que esperava. Ao tentar forçar a entrada, o comando foi recebido a bala e respondeu com seu arsenal pesado. Na troca de tiros, o refém foi morto junto com os três palestinos que o guardavam e o chefe da tropa de choque da IDF. No tiroteio, dez soldados foram feridos. A operação foi um fiasco.
O Hamas capturara o soldado da Brigada Golani esperando trocá-lo por seu líder preso, Ahmed Yassine. Na época, havia centenas de palestinos (membros da resistência, estudantes e até meninos) sofrendo horrores anoninamente nos cárceres israelenses. A detenção do soldado da IDF virou notícia e foi levado até ao conhecimento do presidente dos Estados Unidos, Bill Clinton.

1996

Abril: Operations Grape of Wrath (para o Líbano, April War).
A operação começou no dia 11 de abril e durou até o dia 26. Onze dias, durante os quais 170 civis libaneses foram mortos e mais de 350 sofreram ferimentos graves. Cerca de meio milhão de civis foram desalojados e deslocados, incluindo 150 mil meninos. Os únicos civis que ficaram no sul do Líbano foram indigentes, velhos e camponeses que queriam proteger suas lavouras de tabaco - pois era período de transplante de sementes. Uma das razões dos bombardeios na primavera, período de plantio e colheita.
Seis mil prédios e casas foram bombardeados, dentre os quais, 500 foram totalmmente destruídos e 2.500 bastante atingidos. Habitantes de Khirbit Salim, por exemplo, relataram que seu vilarejo foi bombardeado todos os dias. Por isso, das 500 casas, 30 foram destruídas.
Segundo um observador de uma ONG internacional de Direitos Humanos, "These villages, close to the Israeli-occupied zone, are known in the area to be supportive of Hizballah, but the homes and buildings hit bore no relation to whether or not they housed Hizballah fighters or other Hizballah assets. The extent and pattern of destruction seems clearly disproportionate to any military threat those sites represented."
A artilharia da IDF usou 24.000 balas nessas cidades e a aeronáutica jogou 600 bombas em alguns alvos militares, mas sobretudo em residências e infra-estruturas civis, inclusive um reservatório de água que servia 4 cidades.
No único dia 18, até um quartel da UNIFIL foi visado, quatro soldados irlandeses foram feridos, e a ONU deixou claro em seu relatório que não acreditava no erro que a IDF alegara: "It is unlikely that the shelling of the United Nations compound was the result of gross technical and/or procedural errors." Mas os EUA correram em socorro de Israell, rejeitando as acusações e contra-atacando: "They [the U.N.] are more interested in pointing a finger instead of creating a climate of peace and stability in the region."
O quartel era localizado perto de um abrigo das Nações Unidas em Qana, no qual famílias buscaram refúgio e foram massacradas. No fim do dia, 106 civis estavam mortos e 116 gravemente feridos.
As vidas não tinham preço, mas as instalações da UNIFIL, sim. Portanto, a assembléia das Nações Unidas aprovou uma Resolução obrigando Israel a arcar com a despesa de US$1.7 milhões necessários à reconstrução do abrigo que destruíra. Um terço dos membros votaram a favor, um terço se abstiveram, vois países votaram contra - EUA e Israel. A moção seria colocada na pauta anualmente até 2003 com o mesmo resultado e o embaixador estadunidense bloqueado com o mesmo discurso: que "financial resolutions, such as this, have to be adopted by consensus to apply", e apoiando o argumento de Israel, que dizia: "Any damage caused to the United Nations interim Force in Lebanon is the direct consequences of terrorist aggression and Lebanese collusion."
Tirando a UNIFIL, o prejuízo material que os libaneses sofreram foi estimado em mais de US$200 milhões.
O cessar-fogo foi negociado de novo pelos Estados Unidos e foi bastante criticado por observadores internacionais:  "Despite the improvements [comparing to 1993], the agreement contains some significant ambiguities and loopholes that threaten to undermine its purpose. The agreement does not explicitly proscribe reprisal, which is the issue over which the 1993 understandings broke down, and there is nothing in the agreement that commits both sides to ensuring that attacks on legitimate military targets adhere to the principles of discriminate fire and proportionality to limit collateral civilian casualties and damage. 
Without violating this understanding, nothing herein shall preclude any party from exercising the right of self-defense. And the U.S. has provided Israel with an "interpretive letter" spelling out what Israel and the U.S. understand this point to mean. This letter remains secret. 
Finally, we are concerned about a statement made by Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres on April 27 that "if [Hizballah] violates the agreement, then the agreement is no longer binding." This statement is a good illustration of the problems created by the failure to incorporate international humanitarian law in the agreement, which would have clarified that attacks on civilians are prohibited under any circumstances, even if the agreement is violated"

UNIFIL

NEWS  Palestina

Netanyahu accuses UN chief Ban of ‘giving terror a tailwind’. After UN’s Ban says reacting to occupation is ‘natural,’ prime minister fires back, saying UN has long lost its neutrality and moral standing. Jonathan Lis.

Israel's current head of state is an obnoxious loudmouth jewish supremacist (Part 10). Norman Finkelstein. 

Is Deadly Gunfire the Only Way to Stop a Palestinian Girl With a Knife? The youngest of the knife-wielders to date, 13, was a fourth-grade dropout who milked sheep. Last Saturday she walked, with a dagger, toward a settlement and tried to stab a guard, who shot her to death.Gideon Levy and Alex Levac.

Video: Israeli soldiers daily bullying of Palestinians at checkpoints in the occupied West Bank.

 



66 days of hunger strike: palestinian journalist Mohammed al-Qeeqs' life at severe risk. Detido pelas forças israelenses de ocupação sem motivo, sem acusação nenhuma, faz mais de dois meses que o jornalista palestino Mohammed al-Qiq está em greve de fome.

Seu objetivo é ser ouvido e receber a justiça que lhe é devida: a liberdade de vida e de exercer sua profissão de jornalista. Sua mulher afirma que sua greve só tem uma saída, do presídio israelense - vivo ou morto.
What we can do: global, 3 Fevruary: Gaza activists plan twitter campaign for Mohammed al-Qeeq.
Hunger-striking Palestinian reporter's appeal rejected. Rights groups criticise Israel's detention of Muhammad al-Qeeq, in critical condition.

Irã, em 'nova era' no Oriente Médio?

Faz 36 anos que a imagem do Irã vem sendo denegrida, de maneira errada. Ao ponto do Ocidente inteiro ter sido convencido que os muçulmanos extremistas eram forçosamente xiitas. Só porque é a ala dominante entre os aiatolás que governam a República Islâmica desde que a revolução derrubou a ditadura do Xá, que servia os interesses ocidentais em detrimento dos nacionais e cometia barbaridades a fim de perpetuar-sel.

A ignorância é tanta e a propaganda anti-iraniana é tamanha, que o Congresso dos EUA, em 2011, chegou ao extremo de dar ouvidos a depoimentos absurdos, em uma subcomissão parlamentar que averiguava ameaças aos EUA causadas por atividades iranianas na América Latina.

Entre os perigos surreais repertoriados, estava um de uma demanda anódina do embaixador iraniano ao governo da Bolivia. A embaixada solicitava uma dúzia de vagas na escola internacional de La Paz (que fica a 6.225 km de Washington) para os filhos de seus diplomatas.

Ninguém entendeu se os deputados gringos consideravam perigoso os diplomatas iranianos terem filhos, que estes saíssem de casa, ou que fossem escolarizados como os filhos de qualquer cidadão ocidental. Mas este episódio virou uma das muitas anedotas que a paranóia e o egocentrismo estadunidense geram. Piadas sem graça, quando se sabe que são os EUA que põem em perigo a paz mundial com suas atividades ilícitas e escolhendo mal seus aliados acidentais.

