Os palestinos começaram o ano de 2005 em campanha eleitoral para eleger o sucessor de Yasser Arafat. Sucessão na Presidência da Autoridade Palestina, é claro, pois na liderança propriamente dita, não havia nenhum verdadeiro líder livre. Marwan Barghuti continuava preso e o Fatah não dispunha de nenhum dirigente que gozasse de respeito e prestígio junto aos simptatizantes de seu próprio partido, nem junto ao Hamas e demais facções independentes. Estavam todos mortos ou detidos.
Marwan Barghuti lançou sua candidatura assim mesmo, do presídio. A candidatura foi temporária, mas bem-vinda. Retirou-se do pleito porque ainda era cedo para dar esse passo da cadeia.
Portanto, o candidato do Fatah foi Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas).
Nesse ínterim, a IDF continuava botando fogo pelas ventas. No dia 4 seus soldados mataram sete adolescentes nas imediações de Beit Lahiya, no norte da Faixa de Gaza.
(Bait, em árabe literal, significa casa, moradia, daí a frequência deste prefixo Beit - versão local de Bait - em nomes de cidades e mais ainda em campos de refugiados palestinos)
O clima eleitoral diminuiu o impacto dos assassinatos inexplicáveis, apesar das explicações dos soldados que os jovens estavam com "comportamento suspeito", meio espafalhafoso, enfim, como de praxe nos adolescentes.
No dia 09 os palestinos foram às urnas, deram 62,3% dos votos a Abu Mazen e no dia seguinte sua vitória foi anunciada. Era ele que ocuparia o cargo que fora vitalício de Abu Ammar (Yasser Arafat). De fato continuou onde estava, já que era presidente interino desde o fim de outubro de 2004.
Acreditava-se em Ramallah que a vitória de um defensor da não-violência - carregado em triunfo por Zakaria Zubeidi (à esquerda, ao lado) líder proeminente das Brigadas Al-Aqsa em Jenin, na Cisjordânia, e um dos líderes da resistência militar mais respeitados na Palestina, inclusive pelo Hamas embora fosse do Fatah, o que indicava que Abu Mazen contava com seu apoio para controlar os ataques das brigadas ligadas ao Tanzim (o braço armado do Fatah que Arafat tolerava e encorajava segundo as necessídades) se tivesse espaço político para negociar com seus compatriotas - fosse acalmar George W. Bush e o general Ariel Sharon, já que ambos diziam que o problema era de pessoa, no caso Abu Ammar (Yasser Arafat) e não de falta de vontade de sua parte.
Mas não. O Primeiro Ministro de Israel estava mais preocupado com sua nova coalizão governamental do Likud com o Partido Trabalhista e partidos de extrema-direita que tinha de agradar.
'The Palestinian elections have impressed the world. Until now, if elections were held in any Arab country at all, there was only one candidate, and he received 99.62% of the vote. Yet here there were seven candidates, there was a lively election campaign and the winning candidate got only 62%.'Now it’s official: “the First Democracy in the Arab World” or “the Second Democracy in the Middle East ” has been born.
The truth is, of course, that Palestinian democracy existed already. In 1996, the Palestinians held elections for the presidency and the parliament, monitored by international observers. Yasser Arafat, the leader of the Palestinian struggle for liberation, was not the only one standing; another candidate, Samikha Khalil, a respected woman, did garner almost 10% of the vote. But because of Arafat’s dominant personality, the insufficient separation between the branches of government and the relentless Israeli defamation campaign against him, many people around the world did not recognize the Palestinian democracy.
Now the situation is different. Nobody can deny the near-miracle that has happened: the clean transition from the Arafat era to the era of his successors, and the fair elections held under strict international supervision . And, most importantly, democracy was not imposed from the outside, at the whim of a foreign president, but grew from below. And not under normal conditions, but under a brutal occupation.
The whole world acknowledges the Palestinian democracy. That, by itself, creates a new political situation.
Much now depends on the personality of Abu-Mazen. He is setting out under the shadow of his great predecessor. Those who succeed a Founding Father always have a problem at the beginning, like the heirs of Bismarck or Ben-Gurion.
