Israel vs Palestina: História de um conflito XLIX ( 03-04 2005)

Logo após a conferência de Sharm El Sheik em fevereiro de 2005, o Knesset (Congresso israelense) aprovou o plano de desmantelamento das 21 colônias israelenses da Faixa de Gaza e 4 na Cisjordânia.
O plano seria posto em prática no verão do mesmo ano em coordenação com a Autoridade Palestina e Abu Mazen (Mahmud Abbas) garantiu sua colaboração.
O mapa ao lado foi feito para delimitar a retirada das seguintes colônias na Faixa de Gaza: Atzmona, 650 colonos (criada em 1982); Bedola'h, 220 (1986); Dugit, 80 (1982); Elei Sinai, 350 (1983); Gdid, 310 (1982); Ganei Tal, 400 (1979); Gan Or, 350 (1983); Katif, 405 (1985); Kerem Atzmona, 70 (2001); Kfar Darom, 365 (1989); Kfar Yam, 20 (1983); Morag, 220 (1972); Netzarim, 390 (1972); Netzer Hazani, 410 (1973); Neveh Dekalim, 2.500 (1983); Nissanit, 1050 (1980); Pe'at Sadeh, 105 (1989); Rafiah Yam, 150 (1984); Shirat Hayam, 50 (2000); Slav, 50 (1980; Tel Katifa, 75 (1992).
Todas seriam evacuadas, pois era impossível mantê-las em um território minúsculo e superpopulado como é a Faixa de Gaza . Sem contar que os enclaves judeus dificultavam as operações militares, sobretudo a que seria preparada para três anos mais tarde.

E na Cisjordânia, apenas as marcadas em vermelho seriam evacuadas: Ganim, 175 (1983); Homesh, 220 (1980); Kadim, 170; Sa Nur, 110 (até 2004).
A razão do desmantelamento destas e não das dezenas de outras era pela dificuldade de acesso e pela exiguidade - uma gota d'água nos mares de invasões que muravam, literalmente, os habitantes das cidades palestinas.
Em suma, na Cisjordânia foi uma estratégia geográfica e midiática, pois o número de invasores era irrisório. E foram transferidos para novas colônias recém criadas.

No início de março de 2005, Tony Blair, então primeiro ministro da Inglaterra, organizou uma conferência em Londres com o propósito de demonstrar apoio ao novo governo palestino e oferecer assistência na organização da segurança na Cisjordânia e na Faixa de Gaza.
Israel não participou da conferência. O assunto não lhes interessava.
Mahmud Abbas saiu de lá dizendo que o fim da ocupação e a paz continuavam sendo suas prioridades e que faria tudo para alcançá-las.
Como se ele tivesse alguma influência sobre seu futuro e sobre os acontecimentos premeditados em Tel Aviv e Washington.
A conferência não serviu para nada porque Tony Blair não uniu gestos às palavras. Talvez só quisesse demonstrar que até então tomara a defesa de Ariel Sharon não contra a Palestina e sim contra Abu Amar (Yasser Arafat). E com ele morto, queria mostrar disposição de conversar com Abu Mazen que andava de terno e deixava seu kefieh (lenço tracional palestino) sempre em casa para não espantar seus interlocutores cegos por preconceitos inculcados paulatinamente desde 1948.

A morte suspeita de Yasser Arafat não preocupava ninguém nos países ocidentais, que estavam apressados em apoiar Mahmud Abbas para demonstrar vontade de resolver o conflito - não se falava em ocupação nem em colonização, e chamar Mahmud Abbas de Abu Mazen, nome usado pelos palestinos e por seus conhecidos estrangeiros, nem pensar. O objetivo do novo governo era mudar a imagem e aproimá-la da expectativa europeia e sobretudo estadunidense, para que George W. Bush se sentisse à vontade.
No dia 14, foi a vez do então Secretário Geral da ONU Kofi Annan encontrar Mahmoud Abbas para lhe dizer publicamente que o mundo estava determinado em investir em um processo de paz no Oriente Médio após anos de gelo nas relações entre Israel e Palestina.
Como se as duas partes tivessem direitos e forças iguais nesta batalha e como se a ONU influenciasse em algo. Mas o esforço de Kofi Annan gerou um certo entusiasmo, em Ramallah. Em Gaza o ceticismo reinava.
No dia 16, a IDF retirou-se de Jericó, também para reforçar a posição de Abu Mazen em sua tentativa de convencer as forças de resistência a manter o cessar-fogo para que ele pudesse negociar em paz.
No dia 22, a IDF retirou-se de Tulkarm e devolveu "as chaves" da cidade à Autoridade Palestina, quase fisicamente, pois tiraram os cadeados das barragens e deixaram os carros passarem.