O próprio Irã, há poucos dias, deparou-se com navios militares USA em suas águas territoriais. E como se não bastasse, quando Teerã  soltou, às pressas, os dez marines que detivera, não faltaram políticos (dentre eles a vassala da AIPAC, Hillary Clinton) nem jornalistas mal-intencionados para ousarem chamar o país ultrajado, o Irã, de agressor, no intuito de impedir o levantamento das sanções.

O incidente em questão aconteceu um pouco antes de Washington cumprir o compromisso assumido durante o acordo nuclear. Acordo louvado como "Dawn of a new era" nas relações entre o país 'bicho-papão' e a chamada comunidade internacional à qual Washington dá ordens.

Pergunto-me de que 'nova era' falam, já que concomitantemente ao fim das antigas sanções, os EUA impuseram uma nova  sanção balística de mísseis, o Irã continua sendo persona non grata na "international community" e a Casa Branca continua reclamando de suas supostas "atividades desestabilisadoras" no Oriente Médio.

Para bom entendedor, enquanto o Estado Judeu considerar o Irã seu inimigo número 1 (por ser o único sobrevivente dos que o desafiavam na questão palestina), faça os esforços que fizer, a República Islâmica jamais conseguirá vencer o estigma de "Eixo do Mal".

É Israel que invade, ocupa e massacra seus vizinhos, mas nem é questionado.

É Israel que desestabiliza o Oriente Médio com sua conduta imperialo-racista-expansionista, mas já tem cadeira cativa de vítima na grande mídia, na sala oval, e a tarja preta de fora-da-lei lhe é poupada.

(Aliás, apesar de seus comprovados crimes de guerra, Israel acabou de pedir ao seu padrinho-cúmplice de limpeza étnica um aumento da verba anual a US$5 - em vez dos 'míseros' 3 bilhões de dólares que já recebe para sua política genocida).

Sem contar que o Rogue State of Israel, cheio de bombas atômicas, nunca assinou o Tratado de Não-Proliferação nuclear. Documento este que é sempre usado para demonizar o Irã ainda mais.

No fim do Acordo, Obama e Cia cantaram uma vitória da diplomacia. Esquisito, quando se sabe que os diplomatas estadunidenses passaram anos travando uma guerra incansável contra o Irã, com a ajuda da imprensa. Guerra que começou em  1979 e prossegue nos bastidores, como os navios US flagrados no litoral iraniano atesta.
Aliás, o professor estadunidense Sayres Rudy acabou de dar uma conferência em que diz sem rodeios que a tal "international community, proudly and visibly collectively punished the Iranian population to achieve selective disarmament of the nuclear-unarmed Iranian state, although it remains targeted and threatened continually by nuclear powers. The beauty of sanctions for those who deploy them resides in their "seemingly bureaucratic, lawful, objective, transparent, and non-violent" nature, which provides a civilised veneer for what can amount to the decimation of populations."
Só para lembrar, a então secretary of state de Bill Clinton Madeleine Albright, disse, a propósito das sanções que seu país impusera ao Iraque: "The price is worth it". O preço, no caso, foi o empobrecimento do país, a derrubada de Saddam Hussein, e a emersão de el-Baghdadi e do Daesh. Preço cuja conta os EUa deixam sempre para outrem pagar. Neste caso, os iraquianos, os sírios e o mundo todo à mercê do terrorismo.

Voltando ao Irã, a primeira coisa que o país fez após receber a notícia que estava back on business, foi aumentar sua produção de petróleo a 500 mil barris diários e declarar sua determinação de recuperar seu mercado. Deixou os países do Golfo embasbacados, pois a decisão influencia a queda maior do preço do ouro negro, que se encontra a US$23 o barril, preço considerado irrisório para os nababos que o comercializam.

Nos tempos áureos, o Irã chegou a exportar 2.3 milhões de barris diários. Pretendem retomar este rítmo logo logo.
Com as novas perspectivas de abertura comercial, há uma expectativa de crescimento econômico de 4 a 5.5 por cento em 2016 e 2017, sobretudo graças ao negócio do petróleo, mas não apenas. Bilhões de dólares iranianos estavam 'confiscados' e ao serem devolvidos, trazem consigo uma corja de cartéis industrio-financeiros em busca de contratos milionários e de lucro fácil. Os primeiros vampiros a chegar foram Hewlett-Packard (a boicotar, por causa das colônias na Cisjordânia!), General Electric, Apple e Lenovo.

Inside Story: What's behind the falling price of oil?

Trocando em miúdos, nesta 'nova era', acho que em âmbito interno, a sociedade iraniana aproveitará a oportunidade para testar a abertura dos aiatolás.

A abertura de fronteiras comerciais e culturais trará um afluxo (espero) turístico que acabará provocando uma interação entre estrangeiros e nacionais benéficas para ambos os lados. Tanto para os iranianos, que vão ter mais troca quotidiana com ocidentais, quanto para estes, que terão a oportunidade de comprovar quão enganados foram durante todos estes anos em que acreditaram que no Irã residia o mal e que tinham de ter medo de seus 80 milhões de habitantes. População que por causa do bloqueio dos EUA, padece de alta inflaçao, e muitos deles, até de produtos e serviços básicos. O desemprego está na faixa de 11 por cento.

Uma das coisas que o estrangeiro compreenderá ao conhecer melhor o Irã, é que o regime dos aiatolás não é forte apesar da dinamicidade da oposição e sim por causa da ebulição da classe média instruída, que participa ativamente do destino do país - homens e mulheres - ao contrário das ditaduras árabes do Golfo.

Os iranianos resistem à tirania votando e se organizando socio-politicamente, em vez de explodirem prédios e matando inocentes.
A sociedade iraniana usufrui de uma prerrogativa democrática negada nas ditaduras dos sheiks, príncipes e emires árabes - a do sufrágrio universal. E é nas urnas que a sociedade tem repetido a seu supremo líder aiatolá Khameini pública e repetidamente sua determinação de resistência.
Ao eleger Rouhani, a população votou na segurança e na prosperidade de sua nação, sem mudar o status quo que, por enquanto, lhe garante o fundamental: a paz social, longe da barbárie de Daesh e Al-Qaeda. Os iranianos não votam para legitimizar um sistema mantido por teocratas octogenários fadados a passar o bastão a um governo democrático de maneira natural (como no nosso país-tropical) com o madurecimento da sociedade. Votam para uma transição pacífica para uma nação que respeite os valores básicos da revolução, antes desta ter sido sequestrada pelos aiatolás.

No âmbito externo, os estrangeiros entenderão que a supremacia regional do Irã é devida a seus adversários, e não a despeito da pressão que estes exercem sobre a República Islâmica. Nem Israel, nem Turquia, nem Arábia Saudita, separados ou reunidos, são páreo para a fina versão de poder intelectual persa. O poder regional do Irã vem do cálculo errado que seus adversários fazem da força e da qualidade do próprio poder.

O orçamento militar iraniano está longe do de seus antagonistas ou inimigos regionais financiados pelos Estados Unidos, porém, nenhum destes ousaria partir para um conflito direto (apesar das ameças estridentes de Netanyahu) por saber que jamais alcançará a vitória desejada. Por que? Por causa da margem de manobra sustentada pela fineza de raciocínio adquirida em séculos de cultura e de guerra após guerra do império persa, até os tempos modernos.