Just think of the man who succeeded Gamal Abd-al-Nasser, the founder of modern Egypt and the idol of the entire Arab world... Yet upon assuming the presidency, Sadat astounded the world. He sent his army across the Suez Canal , achieving the first significant military victory ever over the Israeli army. His visit to Jerusalem was a brilliant act without precedent in history. Never before had a leader visited the capital of the enemy while still in a state of war.
Abu-Mazen has lived all his life in the shadow of Arafat. He was not a military leader, unlike the adored Abu-Jihad, who was murdered by Israel . He was not in command of the security apparatus, unlike Abu-Iyad, who was murdered by Abu-Nidal. Since 1974, he was closely associated with Arafat’s historic efforts to achieve a political settlement with Israel , and in charge of the contacts with the Israeli peace forces. I myself met him for the first time in Tunis , in 1983...
...Of course, Abu-Mazen is very different from Sadat. The Egyptian leader had a dramatic flair, he loved big gestures. Abu-Mazen’s style is the very opposite.
And another huge difference: Sadat was in absolute control of a big country. He could afford to ignore different views. Abu-Mazen does not enjoy this luxury.
He brings with him to his job a valuable dowry: his relationship with the President of the United States .
George Bush is a simple fellow. He likes some people and hates others, and this decides the policy of the greatest power on earth. He likes Ariel Sharon and fawns on him. Since he has never been in battle, he admires the combat-rich Israeli general. Sharon personifies for him the American myth – the annihilation of the Indians and the conquest of the territories. Arafat, on the other hand, reminded him of an Indian chief, whose language is unintelligible and whose ploys are satanic.
When Bush saw Abu-Mazen in Aqaba, "a respectable person" in a business suit, without beard or keffiyeh, he liked him on sight. That’s why he congratulated him this week and invited him to the White House. The question is whether Abu-Mazen can translate this attitude quickly into political achievements.
The situation presents Sharon with a difficult dilemma. His natural inclination is to do unto Abu-Mazen what he did so successfully to Arafat: demonize him and cut his ties with America . Already he is muttering darkly about Abu-Mazen’s unwillingness to destroy the “terrorist organizations”.
But Sharon knows that he must behave with the utmost care, so as not to make Bush angry. As long as Bush thinks that Abu-Mazen is O.K., Sharon must not be seen to undermine him. This, too, gives Abu-Mazen a chance.
So what can he do?
His first task is to come to terms with the refusal-organizations. No leader can conduct national policy with armed factions firing in the opposite direction....
... Anyone who says that Abu-Mazen is ready or able to start a civil war against Hamas does not know what he is talking about. Palestinian public opinion would not stand for it. Most Palestinians believe that without the armed struggle, Sharon would not be talking of withdrawing from Gaza . They are ready for a cease-fire in order to give Abu-Mazen a chance. But they do not want the liquidation of the fighting organizations, because it may be necessary to renew the armed struggle if Abu-Mazen can’t convince the Americans and the Israelis to enable the Palestinians to realize their national aims.
In his dealings with Hamas, Abu-Mazen, like Arafat, will prefer a combination of negotiations, political pressure and mobilizing public opinion. He will have to convince the armed factions to accept the national strategy that is adopted by the leadership. In return, he will have to welcome Hamas into the political system, the PLO and the parliament.
The attack at the Karni crossing this week was a demonstration of power by the armed factions. It was a classic guerilla action, much as the recent destruction of an army post on the “Philadelphi Axis”. The organizations want to prove that they have not been vanquished, but rather that they have achieved a draw with the Israeli army. If a cease-fire is arranged, it will not be a sign of weakness on their part. In the same way, the Yom Kippur attack preceded the Egyptian-Israeli peace, and the Hizbullah guerilla war preceded the withdrawal from Lebanon .
If Abu-Mazen achieves such a cease-fire, he will be able to address his main task: to win over Israeli and international public opinion and to change the policy of the United States .
Sadat succeeded in both. But Sadat was dealing with Menachem Begin, who was willing to relinquish Egyptian territory in order to continue his struggle against the Palestinians and prevent the creation of a Palestinian state.
Sharon, too, opposes the creation of a Palestinian state in all of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with its capital in East Jerusalem . But Abu-Mazen, like Arafat, cannot and will not be satisfied with anything less than what is now a sanctified aim.