(Quando digo que uma cidade palestina está ocupada pela IDF, sitiada, significa que os palestinos estão proibidos de entrar ou sair dessas localidades e até as crianças viram reféns da arbitrariedade. Não é apenas ocupação militar de vigilância. É barragem total.
E é sempre impressionante assistir à libertação de uma dessas cidades.
Lembro-me de uma vez que estava na Cisjordânia "a paisana", ou seja, como cidadã comum (no fim da escritura do meu livro) e presenciei junto com palestinos a reabertura de Jericó após um longo bloqueio. O motorista, o fotógrafo e eu sentamos em um "barzinho" no fim do dia, tomamos o chá de menta tradicional do qual gosto muito, e os dois estavam com os olhos marejados de tanta emoção de poder transitar pela cidade.
Acho que para quem nunca pisou na Palestina deve ser difícil entender os horríveis efeitos, além de físicos, psicológicos, da ocupação israelense interminável. Nas crianças os efeitos são ainda mais graves.)

Voltando à nossa história, em meados de março, ativistas palestinos se reuniram no Cairo e concordaram com uma tahidiyeh - um tipo de abrandamento da luta, menos completa do que a trégua, que chamam de hudna.
O Hamas e o Jihad anunciaram que apoiariam a OLP (Organização de Libertação da Palestina criada por Abu Amar) e que participariam das próximas eleições legislativas previstas para maio.

Vendo que as coisas estavam se acalmando, Ariel Sharon suspendeu as retiradas da IDF de outras cidades da Cisjordânia alegando que a Autoridade Palestina não estava desarmando os "terroristas" com a rapidez determinada pelo Road Map. E continuou a prender resistentes de todas as facções e a agilizar a construção do muro e mais colônias. Certamente para garantir que Abu Mazen ficasse sem argumentos para acalmar  a Resistência?

De fato. No final do mês Abu Mazen levou o primeiro golpe de seu lado. Tawfik Tirawi (foto acima), chefe da Inteligência palestina na Cisjordânia demitiu-se porque "little was being done to implement the rule of law."

(Atualmente, Tawfik é quem foi encarregado da chefia da investigação da morte de Yasser Arafat, ainda em andamento).

O mês de março também foi o mês da reunião de cúpula anual da Liga Árabe, dessa vez, em Alger, na Argélia. Esperava-se que a ocupação da Palestina encabeçasse a pauta e que os países árabes demonstrassem apoio ao novo presidente, porém eles recusaram uma nova proposta e preferiram relançar o Plano de Paz saudita apresentado em Beirute em 2002.

Nele ofereciam a Israel relações diplomáticas e comerciais normais contra a retirada civil e militar da Cisjordânia nas fronteiras de 1967.

Enquanto isso, o governo israelense investigava invasões "não autorizadas" na Cisjordânia. Havia entre 20 a 30 mais ou menos que deveriam ter sido evacuadas, segundo o Road Map. Em vez de evacuá-las rapidamente, Ariel Sharon nomeou mais uma comissão de inquérito, para demonstrar serviço deixando o tempo passar.
(É muito comum com essas invasões "não autorizadas", ou seja, em terras palestinas não delimitadas pelo governo israelense para serem invadidas mas que os imigrantes judeus espertinhos ocupam de qualquer jeito, pois sabem que correm pouco risco de serem despejados. Os palestinos dão queixa formal na Justiça israelense e o processo jurídico começa e se eterniza.)

Os palestinos entenderam a manobra e não gostaram. Ainda menos quando o General Primeiro Ministro anunciou a "desapropriação" de mais residências palestinas para a construção de mais invasões judias ilegais em Jerusalém Oriental.
Provocação pouca é bobagem, era o lema do General Bulldozer.