Alguns dizem que o calcanhar de Aquiles do Irã é a Síria e o apoio 'incondicional' dado a Bashar el-Assad. Eu não tenho tanta certeza. Quem viver verá o resultado interno e externo regional deste apoio. Já que no tocante à Síria, todas as potências ocidentais, todos os países árabes, todos os sírios envolvidos na guerra civil (que virou regional, se não planetária), estão com as mãos cobertas de sangue inocente.
As do Irã estão muito mais limpas do que as da Arábia Saudita, Turquia, Israel, França, Estados Unidos e de muitos sírios que querem, a qualquer preço, a cabeça de Assad para reinar em seu lugar, e sem dúvida, cometerem as mesmas atrocidades pelas quais o condenam.

De qualquer jeito, enquanto sunitas e xiitas não amadurecerem e suplantarem suas divergências inter-religiosas, as desavenças na região vão continuar. Apesar da preocupação dos príncipes sauditas ser mais de manter seu padrão de vida em detrimento de sua população castrada e submissa do que sua fé sunita. O obscurantismo reina nos palácios sustentados por pilhas de mortos e pelo ouro negro.

Al Jazeera UpFront: Saudi Arabia vs Iran - Who is to blame for the row?

Listening Post: Saudi Arabia vs Iran: Beyond the Sunni-Shia Narrative

Listening Post: Beyond sectarianism: The Saudi-Iran confrontation

PS. Eis alguns dos mitos e mentiras sobre o Acordo Nuclear:

Myth 1: the US has abandoned its regional allies for Iran
In response to the deal, US Senator Lindsey Graham warned, "It's incredibly dangerous for our national security, and it's akin to declaring war on Sunni Arabs and Israel by the P5+1 [five permanent UN Security Council members plus Germany] because it ensures their primary antagonist Iran will become a nuclear power and allows them to rearm conventionally."
The US and Iran have decreased decades-long bilateral tensions, but this deal is not in any way "akin to declaring war on Sunni Arabs and Israel".
Both Washington and Tehran have demonstrated that constructive and positive dialogue is possible.
The US and Iran, prior to this deal, proved that they could work as de-facto partners with mutual interests in combating the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL).
That being said, the US and Iran are still at odds over Syria, and Washington has provided Riyadh with intelligence, weapons, and ships to partake in a naval blockade in the campaign against the Houthis in Yemen.
Likewise, the US has in no way abandoned other Gulf states, and will continue to count on them for stability in the energy market. Bahrain will remain America's base for its 5th fleet, and pre-existing regional relationships will remain a high priority.

Myth 2: lifting sanctions on Iran will threaten Israel
Echoing Graham's statement, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu warned that " Iran will get hundreds of billions of dollars with which it will be able to fuel its terror machine".
By "terror machine", Netanyahu is referring to the Hizbollah and Hamas groups.
The lifting of sanctions on Iran will unlikely amplify any threat these two groups present to Israel. Hezbollah's threat to Israel is posed not by its rocket arsenal, but by an experienced group of fighters who can hold Lebanese territory if Israel attacks, as it did in 2006.
However, Hizbollah's manpower has been diminished as its military forces are now committed to the fighting against Daesh in Syria and Iraq; conflicts unlikely to conclude in the near future. Hezbollah is unlikely to provoke a war with Israel with its forces overextended.
Lifting the sanctions can provide Hezbollah with more Iranian financial and military support, but it does not create a surge in Hezbollah's manpower or fighting effectiveness, which requires years of training and combat experience.
The Iran-Hamas relationship suffered greatly when Hamas leadership was expelled from Syria for its failure to support Damascus and Tehran's joint efforts in suppressing the Syrian rebels after 2011.
Sanctions were in place on Iran during Israel's first Gaza War in 2008, yet those sanctions did not damage the ability of Iran to support Hamas.
Even though Iran-Hamas relations were frayed over Syria, Israel still perceived Hamas as a threat, demonstrated by the cruel Operation Protective Edge in the summer of 2014, which ironically led to a rapprochement between Iran and Hamas a few months later.
Netanyahu's speech merely seeks to encourage the atmosphere of fear in his country which has garnered widespread political support for himself and his expansionist governing tactics.
It is estimated that Israel has a nuclear offensive capability amounting 100-200 nuclear warheads - an arsenal which would clearly deter any hypothetical scenario were Iran ever seek to pursue the use of a nuclear weapon against them. Simply put, Iran is overwhelmingly outgunned.
Israel's unstated objection to the deal is that it leaves an Iranian nuclear infrastructure intact, giving Iran the potential to challenge Israel's nuclear monopoly in the region in the future, a monopoly which Israel has officially refused to declare.

Myth 3: Iran's nuclear programme will set off a nuclear arms race and further destabilise the region.
Prior to the deal, the US Speaker of the House of Representatives John Boehner said: "It would be naive to suggest the Iranian regime will not continue to use its nuclear programme, and any economic relief, to further destabilise the region."
Which is wrong. Destabilisation in countries like Yemen and Syria has resulted from the choices made by their political elites - not by Iran's intervention.
An influx of Iranian financial support to the government in Damascus or the Houthis in Yemen will not change the reality of the conflicts there.

Houthi rebels have been quite effective and have done remarkably well on their own without foreign aid. That being said, their lack of numbers drastically limit their ability to expand their circle of influence, regardless of outside help from a power such as Iran.
Furthermore, while Iran and Turkey support opposing proxies in the Syrian civil war, they both have to gain from the lifting of sanctions due to the politics of energy security. Lifting of sanctions would allow Turkey to resume trade with its neighbour Iran, and facilitate Ankara's dependence on Iranian natural gas, now that the relations with Russia went sour.
The reality of the region is clear: instability is rife, but no because of Iran. More likely because of The United States and Israel, and despite of Iran. And this instability is likely to continue regardless of Iranian intervention.
Steve Forbes, Chairman and Editor-in-Chief of Forbes Media, wrote: "From all that we now know the agreement will set off a chain reaction of nuclear proliferation in the most unstable region of the world."
The notion of an Iranian nuclear programme creating a domino effect in the region has been echoed by policy makers and media commentators who are unfamiliar with the dynamics of proliferation in the Middle East.
The nuclear arms race in the region began in the 1970s. Both Iraq and Syria sought their nuclear programmes in direct reaction to Israel's enormous development of nuclear capabilities.
It has been said that the Saudi Arabia and Turkey will be the next to hop on the nuclear bandwagon; however, neither country has the human capacity or scientific infrastructure to do so without extensive foreign support.
This support is extremely unlikely to be offered by an international system which is entirely committed to preventing further nuclear proliferation - particularly in the Middle East.

Unless the United States of America decides otherwise, under Israel's pressure, for God knows what short sightedness. If they do, they will commit one more crime against humanity. One more, in a long list that, I'm afraid, is not about to end no time soon. 

Artigos anteriores sobre o Irã: 19/02/12 - 29/09/13 - 30/11/14

NEWS PALESTINE

Amy Goodman fala sobre o novo filme israelense apresentado no Festival Sundance: The Settlers

Do all roads lead to JERUSALEM?  
Using GPS, Al Jazeera followed four people, each on a different journey to Jerusalem. Here's what happened. Select a journey. Halima Abu Haneya. Palestinian.

Israeli soldiers cowardly Duck shoot young palestinian protesters and can be heard making lighthearted comments and congratulating each other for their crimes.
Soldados israelenses atiram covardemente em jovens manifestantes palestinos e se congratulam mutuamente pelo crime.

UN database for Gaza aid may give Israel targets to attack -- secret memo. Ali Abunimah.

Israel spraying toxins over Palestinian crops in Gaza.

Palestinian teen could face 'maximum sentence'. The case of Ahmed Manasra is an example of what Palestinian children experience under Israeli occupation.