That is another huge difference between Sadat and Abu-Mazen: Sadat came to Jerusalem only after he was secretly assured that Begin was ready to give back all of Sinai.
Sharon, on the other hand, is promising Abu-Mazen nothing at all.
Abu-Mazen was sworn in today. Many hope for his success, very few envy him.'
A prova que Sharon além de não estar prometendo nada não tinha nenhuma vontade de dar uma chance ao substituto do presidente de quem se livrara, foi sua reação contra Abu Mazen logo após sua eleição.
No mesmo dia o novo presidente palestino provou que não trairia a confiança que nele depositavam e mostrou ao mundo que o problema não vinha de Arafat e sim do desinteresse do General israelense de fazer as pazes sem levar todas as vantagens.
No dia da posse de Abu Mazen, em vez de apertar a mão que lhe estava sendo estendida, o General israelense "exigiu" como condição sine qua non para voltar a negociar que o novo presidente da Autoridade Palestina procedesse à caça e detenção dos "terroristas" e que "esmagasse" a resistência.
Impôs esta condição certamente por saber, através do Shabak (como o Shin Bet é chamado) que era impossível de ser satisfeita, sobretudo nestes termos.
Zakaria Zubeidi estava do lado de Abu Mazen apesar de suas reticicências, mas muitos estavam impacientes para ver um gesto conciliatório verdadeiro da parte adversa.
Estes impacientes responderam à exigência de Sharon pelas vias comuns de violência, no dia 13 de janeiro.
Três deles atacaram o posto de fronteira comercial de Qarni matando seis israelenses e perdendo a vida no ataque.
No dia 15, durante a posse de Abu Mazen no cargo que ocupava como interino desde o fim de outubro de 2004, a IDF revidou o ataque de Qarni matando sete gazauís e ferindo dezenas.
Abu Mazen, determinado a cumprir a palavra, apesar das enormes dificuldades pôs-se logo ao trabalho. Estava determinado a parar a Intifada e tirar a possibilidade de desculpas do outro lado.
Concretamente, no dia 21 de janeiro, enviou centenas de policiais palestinos para o norte da Faixa de Gaza para que evitassem que os grupos militares do Hamas lançassem torpedos do outro lado do arame farpado murado em que a Faixa está enclausurada.
Diplomaticamente, convenceu o Tanzim a conseguir uma trégua de seus grupos militares e no dia 22 os três concordaram com reservas. O Jihad e as Brigadas ex-Al-Aqsa - rebatizadas Yasser Arafat el-Chahid (chahid em árabe significa testemunha e mártir) - maior grupo de resistência do Fatah criado por Mwamar Barghuti e patrocinado militar e moralmente por Abu Ammar, guardaram as armas temporariamente para dar uma chance ao novo presidente. O anúncio formal dos líderes foi feito no dia 24.
Em contrapartida, a IDF anunciou no dia 26 que pararia a campanha de assassinatos e operações militares em cidades em que a Autoridade Palestina mantivesse a "calma e a serenidade", de fato, cidades em princípio livres cujo policiamento estava a cargo da AP desde os Acordos de Oslo.
No dia 28 de janeiro, Moshe Yaalon, chefe da IDF, ordenou publicamente a interrupção das operações ofensivas na Faixa de Gaza, considerando a boa vontade que Abu Mazen demonstrava.
Mesmo assim, o mês terminou com 52 mortos palestinos e 12 israelenses.
(Um dos problemas deste conflito é que os israelenses, quando querem agradar a comunidade internacional, fazem anúncios positivos abstratos e a imprensa publica como se fossem fatos concretos, que no final das contas nunca são postos em prática, mas deixam a impressão na opinião pública de terem sido gestos de boa vontade efetivados, embora tenham sido apenas parte da campanha constante de contra-informação em cuja rede a mídia sempre cai. Por inocência ou por cumplicidade.)
No dia 03, Israel aprovou um plano duplo. O primeiro era de libertação de centenas dos milhares de palestinos detidos em seus presídios.
O segundo era respeitar os Acordos de Oslo e retirar-se militarmente das cidades palestinas das quais a IDF fora banida, teoricamente, desde 1994. Mas que de fato continuara a ocupar permanente ou intermitentemente conforme sua vontade.