Sharon agiu em silêncio, mas deu satisfação ao Presidente dos Estados Unidos na seguinte carta cheia de conversa fiada.

Dear Mr. President,

The vision that you articulated in your 24 June 2002 address constitutes one of the most significant contributions toward ensuring a bright future for the Middle East. Accordingly, the State of Israel has accepted the Roadmap, as adopted by our government. For the first time, a practical and just formula was presented for the achievement of peace, opening a genuine window of opportunity for progress toward a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, involving two states living side-by-side in peace and security.

This formula sets forth the correct sequence and principles for the attainment of peace. Its full implementation represents the sole means to make genuine progress. As you have stated, a Palestinian state will never be created by terror, and Palestinians must engage in a sustained fight against the terrorists and dismantle their infrastructure. Moreover, there must be serious efforts to institute true reform and real democracy and liberty, including new leaders not compromised by terror. We are committed to this formula as the only avenue through which an agreement can be reached. We believe that this formula is the only viable one.

The Palestinian Authority under its current leadership has taken no action to meet its responsibilities under the Roadmap. Terror has not ceased, reform of the Palestinian security services has not been undertaken, and real institutional reforms have not taken place. The State of Israel continues to pay the heavy cost of constant terror. Israel must preserve its capability to protect itself and deter its enemies, and we thus retain our right to defend ourselves against terrorism and to take actions against terrorist organizations.

The Honorable George W. Bush President of the United States of America The White House Washington, D.C.

Having reached the conclusion that, for the time being, there exists no Palestinian partner with whom to advance peacefully toward a settlement and since the current impasse is unhelpful to the achievement of our shared goals, I have decided to initiate a process of gradual disengagement with the hope of reducing friction between Israelis and Palestinians. The Disengagement Plan is designed to improve security for Israel and stabilize our political and economic situation. It will enable us to deploy our forces more effectively until such time that conditions in the Palestinian Authority allow for the full implementation of the Roadmap to resume.

I attach, for your review, the main principles of the Disengagement Plan. This initiative, which we are not undertaking under the roadmap, represents an independent Israeli plan, yet is not inconsistent with the roadmap. According to this plan, the State of Israel intends to relocate military installations and all Israeli villages and towns in the Gaza Strip, as well as other military installations and a small number of villages in Samaria.

In this context, we also plan to accelerate construction of the Security Fence, whose completion is essential in order to ensure the security of the citizens of Israel. The fence is a security rather than political barrier, temporary rather than permanent, and therefore will not prejudice any final status issues including final borders. The route of the Fence, as approved by our Government’s decisions, will take into account, consistent with security needs, its impact on Palestinians not engaged in terrorist activities.

Upon my return from Washington, I expect to submit this Plan for the approval of the Cabinet and the Knesset, and I firmly believe that it will win such approval.

The Disengagement Plan will create a new and better reality for the State of Israel, enhance its security and economy, and strengthen the fortitude of its people. In this context, I believe it is important to bring new opportunities to the Negev and the Galilee. Additionally, the Plan will entail a series of measures with the inherent potential to improve the lot of the Palestinian Authority, providing that it demonstrates the wisdom to take advantage of this opportunity. The execution of the Disengagement Plan holds the prospect of stimulating positive changes within the Palestinian Authority that might create the necessary conditions for the resumption of direct negotiations.

We view the achievement of a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians as our central focus and are committed to realizing this objective. Progress toward this goal must be anchored exclusively in the Roadmap and we will oppose any other plan.

In this regard, we are fully aware of the responsibilities facing the State of Israel. These include limitations on the growth of settlements; removal of unauthorized outposts; and steps to increase, to the extent permitted by security needs, freedom of movement for Palestinians not engaged in terrorism. Under separate cover we are sending to you a full description of the steps the State of Israel is taking to meet all its responsibilities.

The government of Israel supports the United States efforts to reform the Palestinian security services to meet their roadmap obligations to fight terror. Israel also supports the American's efforts, working with the International Community, to promote the reform process, build institutions and improve the economy of the Palestinian Authority and to enhance the welfare of its people, in the hope that a new Palestinian leadership will prove able to fulfill its obligations under the roadmap.

I want to again express my appreciation for your courageous leadership in the war against global terror, your important initiative to revitalize the Middle East as a more fitting home for its people and, primarily, your personal friendship and profound support for the State of Israel.