At Death Square, Israeli Occupation Forces murder yet another unarmed Palestinian boy, this one on his way to physics class. 

ps://Gigantic protest shuts down Israel lobyy group at Chicado LGBTQ conference…

The Israeli occupation will end suddenly. The strength of organizations working to end the occupation and their supporters is greater than we think. Michael Sfard, Haaretz.

'I'm breaking the silence because I'm Zionist, Israeli and a patriot'. He is the 'star' of the aggressive Im Tirzu campaign against Breaking the Silence, but has so far preferred to keep quiet. Now, Avner Gvaryahu is fighting back: he responds to his comrades who accused him of lies, talks about the threats to his life,...

Democracia cada  vez mais cerceada em Israel: Israeli State-funded Settler Group Sent Private Eye to Spy on Human-rights NGOs. Haaretz investigation: Pro-settlement group Regavim commissioned and paid for private investigation into prominent human-rights lawyer and the organizations he represents.

 

Documentary Al Jazeera: Killing the Count

The murder of Folke Bernadotte by ex-Israeli PM Shamir & his gang …
 

Israel vs Palestina: História de um conflito LXXIII (09 2008)

No Comment: Jerusalém, no dia 01 de setembro de 2008

Em setembro de 2008, houve uma certa oficialização do processo de judeinização de Jerusalém, alienando os palestinos cristãos e muçulmanos de seus direitos de propriedade além dos de nacionalidade.
Infringindo as leis internacionais, Israel incrementou várias estratégias paralelas com o objetivo de inviabilizar a divisão da cidade e "limpá-la" (é o termo usado desde 1948) de seus legítimos proprietários. Como por exemplo:
1. Limitando autorização de reunificação familiar - concretamente significa que se o filho sair de casa para fazer universidade alhures, perde os direitos sobre sua casa e não pode nem voltar a morar com os pais; quando estes morrem, os bens da família são confiscados para colonos judeus ou para membros do governo ou do Knesset;
2. Retraçando as fronteiras municipais da cidade. Extendendo as fronteiras para que incluam as colônias judias ilegais e concomitantemente, construindo cercas e muros para impossibilitar a circulação dos palestinos em sua cidade e marginalizar os que ainda permanecem em suas casas sofrendo abusos e ameaças diárias dos colonos estrangeiros. Até não aguentarem mais as agressões verbais que já estavam começando a concretizar-se em paulada e bala.
3. Expandindo as colônias/invasões/assentamentos de imigrantes judeus;
4. Estabelecendo novas colônias.
O Direito Internacional reza que a Linha Verde divide Jerusalém em Oriental e Ocidental, com a cidade antiga no meio. Apesar disso, desde 1967 que Israel vem ocupando ilegalmente a parte palestina com subterfúgios variados, que vão de violência a desapropriações e demolições abusivas.
Só em agosto de 2008, Ehud Olmert aprovou mais 1.761 unidades imobiliárias coloniais em Jerusalém Oriental, que pertence à Palestina.
A ONG israelense B'Tselem aproveitou para denunciar que já há cerca de 192 mil invasores judeus alem da Linha Verde, morando em 12 invasões ilegais em Jerusalém Oriental.
Conforme a ONU, 25 por cento dos 253.000 jerusalemitas palestinos estavam então cortados de parentes, amigos, escolas por obstáculos do ocupante - checkpoints e muro.
Suhail Khalilieh, diretor do Applied Research Institute in Jerusalem settlement unit, precisou que “The Israelis are implementing the final plan to Judaize Jerusalem completely. The plan began when Israel annexed East Jerusalem in 1967. The last stage of the plan involves the completion of the barrier with the specific aim of manipulating the demographics and limiting the balance of the Palestinian population to a mere 15-20 percent, with the remainder being Jewish.”
A importância de Jerusalém é crucial na solução ou eternização deste conflito. Isto porque a ONU a definiu como capital do "futuro" Estado da Palestina. Sem contar a importância cultural, educacional, religiosa e comercial que a cidade tem para os palestinos de várias gerações, antes da chegada dos israelitas Antes de Cristo e após sua partida no fim do século I.
A Mesquita Al-Aqsa é o segundo sítio sagrado islâmico. O local em que Jesus foi enterrado fica em Jerusalém Oriental, sem contar os outros sítios cristãos inclusive no Monte das Oliveiras. E não me canso de repetir que muitos palestinos são cristãos e muitos são impedidos de ir à missa.
A desapropriação dos nativos contraria a Quarta Convenção de Genebra, mas em muitos casos, como no Vale do Jordão e Jerusalém,  é justificada por Israel como uso de "terra vazia". Ou seja, propriedades que os donos foram obrigados a deixar por livre e espontânea pressão militar.
B'Tselem explica: “Palestinians residing outside of Jerusalem for seven or more years lose their Jerusalem residency status unless they can prove Jerusalem residency within the municipal boundaries and the importance of the city in their daily life, which is imperative in order to keep their identity cards. This does not apply to Israelis in West Jerusalem."
As estatísticas da ONU mostram que em 2006, Israel revogou mais de 1.360 carteiras de residência de jerusalemitas palestinos. O quíntuplo de 2005. 
Na verdade o problema começou a ficar crônico quando em 2003 o Knesset aprovou a lei Citizenship and Entry em Israel. Ela nega carteira de residência (além de nacionalidade) aos palestinos que se casam com israelenses. Portanto, quando um palestino-israelense se casa com uma compatriota dos Territórios Palestinos Ocupados, ele ou ela perde seu imóvel em Jerusalém, inclusive Oriental, ou em Israel.
É por isso que a Palestina é o único país do mundo em que cônjuges vivem separados.
Já os judeus estrangeiros que se casam com israelense são naturalizados automaticamente e têm direito de construir nos TPO.
"However, even before Palestinians are permitted to build they need to obtain the requisite building permits which are both expensive and extremely difficult to obtain,” disse Khalilieh, "Even if Palestinians are fortunate enough to get the permits, they are still restricted to building on only 25 percent of their land. Again, these restrictions do not apply to Jewish residents of West Jerusalem."
Jeff Halper do Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD) disse que em setembro de 2008 havia "a housing shortage of 25,000 units in East Jerusalem, and fewer homes means higher prices. Despite the housing shortage, Israel’s municipality grants Palestinians only around 150 to 350 work permits a year, yet demolishes 150 or more existing homes at the same time.”
Casas que os palestinos constroem sem permits/autorização em lote devidamente adquirido são demolidas. Não durante a construção e sim depois. A perversidade israelense não tem limite. Esperam a família gastar suas economias com os gastos na construção, mobília, instalação da família e só depois chegam com seus caterpillars para destruir a casa com tudo dentro e dexá-los ao Deus dará.
"Both Israelis and Palestinians build illegally, but that the response of the authorities is not equal. Palestinians account for about 20 percent of illegal construction, yet more than 75 percent of the demolitions are carried out on Palestinian homes. While demolitions carried out in Jewish neighborhoods target either commercial buildings or additions to a house, in Palestinian neighborhoods such demolitions leave entire Palestinian families homeless,”  diz a B'Tselem.

O ICAHD explicou que "Palestinians face discrimination in regard to budgeting and taxation as well as essential needs like water, sewage, roads, parks, lighting, post offices, schools and other services." Apesar disso tudo, a Autoridade Nacional Palestina continuava a tentar negociar diplomaticamente com Israel, mas como disse Khalilieh, “The Palestinians are in an extremely weak position. If they stopped negotiations on this basis, Israel would put the blame on failed talks squarely on their shoulders, with the support of the US, and continue with establishing facts on the ground irrespectively.”  