Os gestos, até então só concretos da parte de Abu Mazen, propiciaram outra reunião de cúpula. No mesmo lugar de sempre. No Egito, em Sharm el-Sheikh, às margens do Mar Vermelho.
A cúpula também foi a mesma da época de Yasse Arafat e de sempre. Além dos diretamente interessados, estavam também presentes os Estados Unidos, Jordânia e Egito, representados respectivamente por Condoleeza Rice, o rei Abdullah II e Hosni Mubarak.
Discutiram bastante e no final os participantes oficializaram suas posições com discursos públicos.
Concretamente, a Jordânia e o Egito decidiram restabelecer representação diplomática em Tel Aviv - seus embaixadores haviam sido camados de volta sob pressão popular devida à violenta repressão da Intifada.
Quanto a Israel e Palestina, o general Ariel Sharon e Mahmoud Abbas concordaram com o respeito do Road Map, que Yasser Arafat questionava, e um cessar-fogo bilateral.
Segundo fonte presente na reunião reservada, mal o General sentou-se à frente de Abu Mazen na mesa de negociação, reiterou sua exigência sine qua non para uma trégua que o Presidente palestino desarmasse o Hamas imediatamente. Abu Mazem teria reagido espontaneamente dizendo "Wait, wait, give me a break!"
O break foi a promessa de libertar 900 prisioneiros políticos inclusive do Hamas.
Ambos demonstravam desejo de acabar com os quatro anos de derramamento de sangue e Abu Mazem era o mais determinado.
No dia 10, após o Hamas lançar mais um punhado de foguetes Qassan na colônia israelense Gush Katif, Mahmoud Abbas ordenou a punição dos responsáveis e fez um limpa nas chefias de funcionários públicos da Faixa.
O Hamas e o Jihad da Faixa de Gaza, que não se conformavam em ter sido deixados de fora das negociações, não demonstravam nenhuma vontade de cumprir uma promessa que não haviam feito nem publicamente nem de portas fechadas.
Esperavam uma demonstração concreta de trégua e não apenas promessas. Achavam que Abu Mazen se dobrara depressa demais sem receber nada em troca, só anúncios e promessas.
As mortes "acidentais" de palestinos tinham diminuído, mas continuavam, e nada fora dito sobre o problema crônico de Hebron, onde os cidadãos palestinos são mal-tratados dia e noite pelos colonos judeus sob a proteção dos soldados israelenses que lhes servem de babá condescendente.
As mortes "acidentais" de palestinos tinham diminuído, mas continuavam, e nada fora dito sobre o problema crônico de Hebron, onde os cidadãos palestinos são mal-tratados dia e noite pelos colonos judeus sob a proteção dos soldados israelenses que lhes servem de babá condescendente.
De fato, os soldados da IDF continuavam onde estavam e só no dia 20 que Israel anunciou um plano de retirada, mas sem retirar-se concretamente nem da Cisjordânia nem da Faixa.
A única atitude concreta de Israel foi suspender as atividades dos caterpillars armados. Ou seja, suspender as demolições proibidas de maneira contundente pela ONU e condenada unanimamente pela Europa. Os EUA tiveram de pedir para Ariel Sharon pelo menos esta demonstração, transitória, de respeitar as leis internacionais.
No dia 25 um bomba-suicida do grupo explodiu no Stage Club de Tel Aviv levando consigo cinco israelenses e deixando para trás cerca de trinta feridos.
O ataque ocorreu às 23:15 (GMT) na porta da discoteca da rua Herbert Sammuel, próxima do calçadão da cidade.
O Stage costumava encher às sexta-feiras à noite, como todo clube noturno de dança. O bomba-suicida explodiu no meio da fila de entrada.
A última explosão de um bomba-suicida em discoteca de Tel Aviv fora em 2001, na Dolphinarium, matando 21 jovens.
A última explosão de um bomba-suicida em discoteca de Tel Aviv fora em 2001, na Dolphinarium, matando 21 jovens.
Este ataque teve menos vítimas por ter acontecido na calçada e não dentro, na pista.
Por que um jovem explodiria uma bomba em um lugar de jovens de sua idade?