Sincerely,

Ariel Sharon

À qual George W. Bush respondeu no mesmo tom camarada, porém, dando uma alfinetada ao lembrar as Resoluções 242 e 338 das Nações Unidas, que delimitam as fronteiras de 1967, sem o respeito da qual falar em paz até a ele parecia conversa fiada.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter setting out your disengagement plan.

The United States remains hopeful and determined to find a way forward toward a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. I remain committed to my June 24, 2002 vision of two states living side by side in peace and security as the key to peace, and to the roadmap as the route to get there.

We welcome the disengagement plan you have prepared, under which Israel would withdraw certain military installations and all settlements from Gaza, and withdraw certain military installations and settlements in the West Bank. These steps described in the plan will mark real progress toward realizing my June 24, 2002 vision, and make a real contribution towards peace. We also understand that, in this context, Israel believes it is important to bring new opportunities to the Negev and the Galilee. We are hopeful that steps pursuant to this plan, consistent with my vision, will remind all states and parties of their own obligations under the roadmap.

The United States appreciates the risks such an undertaking represents. I therefore want to reassure you on several points.

First, the United States remains committed to my vision and to its implementation as described in the roadmap. The United States will do its utmost to prevent any attempt by anyone to impose any other plan. Under the roadmap, Palestinians must undertake an immediate cessation of armed activity and all acts of violence against Israelis anywhere, and all official Palestinian institutions must end incitement against Israel. The Palestinian leadership must act decisively against terror, including sustained, targeted, and effective operations to stop terrorism and dismantle terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. Palestinians must undertake a comprehensive and fundamental political reform that includes a strong parliamentary democracy and an empowered prime minister.

Second, there will be no security for Israelis or Palestinians until they and all states, in the region and beyond, join together to fight terrorism and dismantle terrorist organizations. The United States reiterates its steadfast commitment to Israel's security, including secure, defensible borders, and to preserve and strengthen Israel's capability to deter and defend itself, by itself, against any threat or possible combination of threats.

Third, Israel will retain its right to defend itself against terrorism, including to take actions against terrorist organizations. The United States will lead efforts, working together with Jordan, Egypt, and others in the international community, to build the capacity and will of Palestinian institutions to fight terrorism, dismantle terrorist organizations, and prevent the areas from which Israel has withdrawn from posing a threat that would have to be addressed by any other means. The United States understands that after Israel withdraws from Gaza and/or parts of the West Bank, and pending agreements on other arrangements, existing arrangements regarding control of airspace, territorial waters, and land passages of the West Bank and Gaza will continue.

The United States is strongly committed to Israel's security and well-being as a Jewish state. It seems clear that an agreed, just, fair and realistic framework for a solution to the Palestinian refugee issue as part of any final status agreement will need to be found through the establishment of a Palestinian state, and the settling of Palestinian refugees there, rather than in Israel.

As part of a final peace settlement, Israel must have secure and recognized borders, which should emerge from negotiations between the parties in accordance with UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338. In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949, and all previous efforts to negotiate a two-state solution have reached the same conclusion. It is realistic to expect that any final status agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities.

I know that, as you state in your letter, you are aware that certain responsibilities face the State of Israel. Among these, your government has stated that the barrier being erected by Israel should be a security rather than political barrier, should be temporary rather than permanent, and therefore not prejudice any final status issues including final borders, and its route should take into account, consistent with security needs, its impact on Palestinians not engaged in terrorist activities.

As you know, the United States supports the establishment of a Palestinian state that is viable, contiguous, sovereign, and independent, so that the Palestinian people can build their own future in accordance with my vision set forth in June 2002 and with the path set forth in the roadmap. The United States will join with others in the international community to foster the development of democratic political institutions and new leadership committed to those institutions, the reconstruction of civic institutions, the growth of a free and prosperous economy, and the building of capable security institutions dedicated to maintaining law and order and dismantling terrorist organizations.

A peace settlement negotiated between Israelis and Palestinians would be a great boon not only to those peoples but to the peoples of the entire region. Accordingly, the United States believes that all states in the region have special responsibilities: to support the building of the institutions of a Palestinian state; to fight terrorism, and cut off all forms of assistance to individuals and groups engaged in terrorism; and to begin now to move toward more normal relations with the State of Israel. These actions would be true contributions to building peace in the region.