Marinha israelense icinera barco pesqueiro palestino - 02/09

Outro fato marcante foi na Faixa de Gaza. Além dos bombardeios e restrições de liberdade, a IDF pegou pesado nos pescadores. Havia meses que a área de pesca fora restrita ao mínimo, o que prejudicava bastante a pescaria, fonte de renda de muitos gazauís e de alimentação da maioria, devido à impossibilidade de importar carne e a produção interna ser limitada. Já que quando Israel bombardeia, bombardeia até os rebanhos.

No tópico dos pescadores, os vídeos abaixo são melhores do que palavras. Este conflito IDF vs pescadores durou cerca de dez dias durante os quais os gazauís resistiram como podiam. Mas a Marinha de Israel é tão potente quanto o Exército e a Aeronáutica. É impossível e perigosíssimo contrariá-la. A pesca em Gaza já ficara perigosa em 2006 e estava cada vez mais restrita a uma área limitadíssima.  

Israeli Navy attacks Gaza's fishermen - 05/09

Nesse ínterim, no dia 09 de setembro, Israel informou diplomatas europeus que vetava a saída de Gaza de Issam Younis e Mahmoud Abu Rahma, do Al Mezan Center of Human Rights - receptores de prêmios humanitários, e Raji Sourani do Palestinian Center for Human Rights. Os ativistas estavam convidados pelas ONGs humanitárias Diakonia, da Suécia, e Avocats Sans Frotières da Bélgica, para uma conferência marcada para os dias 13 e 14 de setembro sobre a aplicação de leis humanitárias internacionais nos Territórios Palestinos Ocupados (TPO).
Os ativistas tinham também encontro marcado com representantes da União Européia e em seguida iriam a Dublin a convite da ONG irlandesa Trocaire participar de uma mesa redonda dos dias 14 a 19 de setembro.
Os europeus fizeram as reclamações de praxe, mas não mudou nada. Os três ativistas não puderam deixar a prisão Gaza.

No dia 13 de setembro a B’Tselem divulgou relatório sobre a situação dos prisioneiros palestinos em Israel até o dia 31 de agosto de 2008: havia 13 menores em prisão administrativa prolongada. Dentre eles, duas garotas de 17 anos  - Salwa Salah e Sarra Sirwah, detidas de madrugada, em casa. 
A "prolonged administrative detention"  é uma particularidade israelense contrária ao Direito Internacional. Ela não formaliza acusação nenhuma e o prisioneiro não dispõe de assistência jurídica porque oficialmente não está detido. Outra perversidade especificamente israelense. Em junho de 2008 havia 730 palestinos adultos em "administrative detention".

Um advogado explicou o  sistema da seguinte maneira: Administrative detention is carried out solely on the basis of an administrative order, without a judicial determination, without an indictment being filed, and without a trial. Given that administrative detention infringes the right to freedom and due process, and in light of the clear danger of abuse, international law imposes rigid limitations in its use. Over the years, Israel has detained Palestinians for long periods of time without bringing them to court or even telling them of the suspicions against them. When detainees appeal their detention, neither they nor their attorneys are allowed to see the allegedly incriminating evidence. By acting in this way, Israel shows utter disregard for defenses available to suspects in Israeli and international law, which are intended to ensure the right to liberty and due process, the right of persons to state their case, and the presumption of innocence. In recent years, there has been a significant increase in administrative detention of minors in Israel, an especially grave phenomenon. The International Convention on the Rights of the Child states, in article 37, states that, “No child shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily. The arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with the law and shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time.”
Os palestinos aproveitaram a denúncia da B'Tselem para solicitar a libertação de todos os prisioneiros administrativos e o fim desta prática ilícita, argumentando que "if there is sufficient evident to prosecute a person being held in administrative detention, then an indictment should be filed and a trial held."
Falaram no vazio.

A B'Tselem não parou aí em suas denúncias, no dia 15, lançou outro relatório. Este sobre as invasões judias e o muro que recortava a Cisjordânia. Eis estratos: For years, Israeli authorities have both barred Palestinian access to rings of land surrounding settlements, and have not acted to eliminate settlers’ piratical closing of lands adjacent to settlements and blocking of Palestinian access to them. Blocking access is one of the many ways used to expand settlements. In recent years, Israel has institutionalized the closing of such lands in an attempt to retroactively sanction the unauthorized placement of barriers far from the houses at the edge of the settlements.
Settlers pave patrol roads and place physical obstructions on Palestinian lands adjacent to settlements, at times with the authorities’ approval, at others not. Settlers also forcibly remove Palestinians, primarily farmers, from their lands. B’Tselem has documented cases of gunfire, threats of gunfire and killing, beatings, stone throwing, use of attack dogs, attempts to run over Palestinians, destruction of farming equipment and crops, theft of crops, killing and theft of livestock and animals used in farming, unauthorized demands to see identification cards, and theft of documents.
The authorities entrusted with enforcing the law not only fail to take sufficient action to end the violence and prosecute lawbreakers, they join them and block Palestinian access themselves. Soldiers regularly expel Palestinians from their farmland, often under the direction of settlers. Israel has also established a physical system of barriers — barbed-wire fences, patrol roads, illumination and electronic sensory devices — far from the homes at the edge of the settlements, in effect annexing large swaths of land to the settlements.
Especially blatant in this context is the “Special Security Area” (SSA) plan, in which framework Israel surrounded 12 settlements east of the Separation Barrier with rings of land that are closed as a rule to Palestinian entry. As a result of the plan, the overall area of these settlements is 2.4 times larger, having increased from 3,325 dunams (a dunam is the equivalent of 1,000 square meters) to 7,793 dunams. More than half of this ring land is under private Palestinian ownership. The amount of land attached to settlements other than through the SSA plan is much larger, given there are no official limitations and less supervision of the piratical closing of land by settlers. B’Tselem estimates that such piratical closing has blocked Palestinian entry to tens of thousands of dunams, thus annexing them de facto to the settlements. Experience shows that this land grab will be perpetuated and become part of official policy to the extent that the plan is implemented at additional settlements.
Palestinian farmers seeking access to their lands must cope with a complex bureaucracy and meet a number of conditions. First and foremost, they must prove ownership of the land. They also have to “pressure” the Civil Administration time and again to set times for them to enter. Also, the defense establishment subjects Palestinian access to the good will and caprice of the settlers. On this background, many farmers give up and stop trying to gain access and to work their land...
...Israel allows settlers to enter freely, without supervision, the land, which ostensibly was meant to serve as a warning area free of people, but is, in effect, closed only to Palestinians. As a result, settlers move about on the Palestinian land regularly, steal their crops, and even live on and work the land. This practice breaches both the logic of a “warning zone” and the military orders closing the area.
The land adjacent to the settlement is part of a long list of areas that Israel closes to Palestinians in the West Bank: the Jordan Valley, East Jerusalem, military-training areas, the settlement areas themselves, and others. Every piece of land that Israel closes to Palestinians joins those areas previously taken, and together they limit the possibilities of millions of persons, principal harm being suffered by farmers and those who rely of farming for a living. In this context, it should be recalled that the poverty level of Palestinians in the West Bank is extremely high, and that agriculture is the main sector of the Palestinian economy. Blocking access also impedes urban development and limits recreation in the form of nature hikes and enjoyment of land resources.
Blocking Palestinian access to land adjacent to settlements is the direct result, and an integral part, of the illegal settlement enterprise. This enterprise continuously violates the absolute prohibition specified in international humanitarian law on settlements in occupied territory. Consequently, Israel is obligated to evacuate the settlers and return them to sovereign Israeli soil. If the settlers are not evacuated, there are ways, which are presented in the report, to protect them in ways that will harm Palestinians to a lesser extent. But the government of Israel is obligated to evacuate them in any case, and evacuation is the only legal way to meet the security need that stands, according to official spokespersons, at the basis of the regulated closing of the land."