Porque o Jihad via na alienação da juventude dourada de Tel Aviv um ato de cumplicidade tácita na ocupação, da qual participava diretamente durante os três anos de serviço militar e indiretamente não condenando a repressão sangrenta da Intifada.
Porque o Jihad via na alienação da juventude dourada de Tel Aviv um ato de cumplicidade tácita na ocupação, da qual participava diretamente durante os três anos de serviço militar e indiretamente não condenando a repressão sangrenta da Intifada.
Quaisquer que fossem os motivos, nenhum era justificável, apesar dos pesares da resistência pela perda de seus próprios jovens que eram assassinados sem cobertura midiática.
Saeb Ekerat, que liderava as negociações do lado palestino, declarou no mesmo dia que "Whoever is behind it is seriously attempting to sabotage the efforts being exerted to revive the peace process and should not be allowed to succeed," he said.
Mahmoud Abbas também indignou-se e prometeu buscar e punir os culpados.
Israel aproveitou para julgar e condenar a Autoridade Palestina através de seu porta-voz David Baker, "The Palestinian Authority's attempt to reach arrangements for the prevention of terror have failed."
A Secretary of State dos EUA Condoleezza Rice exigiu de Mahmoud Abbas: "take immediate, credible steps to find those behind the attacks."
"We now must see actions that send a clear message that terror will not be tolerated," foram as ordens que chegaram a Ramallah vindas de Tel Aviv e Washington.
Abu Mazen escutou as broncas, convocou reunião de emergência dos dirigentes palestinos e no fim, num gesto de boa-fé, fez uma bobagem. Solicitou, ou aceitou compulsoriamente, investigação conjunta com o Shabak (serviço israelense de inteligência interna, responsável pela campanha de assassinatos dos líderes palestinos e pelas chantagens que tiravam a dignidade de um cidadão normal o transformando em dedo-duro.)
A atitude conciliatória foi interpretada pelo Hamas como demonstração de fraqueza da parte de Abu Mazen e uma traição formal.
Foi o começo da desunião além de geográfica, física, da Cisjordânia e da Faixa de Gaza, do Fatah, representado na Autoridade Palestina e o Hamas.
Foi o começo da desunião além de geográfica, física, da Cisjordânia e da Faixa de Gaza, do Fatah, representado na Autoridade Palestina e o Hamas.
A Intifada estava dando os últimos suspiros. Porém, a paz, sem a participação efetiva do Hamas no processo inteiro de A a Z era uma noção mais do que empírica. Era e é impossível.
O ponto positivo deste mês foi o início da resistência em Bil'in à construção do muro em terras palestinas. O movimento duraria anos com manifestações pacíficas todas as sextas-feiras angariando cada vez mais simpatizantes estrangeiros, inclusive israelenses.
O ponto positivo deste mês foi o início da resistência em Bil'in à construção do muro em terras palestinas. O movimento duraria anos com manifestações pacíficas todas as sextas-feiras angariando cada vez mais simpatizantes estrangeiros, inclusive israelenses.
'Ariel Sharon is the Siamese twin of Bush and cannot move without him. It is barely conceivable that he would do anything, big or small, that would upset Bush.
Abu-Mazen, for his part, is playing va banque in the hope that Bush will help the Palestinians to cast off the occupation and establish their state.
So why did the Americans not come to Sharm? Because they are not ready to risk taking part in a process that might fail. They will come when success is assured. And today it is not.
The second absentee was Yasser Arafat.
The conference would not have taken place without his mysterious death. It deprived Sharon of the pretext to put peace in “formalin”, as described by Dov Weissglas, his closest advisor, who sat next to him throughout the conference. No Arafat, no pretext. Israeli propaganda, which worked so hard to portray Arafat as a devil, will have to toil hard to do the same to Abu Mazen.
Abu Mazen succeeded in slipping the name of Arafat into his speech, but only in an indirect way. But he – like every Palestinian – knows that it was the 45 years of Arafat’s work that laid the foundations on which Abu Mazen is now building his new strategy. Without the first intifada there would have been no Oslo , and without the second intifada there would have been no Sharm-al-Sheikh conference. Only the violent Palestinian resistance, which the Israeli army has not been able to put down, has brought Sharon to the round table.