Mr. Prime Minister, you have described a bold and historic initiative that can make an important contribution to peace. I commend your efforts and your courageous decision which I support. As a close friend and ally, the United States intends to work closely with you to help make it a success.

Sincerely,

George W. Bush

Enquanto o General e o Texano correspondiam falsas amabilidades, no terreno a colonização continuava brava, os hebronitas continuavam sendo diariamente aterrorizados  e o muro se estendia como uma jararaca patrocinada por empresas amorais.

Quando Sharon em vez de dar uma chance à paz anunciou a construção das novas invasões em Jerusalém, Condoleeza Rice e Dan Kurtzer, embaixador local dos EUA, condenaram a medida de provocação e Sharon recebeu uma chuva de críticas da direita e da extrema direita domésticas que apoiavam o seu governo.

Ehud Barak, o outro general que precedera Sharon em outro governo calamitosamente expansionista, aproveitou para fazer uma declaração absurda para pressionar o padrinho de Israel que parecia bravo com o afilhado. Disse que a postura dos dois estadunidenses demonstrava que as promessas da Casa Branca não valiam nada.
É assim, os governos sucessivos de Israel, pelo menos desde a década de 80 que sigo o conflito de pertinho, sempre se mostraram insaciáveis. Os Estados Unidos não precisam nem lhes dar uma palmadinha para choramingarem. Basta Washington amuar para Tel Aviv reagir como se estivesse sendo esquartejado. Mas sempre dá resultado porque a APAIC (lobby ultra-direita-sionista em Washington) tem os bracos longos e poderosos.

O resultado foi que logo Rice e Kurtzer voltaram atrás e negaram qualquer divergência de opinião entre Tel Aviv e Washington sobre os planos referentes às colônias - chamadas amigavelmente "assentamentos" inclusive pela imprensa, como se fossem construções inofensivas e legítimas instaladas para abrigar sem-terras em imensos latifúndios de bilionários israelenses e não invasões erguidas em terra alheia usurpada com violência desabrigando as famílias que há séculos a habitam.

Uma questão de semântica importante que retrata ou minimiza um ato bárbaro.

Aliás, no dia 06 de abril Ariel Sharon voltou a cutucar W. Bush para ver até onde podia espichar a paciência dos Estados Unidos. Anunciou a extensão da maior colônia israelense na Cisjordânia na maior naturalidade.

A Casa Branca ficou em silêncio, a embaixada dos EUA em Tel Aviv, idem. Sharon passou no teste. Sua margem de manobra continuava imensa.