Nesse ínterim, o conflito intestino ente Hamas e Fatah continuava na Faixa de Gaza. Na mesma segunda-feira, dia 15 de setembro, houve nova confrontação entre o clã Dughmosh e os policiais do Hamas. Quando terminou a troca de tiros no dia seguinte, havia 10 membros do clã mortos, um policial e 42 feridos, dentre eles 10 policiais.
O Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR) reclamou e exigiu o fim das hostilidades. Outros tentaram convencer os dois lados do absurdo desta guerra fratricida em vez dos dois partidos juntarem suas forças contra o verdadeiro inimigo comum que os oprimia. Entretanto, a reconciliação continuava fora de cogitação.

Gaza fishermen resist Water cannon  assault - 17/09

No dia 19 de setembro foi a vez da UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) responsável pelos refugiados palestinos divulgar relatório denunciando a violação dos direitos infantis nos TPO.
“In one of the gravest incidents in July, a 10-year-old Palestinian boy, Ahmad Husam Yousef Mosa, was shot in the head with live ammunition and killed by the Israeli border police following an anti-barrier demonstration in Nilin village in the central West Bank. 
The following day, 15-year-old Yousef Ahmad Amira was declared brain dead after he too was shot in the head at close range with several rubber-coated metal bullets, also by Israel’s paramilitary border police.
Another 44 children were injured this month, all but one in the West Bank. Two children were killed and seven injured in Palestinian internal fighting in the Gaza Strip in July.
All these incidents brings the number of child fatalities to 95 Palestinians and four Israelis, while the number of child injuries has reached 386 for Palestinians and eight for Israelis since the beginning of the year.”
Muhammad Ayman, de 18 anos, da cidadezinha de Al-Mazraa al-Qiliya perto de Ramallah presenciou o assassinato de seu amigo Muhammad Shreitih que sangrou até morrer após levar um tiro na cabeça. Quem atirou nele não foi um soldado da IDF e sim um colono judeu. “I struggle to sleep at night as I continue to have nightmares, only to wake up covered in sweat after seeing Muhammad’s face in a pool of blood,” disse o adolescente. Muhammad estava com um grupo de amigos quando chegou seu assassino. Seu amigo traumatizado conta:  “The settler started shooting towards us before we even reached the settlement. He got out of the bus and came towards us and shot from 50 meters away. We tried to evacuate our friend to hospital but he was dead on arrival. A subsequent Israeli police investigation ruled the settler had shot “in self-defense.”
O psicólogo Marwan Diab do Gaza Community Health Programme (GCHP) que acompanha crianças traumatizadas disse que o impacto psicológico da violência endêmica na Palestina vai ser grande nos futuros líderes: “A generation of Palestinian children face the danger of being psychologically damaged beyond repair unless there is sufficient urgent psychological intervention and an improvement in the political, social and economic conditions in the Gaza Strip.”
Patricia McPhillips, representante da UNICEF nos TPO acrescentou: “We are extremely concerned about the children. Last year alone, 37,500 Palestinian children in the occupied territories participated in our group counseling sessions, 1,200 in individual sessions, and over 18,000 care givers participated in parenting sessions. We also visited 800 families in homes and hospitals following acute episodes.”
Além do número alarmante de problemas psicológicos e deficiências físicas causadas por tiros de colonos e soldados, as crianças lidam diariamente com os efeitos da ocupação na Cisjordânia e da prisão na Faixa de Gaza - vigiada dia e noite por zepelins e drones espiões que zunem constantemente em seus ouvidos, o que em si já é uma tortura ininterrupta). 
John Ging, diretor da UNRWA disse que 50-60 por cento das crianças gazauís nas escolas da ONU foram reprovadas nos exames de matemática e 40 por cento, de árabe por causa da dificuldade de concentração e acesso aos estudos. “School attendance has been seriously disrupted due to inter-factional fighting, repeated Israeli military raids, and unprecedented poverty where children come to school hungry and unable to concentrate.” A UNRWA proporciona ensino gratuito aos refugiados e a demanda é tão grande que estabeleceram dois turnos.
Segund a UNICEF, 70 por cento das crianças gazauís nessa data eram refugiados - 588.000 de 840.000 meninos.
O bloqueio gera subnutrição, doenças gástricas e raquitismo devido à água contaminada que Israel vende para a Faixa. "From birth itself Palestinian children are disadvantaged, with many infants dying from congenital malformation, low birth weight, premature birth and acute respiratory infection in the camps" disse a UNRWA. "his is compounded by high rates of malnutrition, economic privation and unemployment, exacerbated by the Israeli blockade of Gaza."
Como a B'Tselem denuncia acima, os meninos palestinos são frequentemente detidos e postos em prisões israelenses com criminosos adultos. " They receive practically none of the rights given to Israeli minors jailed."
O relatório do OCHA foi claro: "The Israeli army arrested around 700 Palestinian children in 2007, 30 of whom were held on administrative detention orders where they are detained without trial. The number of children arrested in 2007 brings the total number of Palestinian children arrested by Israel since the beginning of the second intifada in September 2000 to approximately 5,900.”
O relatório descreveu também os abusos e humilhações que os meninos sofrem na prisão, além dos abusos psicológicos durante os "interrogatórios". Os meninos são detidos em checkpoints, nas ruas, ou durante batidas residenciais da IDF. Basta reagir ou demonstrar revolta contra o mau-tratamento que são presos. Qualquer que seja a idade. E na prisão, como diz B’Tselem, "some Palestinian children are held in solitary confinement in the “lock-up” — a dark cell one-and-a-half by one-and-a-half meters. Others are confined to the “closet,” a narrow cell one can stand in but not sit or move. The “grave” — a kind of box closed by a door from the top and measuring approximately one meter by 60 centimeters with a depth of about 80 centimeters is another favorite used by Israel’s domestic intelligence agency, the Shin Bet." Acrescentando que "many of the children are jailed for 'political offenses' such as throwing stones." O que obriga a Defence for Children International - a concluir que "the penalties handed out to Palestinian children are generally very harsh".
"Geralmente duro" é eufemismo. Um menino palestino preso por responder a tiros com pedras são condenados a penas que variam de 10 a 20 anos... Um menino palestino acusado de "damage to an Israeli army facility" ou seja, até o arranhão de um escudo ou veículo da IDF, está sujeito até a prisão perpétua.... Um menino palestino acusado de insultar ou ameaçar (!) um soldado é condenado a 10 anos de prisão - pena apenas 5 anos inferior à de um israelense acusado de homicídio; de outro israelense, é claro, pois de palestino são absolvidos.
Contudo, Marwan Diab terminou com uma nota de otimismo inacreditável para quem não conhece a capacidade de resistência dos palestinos: “There is no question whatsoever that the plight of Palestinian children is inextricably intertwined with politics, and my reason for cautious optimism is the amazing resilience I have witnessed amongst these youngsters, despite the extraordinary difficulties they face.”

No dia 22 de setembro de 2008, 78 organizações de refugiados palestinos apresentaram uma carta aberta ao presidente da Autoridade Nacional Palestina e da OLP, Mahmoud Abbas-Abu Mazen, para transmitir uma mensagem contundente: O Direito de Retorno dos refugiados não é negociável.
Palestinian parties and organizations to Abbas: Right of return non-negotiable

Na leva de reclamações e reivindicações, no dia 26 de setembro, várias ONGs internacionais apresentaram um relatório dando cartão amarelo avermelhado ao Quarteto para o Oriente Médio e a Tony Blair, ao constatarem que os objetivos da Conferência de Annapolis não estavam nem sendo abordados como deviam: International orgs. give Quartet failing grade.