The Israeli army knows by now that it cannot stamp out the insurgency by military means. The Palestinians have recovered their self-respect, much like the Egyptians after Yom Kippur. Many of them also believe that in his second term of office, Bush will impose withdrawal on Israel .
Incidentally, the demonization of Arafat has by no means stopped after his death. On the contrary, it goes on with great fervor. The Left and the Right in Israel , in heart-warming unity, declare in almost every article and TV talk-show that Arafat was the great obstacle to peace. Not the occupation. Not the settlements. Not the policy of Netanyahu-Barak-Sharon. Only Arafat. Fact: Arafat died and hopla – there is a conference.
The game played by Condoleezza Rice was especially amusing. She visited the Mukata’ah, where every stone shouts the name of Arafat. She did not lay a wreath on his grave – a minimal gesture of courtesy that would have won the hearts of the Palestinians. However, as a diplomatic compromise, she agreed to have her handshake with Abu Mazen photographed under the picture of Arafat.
Arafat smiled his canny smile. He surely understood.
So what was achieved at this conference?
Easier to say what was not.
The Oslo agreement failed because it did not spell out the final aim which was to be achieved after the tortuous interim stages. Arafat and Abu Mazen had a clear objective: a Palestinian State in all of the occupied territories with East Jerusalem as its capital, a return to the Green Line border (with minimal adjustments), dismantling the settlements and a practical solution to the refugee problem. The Israelis did not have the courage to define this inevitable solution, and many still dreamed about a Greater Israel .
That was a recipe for failure. And the very next day the quarrelling about every single paragraph began.
At Sharm-al-Sheikh the resolution of the conflict was not mentioned at all. Abu Mazen succeeded in slipping in some words, but Sharon did not react. This omission is very significant. It must be emphasized: Sharon did not utter a single word that does not conform with his plan of annexing 58% of the West Bank and enclosing the Palestinians in small enclaves in the rest of the territories.
The same goes for the timetable. In Oslo dates were indeed fixed, but the Israeli party had no intention of keeping to them. “There are no sacred dates,” Yitzhaq Rabin famously declared after signing the timetable.
That was a fatal mistake. Quite literally – it killed Rabin. The postponement of the solution allowed the opponents of peace the time to regain their strength, to regroup and mount the counter-attack that culminated in the assassination of Rabin. In vain did we quote to Rabin the dictum of Lloyd-George: “You cannot cross an abyss in two jumps. ”
Abu Mazen said at Sharm-al-Sheikh that this is the first step on a long road. A long road is a dangerous road. All along it the saboteurs of peace, Israelis and Palestinians, are lurking.
Moreover, one of the basic conditions for a real peace process – and perhaps the most important one – is the truthful representation of reality.
If one listened to all the speeches, one could get the impression that the root problem is “Palestinian terrorism”, and that if this stops, everything will be alright.
In the following sequence: (a) The Palestinians end their “violence”, (b) Israel stops military actions, (c) security cooperation is established and (d) God and/or Allah will take care of the rest.
Pessimists will say: Nothing came from of the conference. The cease-fire is fragile. In the best case, Sharon will fulfil his promise of withdrawing from the Gaza Strip and dismantling a few settlements. Then the trouble will start anew.
Optimists will say: This is a good beginning. The cessation of “Palestinian terrorism” will create a new atmosphere in Israel . The dismantling of the first settlements will create a crucial confrontation. The settlers and the nationalist-messianic Right will be defeated. People will realize that life can be different. The dynamics of the process will carry Sharon along and he will not be able to stop it, even if he wants to.
Who is right?' [Infelizmente, o futuro provaria que eram os pessimistas que estavam certos.]
Abu-Mazen, for his part, is playing va banque in the hope that Bush will help the Palestinians to cast off the occupation and establish their state.
So why did the Americans not come to Sharm? Because they are not ready to risk taking part in a process that might fail. They will come when success is assured. And today it is not.
The second absentee was Yasser Arafat.
The conference would not have taken place without his mysterious death. It deprived Sharon of the pretext to put peace in “formalin”, as described by Dov Weissglas, his closest advisor, who sat next to him throughout the conference. No Arafat, no pretext. Israeli propaganda, which worked so hard to portray Arafat as a devil, will have to toil hard to do the same to Abu Mazen.