'Seven words uttered by President Bush in Brussels have not been paid the attention they deserve.
He called for the establishment of “a democratic Palestinian state with territorial contiguity” in the West Bank, and then added: “A state on scattered territories will not work.”...
... Nobody warns of a danger without a reason. If Bush said what he said, it means that he believes that someone is causing this danger.
Just who might that be?
For years now I have been warning that this is the intention of Ariel Sharon, the basis of the whole settlement enterprise planned and set up by him. The lay-out of the settlements on the West Bank map is designed to cut the territory up from North to South and from West to East, in order to forestall any possibility of establishing a really viable and contiguous Palestinian state, a state like any other.
If the settlement blocs that have been created are annexed to Israel , the Palestinian territory will be sliced up into a number of enclaves – perhaps four, perhaps six. The Gaza Strip, an isolated ghetto by itself, will be another enclave. Each enclave will be surrounded by settlements and military installations, and all of them will be cut off from the world outside.
The American intelligence agencies are familiar with this picture, of course. They can see it with their satellites. But that did not deter President Bush from promising Sharon last year that Israeli “population centers” in the West Bank will be annexed to Israel . These “population centers” are the very same settlement blocs that were defined by the US in the past as “illegal” and “an obstacle to peace”. During the presidency of the first President Bush, the American administration even decided to deduct the costs of new settlement projects from the financial benefits accorded to Israel .
So why did the second Bush suddenly make a declaration whose practical meaning is that some of these settlement blocs must be dismantled? And why did he make it in Brussels ?
It is clear that he wanted to gain favor with his European hosts. The European Union opposes the annexation of West Bank territory to Israel . Bush said what he said in order to reduce his differences with Europe .
So he said it. And what is happening on the ground in the meantime?...
... Nowadays one speaks only about the wall that will separate the West Bank from Israel proper. Nobody is talking now of the “Eastern” wall.
It is no secret that Sharon plans to build this wall in order to complete the encirclement of the West Bank and cut it off from the Jordan valley and the Dead Sea shore. That is a big slice of territory, about 20% of the West Bank , and would cut the West Bank off from any contact with the world. Sharon knows that he cannot build this wall at the moment, because of the opposition of the US and the whole world. Also, there is no budget for it. Therefore, he is leaving it for the future.
The government decision does formally include the southern border of the West Bank , where the planned path of the wall runs almost completely along the Green Line. That looks really nice. But this, too, contains a trick: Sharon does not intend to build this part of the wall in the near future. He is postponing it for another time – and then he will propose a different path altogether, including a finger thrust deeply into Palestinian territory, so as to annex the South Hebron settlement bloc, up to Kiryat Arba. [Foi feito de fato]
By way of deception shalt thou build settlements.
In the meantime, Sharon is keeping himself occupied with building on the 7% of the territory that has been approved by the government decision. All this area between the wall and the Green Line – the territory already annexed in practice – is being filled with new settlements. Among others: A new town called Gevaoth that is to be built west of Bethlehem , in what is called the “Etzion Bloc”.
That is a mendacious name: the original Etzion Bloc consisted of a small group of settlements near the Green Line. 
A big new settlement called “ North Tsufim ” that is to be built north of Qalqilia. This, too, will reach the proportions of a town. 
A giant housing projects, that will be set up in order to connect the Ma’aleh Adumim bloc to Jerusalem, and just about reach the Jordan river.
Also in the Jerusalem Area, the new (Labor) Minister for Housing, Yitzhak Herzog, promises to build big housing projects from Har Homa to Ma’aleh Adumim, while another one is going to be built east of a-Ram. The aim is to cut Jerusalem off completely from the West Bank .
All this is happening while Israel and the world are waxing lyrical about the “disengagement” plan – which, in essence, is nothing but a plan to consolidate the Gaza strip as one of the enclaves in “a state of scattered territories”. (The Gaza Strip constitutes only 6% of the occupied territories.)
The Labor party is a full partner in this scheme.
As far as Sharon is concerned, the disengagement plan plays with the dismantling of some small settlements in a remote corner of the occupied territories for the fulfillment of his grand design to take over most of the West Bank .
Now President Bush has declared that he does not accept this design. His European hosts smiled politely. Perhaps they believed him, and then, maybe they did not.
Uri Avnery, 26 de fevereiro de 2005

Reservistas da IDF, forças israelenses de ocupação,

Shovrim Shtika - Breaking the Silence 

"Desmantelamento" de colônias

What do you remember from Hazon David [an illegal outpost in Hebron, which was ordered evacuated and destroyed—more than thirty times]? The evacuations started during your time there . . .
I remember I evacuated them a few times. Each time, we tried to trick them a different way, do you remember all that nonsense? To show them they were being evacuated? We tried all kinds of tricky things, they never worked.
Tell a story.

There isn’t much of a story, Hazon David is still there.
How did the evacuations start? When? Why wasn’t it ever really evacuated—how did that play out?
First of all, I don’t even remember how many times they told me to evacuate the Hazon David outpost, but I think at least a few. There’s a court ruling on it.
When was Hazon David first established?
I don’t remember exactly. During my time there, end of 2002, beginning of 2003, something like that. It was clear why they put it up. They always had a dream to connect the western gate of Kiryat Arba to the Jewish settlement. They’d say it to you directly. It was clear why they were doing it. Hazon David is a bullshit story—every time the army went to evacuate it, an order was given by the minister of defense not to evacuate. Whenever they evacuated it, the outpost would reappear, and that was the story. I don’t know what the dirt there was. If I were serving the settlement’s interests I’d be able to tell you a story about it, but I wasn’t interested in that. I don’t know what happened there.
Were there times when you went to evacuate Hazon David and the minister of defense ordered you not to do it?
The night we were supposed to evacuate it, they canceled the evacuation once, they canceled it a second time, and the third time we did evacuate it, but the outpost was put back up the next day. I don’t remember what happened there. I wasted so many nights on Hazon David.
Did you guys know from the beginning that the outpost was on private Palestinian land? Private property?