Fecho o mês publicando parte do balanço que a ONG palestina Al Mezan fez no dia 29. "Palestinians killed, killed either by the IOF or during confrontations with it, as well as material damages of Gaza Strip’s civilians during the last eight years shows that the death toll amounts to 3,143, including 611 children, 113 women and 22 disabled persons. It also shows that there are 7,650 demolished homes, including 3,014 pulled down. Furthermore, 33,948 dunums (a dunam is the equivalent of 1,000 square meters) were bulldozed, including 9,684 dunams that were bulldozed more than once. The IOF [Israeli Occupation Forces-IDF] destroyed 378 public facilities, 647 vehicles of different types and 899 manufacturing and commercial facilities.
The IOF continue to construct the Apartheid Wall in the occupied West Bank in defiance of the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004 on the legal consequences of the construction of the wall by the IOF on the OPT [Occupied Palestinian Territories]. The IOF accomplished the construction of approximately 57 percent of the wall’s final route. It is noteworthy that 329 kilometers of the wall are built in the occupied West Bank.
It is also important to note that the construction of the separation wall by the IOF not only changes the status quo of the OPT, but also inflicts gross damages to the civilian residents and their properties. Upon the completion of this Wall, the IOF would confiscate 50 percent of the West Bank. The Wall divides the West Bank, turning it into ghettos where villages are separated from their agricultural land and other cities. The Wall affects 875,000 Palestinians in addition to confiscating water resources and denying access of tens of thousands of Palestinians to medical centers, hospitals, universities and schools. Based on the resources of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, only 20 percent of farmers who used to cultivate their lands in those areas prior to the construction of the Wall were granted permits to cross through the Wall’s gates to reach their farms. Moreover, the number of stationary military checkpoints, built by the IOF on the roads inside and between the West Bank’s cities and villages, amounts to 630 checkpoints mainly used to humiliate and punish the Palestinians.
Al Mezan Center for Human Rights strongly condemns the IOF’s continuous, grave breaches of the principles of international humanitarian law and standards of human rights, which are tantamount to war crimes. The Center calls on the international community, especially the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention, to take immediate action to bring an end to the IOF’s crimes and particularly the continuous collective punishment of the Gaza Strip that violates all human rights. Therefore, based on the repeated evidence proving that the IOF deliberately commit war crimes and that the Israeli judiciary overlooks them and fails to prosecute those responsible, Al Mezan Center calls on the international community to consider the establishment of war crimes tribunals for Israel and cease from politicizing the issue of human rights in the OPT and treating it as subject to political and economic interests of the international parties."

Displaced children in Gaza use Legos to tell their story

Artigos publicados na Electronic Intifada em setembro de 2008

No dia 1°, a ONG sueco-palestina IRIN denunciou a crise hídrica na Palestina: Palestinian water strategies subject to Israeli veto.
Enquanto isso, os hebronitas denunciavam a violência quotidiana que sofrem nas mãos dos colonos judeus que ocupam sua cidade: Settler violence against Palestinians on the rise.
No dia 04, o professor Zohair M; Abu Shaban publicou um artigo lembrando a Prisão Gaza: Israel turns Gaza into prison for Fulbright Scholar.
E David Wildman comentou a posição das igrejas protestantes dos EUA em relação à ocupação. US churches seeking justice in Palestine-Israel (Part 1). US churches seeking justice in Palestine-Israel (Part 2).

No dia 10, Ahmad Abed, refugiado palestino em Londres, prestou depoimento sobre sua terra: Growing up occupied in Gaza.

No dia 12, Jonathan Cook abordou um assunto dramático: os palestinos que são forçados pelo Shin Bet a trair sua pátria para receber tratamento médico: Israel's dark arts of ensnaring collaborators.
No dia 15, o mesmo jornalista alertou para a 'renovação' de Jaffa: Jaffa's "renewal" aims at expulsion of Palestinians.
No dia 19, Mahmoud Abbas recebeu essa carta aberta de compatriota refugiado: A refugee's open letter to Mahmoud Abbas.
No dia 23, Mohammed Omer denunciou a ignorância mútua de Hamas & Fatah por censurarem a imprensa: Mutual censorship in the West Bank and Gaza. IPS.

No dia 26, Jonathan Cook deu um aviso que chegaria ao Vaticano e geraria medidas em 2015. Pois além das propriedades palestinas correrem perigo, os sítios sagrados do cristianismo também estão amaeaçados pela cobiça do ocupante: Archaeology used politically to push out Jerusalem Palestinians.

E no dia 30, Jonathan Cook soou o alarme contra o terrorismo judeu nos territórios palestinos ocupados: Israel's breeding ground for Jewish terrorism.

Reservistas da IDF, forças israelenses de ocupação,

Shovrim Shtika - Breaking the Silence

"Guys, cheer up. That's how it is"
Rank: Captain;  Area: Ramallah and al-Bireh area
I think that… the reason I'm sitting here and talking to you, well, lots of things made me sit and talk to you. It's not one specific event, but I think the first case that really turned some warning on in my mind… It wasn't the first, but was relatively the first in my time as an officer, a commander, but now, while I sit here and think about it, I realize there were earlier instances that made me understand I'm doing things that are wrong. I think the first case that got me thinking, or rather, the straw that broke the camel's back, happened in the Binyamin district. Yes, it was there and actually our mission was to secure the settler access roads from terrorist [resistants] attacks, shootings, laying explosive charges, all that stuff, which sounds legitimate to me, which is legitimate as far as I'm concerned. As long as Israeli citizens live out there we have to protect them, and if it's the most… some weak spot, I did the job willingly. These were lengthy ambushes along the roads, tying to detect any movement there, or armed militants reaching the roads and getting set up or laying charges, all of that. These are things that I know are being done and a lot, and it's important. In that same situation, there really was a shooting incident on one of the roads, which I didn't manage to lay our hands on in time. I mean, they came from some area that we couldn't cover, and they really hit the trunk of a car, the edge of it, and we were very upset. I mean, how could this happen, how could we not see it? We got there very fast to the site, and that's it, we stood there and waited. The scouts arrived. There were no tracks and no idea where the guy had run off too, but the scouts were there and said they had seen. I don't know, perhaps they are very competent, or they tried to prove it, or perhaps they really saw something. They said the tracks led to… tracks that really weren't there, but led to the closest village. Essentially that made sense. We really did come a long way. And we went in… We got to the edge of the village, there were two houses and we took out the people there and began to question them. No, I mean what happened was that I told my soldiers to cover and we asked the father and the adults there to go outside and they were interrogated. This was still legitimate, and we had a common language because the scouts spoke Arabic [scouts in the IDF are Bedouin]. and they really did question the people and it was carried out… It was relatively reasonable. I mean, there was an attack, these houses were on the periphery, perhaps they saw something. No doubt they didn't. I mean, no shooting could be heard, in our position we were closer to the incident than the village was, and they really said, "We heard nothing, saw nothing, knew nothing." That's not necessarily true, but it could be. And, still, it was legitimate. I mean, to take people out of the peripheral houses and interrogate them. Perhaps someone saw or heard something. So nothing was found, and we find ourselves walking on in those streets, very aggressively. I mean, not casually walking down, but flaunting our presence. It's important to note that it was about 1:30 a.m., if not 2, in the morning. Wee hours of the night. And we find ourselves in the middle of that village, at its main junction. Lots of our forces were already there. There were Border Patrol troops and the regional forces and our own unit and others. An extremely large show of armed soldiers in the middle of the village. Then the battalion commander arrives and says words that I'll never forget, I can quote him. I mean, I remember it with full certainty. He says, "Okay, guys, enter the houses so they'll understand. Make them understand." These were the two phrases uttered, this was the order. To my utter amazement, this was the order. Forces take off immediately, as if they know what… I don't know, to me this order sounded very bizarre. I mean, to do what? I find myself actually yelling, "Wait a minute! I don't really understand the order. What? To do what? Enter a house? Not enter a house? Take people out? Not take them out?" He tells me, "No, no, make them understand." He was very determined and angry, and said, "Make them understand." So I say, "What, am I supposed to take people out?" and he does not answer me. I say, "I don't have to take people out. I mean, my point is to make them understand that they can't do this, if they were, they can't give terrorists shelter". He says, "Yes, yes. Go on. Go." I find myself going, I mean areas were designated and each force went out to… There were forces that had already gone ahead, they didn't wait one moment. This didn't sound strange to them. I had half a Border Patrol force under my command, I mean I wasn't really their commanding officer but the battalion commander somehow told me,"You take charge of them", because of my experience or maturity or something. In fact I go out and say, "Okay, you take this part of the street and I'll take that row of buildings of this street". And then I began to realize what's happening as soon as I enter the home of the first family. I go in there and suddenly see myself there with a gang of thugs, when I say "thugs", I mean these are excellent, obedient soldiers standing behind me all wrapped up in bullet-proof vests and masses of mud on our feet. Incredible. The staircase is already full of mud, to say nothing of the carpets. I enter the apartment and begin to use mime so they'll understand. I mean, I want them to understand what's happened and I can't manage to communicate with them. I don't speak Arabic. No one spoke Arabic, no one understood Arabic. So I don't understand what they want. I sense their panic. I sense my own panic, because I have to be aggressive, and I am. I have to watch out for myself and I do. On the other hand, they are scared. And I think to myself, for heaven's sake, what am I doing? I don't explain, I'm not functioning properly, I don't know what to do, and I am very aggressive, I dirty up their place, and it's two o'clock in the morning. I decide to leave the family.
I assume that one of the things that made you function properly were your soldiers. You were in charge of how many there?