Abu Mazen succeeded in slipping the name of Arafat into his speech, but only in an indirect way. But he – like every Palestinian – knows that it was the 45 years of Arafat’s work that laid the foundations on which Abu Mazen is now building his new strategy. Without the first intifada there would have been no Oslo , and without the second intifada there would have been no Sharm-al-Sheikh conference. Only the violent Palestinian resistance, which the Israeli army has not been able to put down, has brought Sharon to the round table.
The Israeli army knows by now that it cannot stamp out the insurgency by military means. The Palestinians have recovered their self-respect, much like the Egyptians after Yom Kippur. Many of them also believe that in his second term of office, Bush will impose withdrawal on Israel .
Incidentally, the demonization of Arafat has by no means stopped after his death. On the contrary, it goes on with great fervor. The Left and the Right in Israel , in heart-warming unity, declare in almost every article and TV talk-show that Arafat was the great obstacle to peace. Not the occupation. Not the settlements. Not the policy of Netanyahu-Barak-Sharon. Only Arafat. Fact: Arafat died and hopla – there is a conference.
The game played by Condoleezza Rice was especially amusing. She visited the Mukata’ah, where every stone shouts the name of Arafat. She did not lay a wreath on his grave – a minimal gesture of courtesy that would have won the hearts of the Palestinians. However, as a diplomatic compromise, she agreed to have her handshake with Abu Mazen photographed under the picture of Arafat.
Arafat smiled his canny smile. He surely understood.
So what was achieved at this conference?
Easier to say what was not.
The Oslo agreement failed because it did not spell out the final aim which was to be achieved after the tortuous interim stages. Arafat and Abu Mazen had a clear objective: a Palestinian State in all of the occupied territories with East Jerusalem as its capital, a return to the Green Line border (with minimal adjustments), dismantling the settlements and a practical solution to the refugee problem. The Israelis did not have the courage to define this inevitable solution, and many still dreamed about a Greater Israel .
That was a recipe for failure. And the very next day the quarrelling about every single paragraph began.
At Sharm-al-Sheikh the resolution of the conflict was not mentioned at all. Abu Mazen succeeded in slipping in some words, but Sharon did not react. This omission is very significant. It must be emphasized: Sharon did not utter a single word that does not conform with his plan of annexing 58% of the West Bank and enclosing the Palestinians in small enclaves in the rest of the territories.
The same goes for the timetable. In Oslo dates were indeed fixed, but the Israeli party had no intention of keeping to them. “There are no sacred dates,” Yitzhaq Rabin famously declared after signing the timetable.
That was a fatal mistake. Quite literally – it killed Rabin. The postponement of the solution allowed the opponents of peace the time to regain their strength, to regroup and mount the counter-attack that culminated in the assassination of Rabin. In vain did we quote to Rabin the dictum of Lloyd-George: “You cannot cross an abyss in two jumps. ”
Abu Mazen said at Sharm-al-Sheikh that this is the first step on a long road. A long road is a dangerous road. All along it the saboteurs of peace, Israelis and Palestinians, are lurking.
Moreover, one of the basic conditions for a real peace process – and perhaps the most important one – is the truthful representation of reality.
If one listened to all the speeches, one could get the impression that the root problem is “Palestinian terrorism”, and that if this stops, everything will be alright.
In the following sequence: (a) The Palestinians end their “violence”, (b) Israel stops military actions, (c) security cooperation is established and (d) God and/or Allah will take care of the rest.
Pessimists will say: Nothing came from of the conference. The cease-fire is fragile. In the best case, Sharon will fulfil his promise of withdrawing from the Gaza Strip and dismantling a few settlements. Then the trouble will start anew.
Optimists will say: This is a good beginning. The cessation of “Palestinian terrorism” will create a new atmosphere in Israel . The dismantling of the first settlements will create a crucial confrontation. The settlers and the nationalist-messianic Right will be defeated. People will realize that life can be different. The dynamics of the process will carry Sharon along and he will not be able to stop it, even if he wants to.
Who is right?' [Infelizmente, o futuro provaria que eram os pessimistas que estavam certos.]
Uri Avnery, 12 de fevereiro de 2005