That’s not relevant, I don’t remember, I don’t know what to tell you. I don’t know whose land it was, I don’t remember. But  it doesn’t matter.

Why is Hazon David still not evacuated, do you have any idea?
 Because . . . listen, here’s what happened. In the middle of 2003 some Knesset members visited the Jewish settlement in Hebron, after Hazon David was established, you can check the papers. I escorted their tour. Tzachi Hanegbi was there, Ruby Rivlin [members of the government, from the right-wing Likud Party], and all kinds of people like that. And there was Hazon David, a fact on the ground. Listen, when you get verbal legitimization from a Knesset member . . .
Knesset members visited the settlers?
They visited the whole Jewish settlement, they went on the tour, the western gate, they really did the whole tour.
I remember Tzachi Hanegbi said that one of the goals was to connect the western gate and the Jewish settlement. He said it to the settlement leaders. Look in a newspaper, Ha’aretz, from that period, and you’ll see. Sometime in 2003.
That whole business of the photos taken while someone is picked up for interrogation, blindfolded, hands tied, and he's placed in a post like that and…

Someone is shackled and everyone would come along and get their pictures taken with him?

Yes, that was normal.

What would they do with the photos?

Hang them up at home.

Did you do checkpoints?

Yes.

Were there all kinds of improper conduct?

There's no such thing as a "proper" checkpoint.

That's how you feel.

You can't run a checkpoint properly.

How is this manifested?

A young soldier in the company (there are these mixed companies of older and younger soldiers) and he does 8-hour shifts at the checkpoint, 8 hours break for sleep, 8 hours at the checkpoint, he's no longer objective. It's his little life and all his moods and his nerves all come out there, and it's reflected in his treatment of Arabs.

For instance?

Yelling, aggressiveness that is totally unnecessary. There was also this fun thing with car keys. Every time there was curfew or some such procedures, games of the army, detaining someone driving along, a jeep comes along, picks up his car keys -let him find them himself. He was told to reach the brigade HQ. "Next Sunday you'll get your car keys back." On many occasions the keys would simply get lost, be thrown into the jeep and one guy would pass them on to another and they disappeared...

...Were there instances at the checkpoints of bribery, like cigarettes, food, money, humiliation, tasks?

That happened all the time. People [the israeli soldiers] would receive things, from cigarettes and food… There was a checkpoint in Hebron. I forgot which. Some little checkpoint in Hebron, don't remember where. Outside. There were lots of commercial vehicles. The soldiers in the platoon would compete to see who manages to squeeze the most out of people. Starting with Coke trucks… They would make them stand there until… harass them until the Arab would realize he had to take down something. At the post above the checkpoint there were 5 soldiers. There was a platoon that would man the post and checkpoint and they were the only ones who did the checkpoint. At that post there were whole cases of Coke and Arab snacks, and this got out to the platoon commander, like, he knew it was happening, but okay… No, why shouldn't the soldiers get snacks, any car that was carrying stuff, 85-90% certainty the driver would [have to] give the soldiers something. Drinks, food, stuff like that.

... It seems unclear to me, you describe a very extreme difficult, immoral situation, personally uneasy, and still…

That's the point. Now, on the outside, it looks like that, but when you're there, inside things, your judgment is totally different, you don't think these things are so important…

You regard things on the personal level, to cope and manage?

You care less, somehow. Only after you get out of the army do you look back and realize what you did.

Were there others? What was the dynamic like in the platoon, in the company, social pressure, where did that go, what was the talk like?

Most were into it. Most guys were very extreme. There were two others with me who felt bad. Didn't touch things, did nothing of the sort their whole time in the army, but it didn't bother them enough to get up and actively do something about it. Eventually they did. Two went to the company commander with me, that was the most. When I approached the battalion commander, I was already on my own. They didn't come along.

How were you treated? Did you come to soldiers and say, don't do this?

I didn't say. I didn't do.

Criticism was voiced only in private?

Yes. 

Reservista da IDF que serviu em Hebron.

Documentário Journeyman: Waiting for Mordechai