Officially, fifteen men at the time.

How many were your subordinates but not from your own unit?
Another twenty, approximately. At my command. I must reiterate this was not all so clear-cut. It was somehow… I was told I'd be in charge of them. In short, I decided to get out. I realized I was not fulfilling my mission as I should and decided to get out. Without taking people out. Without I don't know what. And as I was going out, I saw Border Patrolmen banging at someone's door and yelling violently, terrible banging. With soldiers who… This was two o'clock at night, people don't just open their door straight away. It's not like you knock on a door and immediately someone's going to open it for you. After all, two a.m. So I run over to them, I leave my soldiers behind, telling them to cover me. I run over to those guys and say, "Wait a minute…" No, before I run over there, there is horrible banging on the door and yelling, "Come on, move it! Move it!" The door was not opened very fast. So a soldier was already running –without being ordered to, things I'm really not used to – and shattered a window. I run over and shout, "Who's the commander here? Hey, what's going on here?" And one of them says, "I am!" Another guy says, "I am the commander." Suddenly there are three commanders there. I say, "Who's really the commander? I want to talk to the commander". Another guy arrives. I say, "Hey, take it easy. Slow down. Let them open their door, let them… No one is firing at us." and he says, "No, no, no" and the havoc continues. The soldiers get people out of their houses in their underwear, and I am registering this… When I say a 'house", I don't mean a house where three people live. It's a building with three families and everyone's outside, and the soldiers are conducting searches. I yell, "Wait, explain to them. Let them know what happened, so they'll understand", and I realize no one is listening. Suddenly I look back and notice I still have these soldiers of mine to take care of. So I said, okay, my own soldiers and my own assignment are more important to me, and one moment before I leave I also see a little soldier, looking like he'd just gotten sworn-in today, with this long weapon, jumping up and down and yelling, "Action, action, action!" pointing his rifle at the people. I was stunned. So were my soldiers. I saw them stunned. They were right across the street, they saw it all. I go back and explain to the soldiers, "Guys, we have a mission. We need to carry it out. Like the battalion commander defined it for me – to explain to the people. We'll go in and clear things up.", and I continue to enter house after house. All in all, we went over five houses, or buildings rather. Later when I asked, "How many buildings did you do?" there were people there who had managed five times four, so that was twenty buildings, and woke everyone up. Actually, the entire village woke up. And the other scene there was at the same time, we got to another house and I … there was a sequence of events there and I must retell them. That was the night that broke the camel's back. The straw that broke the camel's back. I enter a house, there's a woman there. Again, I'm covered with mud, and I really, I look… I can imagine I looked really scary. I go in and there's this old woman and I ask her, "Where is the man of the house?" No one understands anyone. Then I see some mattress covered with a blanket. The blanket is moving as if in some earthquake, and I… I don't know, maybe he's hiding in there. I ask my soldier, "Go quickly, see what's under that bed" and he tries to pull the blanket, and no, it's… finally he grabs that blanket. I realize… I counted eight on one double mattress, eight children held together in some… dying of fright. Looking at us as if the next moment I'm going to do I don't know what. Each hiding behind the other's back. Like little cubs hiding… One behind the other, the other exposed so he scurries over and they all move… And I say, God almighty. I try to talk, I say, "Does anyone here understand Hebrew?", and with the Arabic… I don't speak Arabic but I manage to say a few broken words, and they say "No, no…" And my soldier asks me, "Listen, maybe we should search" and I feel there's nothing to search here but still I tell him, "You know what? Let's search". We're used to conducting searches in houses where we really search, so this one is… He began to search really thoroughly, knock on walls, check the place out for some hidden partitions. Finally I tell him, "Come on, they've understood. I hope they've understood". I know they haven't. Once more I go out. I come out of there in shock. I feel I lost this one. I'm defeated and the army is defeated. I mean, it's not I who lost. There's a whole village here that woke up at two o'clock in the morning. I think 90% of them didn't know why. I felt we did just the opposite here. All the looks I got were enough for me to understand that I did just the opposite. Regarding the Border Patrolmen, do you think that what you saw was… That's just the point. I know what you're going to ask me, so let me continue. We were stunned. I get inside the vehicle, an armored truck was brought on the spot, two of them. We were so many troops in the village. So I get on and a soldier, a commander, too, but not wearing his ranks, see that I'm rather stunned. I look at my mates, who are looking just as stunned as I am. So a soldier catches the two of us and says, "Guys, get used to it. This is how it is. That's it."
What soldier?A commander. Some sergeant from the Army, not Border Patrol, the regional brigade. He says to me, "Guys, cheer up. That's how it is. Nothing you can do about it. That's how it's done. That's what needs to be done." We returned, feeling very upset and said this was not right, what we'd done. We said this to our commander. We said what we felt, and I realized how unreasonable the situation was. I smoked my first cigarette after this event.
And you hadn't killed a terrorist [resistants]?
And I hadn't even killed a terrorist. I fired at people often before that, but here I felt the army had not done the right thing.
What is "often"? Had you been on combat duty?
I was on combat duty. Lots of it. I had killed terrorists {resistants]. But…
But smoked your first cigarette after that night? 
Yes. It was one of the worst nights. … On our way (to the village) I was not with him, but a friend of mine was, and the battalion commander was very agitated. He suddenly stopped his jeep, caught a (Palestinian) transit van, told the driver, "Show me your IDs". The guy handed him the IDs. "What's this, why are you driving around at such an hour?" and all. He began to rip the whole upholstery inside the car. He trashed the vehicle, found nothing, let him go.
A lieutenant-colonel. A lieutenant-colonel in the Israeli army. A battalion commander, responsible for hundreds of soldiers.
Yes. 

 Erez  II

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